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Soeharto, who ruled Indonesia for thirty-two years (1966-98), was born in the 
hamlet of Kemusu, twelve miles west of the court city of Yogyakarta, in June 1921. The 
product of a broken home, he lived with a succession of families and attended a string 
of primary schools before entering a schakelschool (link school), designed to connect the 
village school system, where the language of instruction was Javanese and where the 
education was rudimentary, to the parallel and infinitely more prestigious Dutch- 
language stream. Although his command of Dutch was never good, putting him at a 
disadvantage in his later career, Soeharto joined the Royal Netherlands Indies Army 
(Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger, KNIL) in 1940. As a soldier in the KNIL, he 
showed promise and was pushed through a series of good, if rushed, basic military 
training programs. He was promoted to sergeant as a powerful Japanese force invaded 
Java on March 1,1942. The Dutch surrendered a week later.
This article had its origins in research for a book that will look at the early life and 
times of former President Soeharto. Because there was a great deal of contextual 
material that is important for an understanding of Indonesian social, political, and 
military history during the Japanese occupation, it seemed worthwhile to present it 
here in a way that would allow full play to the context.
1 For their comments on drafts of this paper, I am very much indebted to Ben Anderson, Brigadier General 
Ben Bouman, Bob Elson, the late Colonel Carel Heshusius, John Legge, Ruth McVey, Jamie Mackie, 
Lieutenant General Purbo Suwondo, Ken Ward, and Yamaoka Yasuko. I also owe a special debt of 
gratitude to Ruth McVey and Ben Anderson, who generously gave me access to, or sent me items from, 
their extensive personal archives. At the same time, I owe a heavy on to Yamaoka Yasuko, who was an 
outstanding researcher and interpreter when I visited Japan in February 1999 and who conducted a series 
of invaluable follow-up interviews on my behalf, as well as locating and translating additional material.
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Part One: A Policeman for the Japanese
A Spurious Air of Normality
In the days after the Dutch surrender, Soeharto stayed on in Cisarua, West Java, a 
soldier in a defeated army, waiting to see what would happen next. As a sergeant in 
the KNIL, he assumed, not unreasonably, that he would become a prisoner of war of 
the Japanese.2 For a time nothing happened. Soeharto whiled away the hours playing 
cards, making, or so he later claimed, a handsome profit in the process. "I had only a 
guilder in my pocket, but as I played—and won—it soon grew to fifty."3 Deciding 
eventually that he had no wish to be incarcerated in a POW camp with his Dutch and 
Indonesian military comrades, Soeharto made his way to Cimahi, on the western 
outskirts of Bandung, accompanied by Amat Sudono, his closest friend in the KNIL. 
Here, they "bought some ordinary clothes" and discarded their distinctive green KNIL 
uniforms. Here, too, Soeharto encountered the Japanese army for the first time. "I was 
taking a break outside a civilian's house," he recalled. "Japanese soldiers had driven 
out the Dutchmen who had controlled us for centuries [sic]. They looked full of 
confidence and their countenances were truly frightening."4 A person of churlish 
disposition might be inclined to note that the Dutch had only been able to control 
Indonesians because they had always been able to find men like Soeharto who were 
willing to take the Queen's shilling to keep other Indonesians in their place. A more 
serious charge might be that Soeharto was now a deserter. As it happened, the 
surrender announcement of Lieutenant General Hein Ter Poorten, the ill-starred Dutch 
commander-in-chief, had declared that the KNIL had "ceased to exist," meaning that 
the Dutch colonial army had no further claims on Soeharto, or indeed on anyone else.5
In those early weeks of March 1942, Java was in a state of confusion and panic, 
powerful Japanese forces having landed at either end of the island and converged on 
Central Java in a giant pincer movement. But the Dutch were nothing if not efficient, 
and the trans-island trains were still running, lending a spurious air of normality in 
what was a period of extreme anxiety, at least for Europeans. Soeharto and Sudono 
bought tickets to Yogyakarta, which had fallen to the Japanese late on the afternoon of 
March 5, with barely any resistance from the seven-hundred-man Dutch garrison. 
Upon their arrival at Tugu station in the center of Yogyakarta, the two men heard an 
announcement, ominous in its implications, ordering all servicemen to report to an 
office in Jetis, a suburb about half a mile to the north. The idea of turning themselves in 
now had even less appeal, and they continued on to Sleman, a small town about six
2 Soeharto, My Thoughts, Words, and Deeds: An Autobiography as told to G. Dwipayana and Ramadhan K. H., ed. 
Mutiah Lestiono (Jakarta: Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada, 1989), p. 17.
3 Ibid.
4 Soeharto, "Watashi no rirekisho" [My Personal History], part 5, Nihon Keizai Shimbun, January 6,1998.
5 B. Bouman, van Driekleur tot Rood-Wit: De Indonesische officieren uit het KNIL, 1900-1950 [From Tricolor to 
Red and White: The Indonesian KNIL Officers, 1900-1950] ('s-Gravenhage: Sectie Militaire Geschiedenis, 
1995), p. 165; and written communication, Brigadier General Ben Bouman, April 9, 1998.
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miles north of Jetis. From there, they slipped away and spent a night in Sudono's 
house. The next morning Soeharto took a bus to Wonogiri and then traveled on to 
Wuryantoro, where he was taken in by his aunt and uncle.6 For the time being, he was 
relatively safe. But in Wuryantoro he had a relapse of malaria and was, or so he 
improbably claimed, bedridden for about six months.
A New Order in Java
Although they had been the unchallenged power in Java for more than 110 years 
and had made many profound changes, the Dutch had put down shallower roots than 
they liked to imagine. In Yogyakarta, as in other parts of the island, the brown- 
uniformed Japanese troops were greeted as liberators, at least initially. "When we 
arrived in Java," said Tsuchiya Kiso, a Sixteenth Army intelligence officer who was 
soon to play a key role in Soeharto's career, "all the Indonesians welcomed us ... 
Nowhere else, such as China or Manchuria, did it happen that the natives welcomed 
the Japanese occupation."7 The editor of the Japanese occupation newspaper Unabara 
(The Ocean) made the same point. "I was surprised because we were welcomed," he 
noted many years later. "We hadn't expected it. They were so fantastically 
welcoming."8 In the words of Selo Soemardjan, who was working at that time in the 
political affairs section of the Dutch police force in Yogyakarta:
We were very glad that the Dutch were driven away. So we received the 
Japanese with open arms. We welcomed them because they were liberators. 
Liberators from the colonial Dutch. I saw the Dutch running away, outside the 
city ... So we did nothing to help the Dutch. Perhaps one or two people who 
were very close to the Dutch [helped them]. But in general, nobody helped the 
Dutch. We were even glad that they had run away.9
Speaking on another occasion, Selo said, "We Javanese didn't care about the Dutch 
. . . So when the Japanese came we didn't lift a finger [to help the Dutch]. We just 
watched.10
Apart from the warmth of the welcome, the troops of the occupying army were 
struck by the fact that the Indonesians seemed, physically at least, rather similar to 
Japanese. Nor, some of the better-educated Japanese officers soon realized, was this 
some indolent South Seas backwater, as many of them had imagined. The Javanese and 
the Sundanese were sophisticated people, with ancient cultures and elaborate social 
codes. Then there was the infrastructure. The Japanese could not help but admire the 
cities and towns they found in Java. These were well planned and well laid out, with 
many imposing European buildings, some almost as large as the big buildings in 
Tokyo. There were canals and graceful, tree-lined suburban streets. It was not difficult, 
they soon discovered, to live comfortably in Java. At the same time, some Japanese 
officers, familiar with the advanced factories and shipyards of their own country,
6 Soeharto, My Thoughts, pp. 17-18.
7 Interview, Tsuchiya Kiso, Mishima, Shizuoka Prefecture, February 2,1999.
8 Interview, Kaneko Tomokazu, Tokyo, February 3,1999.
9 Interview, Selo Soemardjan, Jakarta, September 2,1997.
10 Interview, Selo Soemardjan, Jakarta, September 3,1998.
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professed to be surprised, even angry, that the Dutch had done virtually nothing to 
industrialize their Southeast Asian possession. It was true that the Dutch had built 
ports and railroads, sugar factories and irrigation canals. But that had been done, the 
Japanese were inclined to sniff, even six decades later, when all the excesses of their 
own rule were so widely known, to extract the natural resources of Java, not to help 
the Javanese themselves.
In the event, it did not take long for the warmth of the Indonesian welcome to cool. 
In some places, Japanese troops behaved with the same kind of cruelty they had shown 
in China. In the East Java junction town of Cepu, for example, troops terrorized and 
raped local women after Japanese units gained control. A more widespread problem 
stemmed from the sudden breakdown in law and order. At the time of the Dutch 
surrender, "the Indonesian masses, like a rising tide, attacked and plundered 
mercilessly the properties of the Europeans and the Chinese throughout Java," the 
Japanese commander, Lieutenant General Imamura Hitoshi, told Allied interrogators.11 
Many of those who resisted the mobs were murdered. The Japanese did not take 
kindly to lawlessness of this kind. Determined that Java be run with maximum 
efficiency in the interests of the war effort, they sent field units of the Kenpeitai, the 
notorious Military Police Corps, to restore order, an instruction the Kenpeitai carried 
out with exemplary brutality, bringing terror to many parts of the island.12
In Yogyakarta one morning in mid-1942, the Japanese rounded up a large group of 
people and forced them to watch a public execution. Indonesian prisoners, guilty of 
what crime no one knew, were tied to poles with their hands behind their backs. On a 
shouted command, Japanese soldiers ran forward and killed them with fixed bayonets. 
Some of those who had been obliged to watch spent the day vomiting.13 Nor did the 
situation improve much once order had been re-established. On the contrary, Japanese 
soldiers behaved with arrogance and cruelty, leaving the Javanese humiliated and 
deeply afraid. Selo Soemardjan's father was a low-level official in the palace of the 
Sultan. One morning, not long after the start of the occupation, he walked to work past 
Fort Vredeburg, not realizing that he was expected to stop and bow to the Japanese 
sentries. When he failed to do so, he was punched and knocked to the ground in front 
of passersby. For any Javanese, this would have been deeply humiliating. For a retainer 
of the Sultan, however lowly, it was an unbearable affront. He felt he had been 
shamed.14
During the early months of the occupation, the Japanese began to implement 
policies, devised well in advance, that were profoundly to transform the former Dutch 
East Indies. The guiding ideological principle of Japanese rule in the occupied regions 
of the Southern Area was the construction of the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
11 Interrogation of General [sic] Imamura Hitoshi, "Supplement," undated, Algemeen Rijksarchief Tweede 
Afdeling, Algemene Secretarie en de Daarbij Gedeponeerde Archieven (1942-50) [hereafter abbreviated 
ARA ASDGA], No. 5284A, pp. 53-55 (p. 1 of Allied translation).
12 For details of Kenpeitai responsibilities at the time of the Dutch surrender, see Zenkoku Kenyukai 
Rengokai Hensan Iinkai [Editorial Committee of the National Federation of Kenpeitai Veterans' 
Associations], Nihon Kenpei Seishi [The Authoritative History of the Japanese Kenpeitai] (Tokyo: 
Kenbunshoin, 1976), p. 1026.
13 Interview, Selo Soemardjan, September 2,1997.
14 Ibid.
Soeharto and the Japanese Occupation 5
Sphere."15 On the face of it, this principle implied equality among the various races and 
states in Asia, even if it was understood that Japan had cast itself in the role of 
dominant older brother. In practice, there was to be no equality and no co-prosperity. 
From the start, Japanese self-interest was paramount. Two weeks before Pearl Harbor, 
Tokyo had decided that "the supreme purpose of Japan's southward advance was the 
acquisition of resources in the Southern Area, with the main emphasis on petroleum."16 
Japan hoped to establish a self-sustaining system that would allow it to wage war and 
"form a new order in Asia centering around Japan."17 In support of that goal, the 
Sixteenth Army's propaganda department launched an intensive campaign designed 
to convince Indonesians that they and the Japanese were brothers-in-arms in the great 
struggle for the new order in Asia.18 And although the campaign was undermined by 
the inescapable evidence of Japanese cruelty and self-interest, it succeeded in feeding 
anti-Dutch sentiment.
The Japanese, it is true, did not propose to treat the Southern Area as they treated 
Taiwan, which they had annexed in 1895, or Korea, which they had annexed in 1910. In 
those colonies, old forms of government had been abolished and replaced by 
administrative systems built on Japanese lines. Nor did they want to repeat the 
mistakes they had made more recently in Manchuria and China, where brutal and 
heavy-handed Japanese occupation had alienated the population. In the South, existing 
administrative structures and staff were to be utilized to the utmost and local culture 
respected. Nevertheless, the Japanese were determined to impose careful controls on 
the people of this area. While "native inhabitants" were to be encouraged to trust the 
Japanese forces, independence movements were "not to be stimulated prematurely."19
For administrative purposes, and as a concession to the Imperial Navy, the 
Japanese had divided the Dutch East Indies into three distinct regions, with so little 
contact between them that they might as well have been three watertight 
compartments. Sumatra was placed under the Japanese Twenty-Fifth Army, after 
being linked for a time to Malaya. Java came under the Sixteenth Army. Kalimantan, 
Sulawesi, Bali, and the other islands of East Indonesia were under the control of the
15 See Kishi Koichi and Nishijima Shigetada, eds., Indonesia ni okeru Nihon gunsei no kenkyu [Research on the 
Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia] (Tokyo: Waseda University, Okuma Memorial Social 
Sciences Research Institute, Kinokuniya Shoten, 1959). An English translation of this pioneering work was 
produced in 1963 by the Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) of the US Department of Commerce. 
The material in this section is derived from the JPRS version, pp. 103-15.
16 Kishi Koichi et al., eds., Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia (JPRS), pp. 114—15.
17 The phrase "new order" is of interest. Benedict Anderson has noted that the two endlessly repeated 
slogans of the late colonial regime were rust en orde (peace and order) and opbouw (development). 
"Characteristically," he writes, "the Suharto regime simply Indonesianized these slogans in the Orde Baru 
(New Order) and pembangunan (development)." See Benedict Anderson, "Indonesian Nationalism Today 
and in the Future," New Left Review, 235 (1999): 14. It might be argued that the terminology was derivative 
in other ways as well. In 1940—41 there had been much talk about a New Order (Neues Ordnung) in Europe, 
with plans for a Reichsmark currency bloc. What was afoot, the historian Michael Burleigh has noted,
"was an old-fashioned economic imperialism, with an industrially developed core surrounded by a 
periphery producing food and raw material." See Michael Burleigh, The Third Reich, A New History 
(London: Pan Books, 2001), p. 424. It is arguable that the tainted terminology of German fascism and 
Japanese militarism became doubly derivative when Soeharto picked up the phrase "New Order" and 
applied it to his political system in 1966.
18 M. C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia Since c. 1200, 3rd Edition (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), 
p. 250.
19 Ibid., p. 107.
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Navy. The resources after which the Japanese hungered lay mainly, of course, in the 
Outer Islands. But Java was important, too, first as a source of sugar, rice, and salt, and 
later as a source of labor. Moreover, Java had to be defended against an Allied counter­
attack, which US General Douglas MacArthur was expected to launch from bases in 
northern Australia. For the economic goals to be met, Java would have to be run with 
maximum efficiency, the army brooking no opposition. Nor did the Japanese waste 
any time in making their intentions plain. On March 7, the day before the Dutch 
surrender, General Imamura, a former deputy chief of staff of the notorious Kwantung 
Army, which had run the puppet state of Manchukuo (Manchuria) as an Imperial 
Army fiefdom for the best part of a decade, issued Order No. I.20 The army, it declared, 
was setting up a military administration in the "occupied territories" in order to 
"ensure the prosperity of the inhabitants, preserve the peace, and hasten the tranquility 
and happiness of the people." The commander of the Japanese army would perform 
the functions of the governor general, but the "present machinery of government" 
would continue for the time being. That meant, in practice, that while Allied soldiers 
and Dutch policemen were detained, some fifteen thousand Dutch officials on Java 
were to remain at their desks.21
Once established, the Japanese moved to reshape the face of Java. Dutch 
businesses, plantations, and mines were taken over. Dutch banks, including the semi­
government Javaasche Bank, which issued the currency, were liquidated; henceforth, 
Japanese military currency was to be used. Commercial banking was taken over by the 
Yokohama Specie bank. A press monopoly was awarded to the Asahi Shimbun group. 
Strict censorship prevailed, in newspapers, broadcasting, and filmmaking. It became 
an offence, sometimes punished by torture or death, to listen to foreign radio 
broadcasts. All existing law courts were abolished and replaced by courts run by the 
Japanese military administration. The name Batavia was changed back to Jakarta. Even 
the calendar and the system of timekeeping changed, in line with Japanese practice 
throughout the conquered territories. The Imperial calendar, which starts with the 
mythical founding of Japan in 660 BCE, was introduced, so that 1942 became 2602. 
Henceforth, the Japanese declared, Java would operate on Tokyo time, which meant 
that the sun would rise ninety minutes later than usual (at 7:30 AM, rather than at 6:00 
AM).
Then there was the issue of communication. The Japanese faced a huge language 
problem in the East Indies. Almost no Indonesians knew any Japanese in 1942, and 
only a handful of Japanese knew any Dutch or even Malay, although some had begun 
studying rudimentary Malay on the ships carrying them south. Imamura banned the 
use of the Dutch language in schools, law courts, newspapers, letters and telegrams,
20 A translation of "Order No. 1—Operation of Military Administration," can be found in JAVINT 3131 / 4, 
SEATIC Det. HQ 23 Ind Div, 1 Feb 46, ARA ASDGA No. 5185. This was the first public notice issued by 
the Japanese in Java. It had been prepared and printed in Taiwan and was posted up everywhere behind 
the advancing troops. Although Imamura had served in the Kwantung Army, he had a broader 
background than most other army officers. In 1918, he had been posted to London as a military attache. A 
decade later, he served as a military attache in British India. See "Hitoshi Imamura," Wikipedia (accessed 
April 15, 2009). Before World War Two, few Japanese army officers visited Britain or the United States. See 
Ronald H. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan (London: Penguin, 1987), p. 38. 
Imamura's chief of staff, Okazaki Seizaburo, had commanded a garrison regiment in China in 1937-39.
21 Sato Shigeru, War, Nationalism and Peasants: Java Under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945 (Sydney: Allen 
& Unwin, 1994), pp. 22-24.
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and telephone conversations, mainly because the Japanese could not understand it. He 
did not, however, limit or prohibit people's use of the Dutch language in general.22
Nor was Imamura willing to make any concessions to the Indonesian nationalists. 
On the contrary, during the early stages of the occupation, the Japanese "restricted the 
nationalist movement to a greater extent than [had] the Dutch."23 All political parties 
were banned, all tertiary institutions closed. The Kenpeitai and the Japanese-run 
civilian police force monitored all political activity. The military administration banned 
the flying of the red-and-white Indonesian flag, insisting that the Japanese red-and- 
white flag be flown across the island. It also banned the playing of "Indonesia Raya," 
the "national" anthem. Later, it is true, the army allowed Indonesians to participate in 
a number of Japanese-sponsored mass organizations (Tiga A Movement, Putera, Jawa 
Hokokai, Masyumi) set up to mobilize support for the war effort. These bodies, which 
had no Dutch precedents, were to give the two dominant nationalist leaders, Sukarno 
and Hatta, whom the Japanese had released from internal exile, a highly visible public 
role.
Although many of the new measures were harsh, Imamura rejected the even 
harsher measures being urged on him by Tokyo and by the Southern Area Army 
Corps in Singapore.24 Having seen in China that a repressive policy aroused popular 
resentment and led to failure, and having been surprised by the enthusiastic welcome 
his troops had received in Java (that welcome, he claimed, had convinced him that the 
Indonesians and Japanese were "certainly people of the same race and common 
stock"), Imamura decided at his first staff meeting, on March 10, to adopt a "mild" 
policy.25 Priority would be given to economic reconstruction, the reestablishment of 
normal civilian life using Dutch engineers and executives and Chinese merchants and 
economic institutions, the reappointment of Indonesian officials, the reopening of 
Indonesian schools, and a strong propaganda campaign to emphasize friendship and 
cooperation.
Before long, Imamura found it necessary to modify his "mild" policy. In June, three 
months after the Japanese landings on Java, Tokyo decided to withdraw all but fifteen 
thousand of the fifty-five thousand troops on Java. Fearing an Allied attack from 
Australia and concerned about public order, Imamura believed he had no option but to 
intern all the Allied civilian nationals who remained at large.26 In April, the Japanese 
had interned about two thousand Dutch officials. Now, tens of thousands of European 
men, women, and children, including the thirteen thousand Dutch officials still at their
22 See Imamura, "Supplement," p. 2.
23 Robert Cribb, Historical Dictionary of Indonesia (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1992), p. 221, from which 
this paragraph is in part drawn.
24 Mitsuo Nakamura, "General Imamura and the Early Period of Japanese Occupation," Indonesia 10 
(October 1970): 11, on which this paragraph is largely based. (In other sources this author's name may 
appear as Nakamura Mitsuo.)
25 Imamura Hitoshi Taisho Kaikoroku [Memoirs of General Imamura Hitoshi], Volume II (Tokyo: Jiyu Ajai- 
sha, 1960), pp. 11,146-147, cited in Nakamura, "General Imamura and the Early Period of Japanese 
Occupation," pp. 10, 12.
26 Imamura "Supplement," pp. 1-2. Imamura was "keenly expecting" that Java would be the chief target 
for an attack by US and Australian forces. He was concerned that Europeans would work in concert with 
any Allied force that landed in Java and that, at the time of such an attack, Indonesians would once again 
turn on Europeans.
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desks, were sent (albeit over a twelve-month period) to civilian camps, where 
conditions were to prove deplorable and where acts of brutishness were to be more or 
less routine. The following month, Imamura informed Sukarno that Tokyo had 
decided to send a large number of Japanese civil servants to administer Java.27 As the 
months went by, indirect rule gave way in some areas to a system of direct rule not 
unlike that prevailing in Taiwan and Korea. Boatloads of Japanese civilian contract 
employees (gunzoku) disembarked, to serve as administrators, policemen, teachers, 
engineers, judicial officers, interpreters, nurses, and clerical workers. The Japanese 
even brought in errand boys and stable hands.28 Many of the newcomers had earlier 
served in Taiwan.29
In more "normal" colonial circumstances, a system of rule based on Japanese 
practices on Taiwan might have worked well enough on Java, at least in the short term. 
Taiwan was ceded to Japan, not invaded, after Japan's brief and hugely successful war 
against China in Korea. Japanese rulers were authoritarian and paternalistic, but they 
reformed the school system, modernized agriculture, and laid the basis for future 
Taiwan industrialization. These, however, were anything but normal circumstances. 
Japan was fighting by far the biggest war in its history against the immensely rich and 
powerful United States, as well as other enemies. It needed the resources of the East 
Indies, and it was prepared to go to almost any lengths to obtain them, introducing, as 
time went on, a system of forced labor and massive rice levies. As the war progressed, 
the Japanese were to exploit Java with a singularity and savagery that shocked the 
Javanese and the Sundanese. This exploitation coincided with a collapse in exports, 
brought on partly by the loss of traditional markets and partly by the depredations of 
the US Navy submarine fleet, which was soon sending scores of irreplaceable Japanese 
merchant ships to the bottom. Before long, Java's entire economy was disrupted. Not 
surprisingly, whatever honeymoon may have occurred between the Japanese and the 
Indonesians proved short-lived.
On the surface, wrote Kuroda Hidetoshi, who visited the island in late 1942, Java 
was "a paradise in the occupied areas," with an abundance of low-priced goods.30 But 
it was a paradise built on sand. The symptoms of inflation were already visible. A huge 
quantity of rice had to be imported from Malaya, where rice fields were being 
converted to the cultivation of rubber. The supply of clothing was about to run out, 
with little hope of imports from Japan. Japanese civilians were troublemakers, quick to 
get intoxicated and quick to quarrel. Japanese soldiers were worse, since they became 
arrogant. "Thus, the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was turning into a Co-
27 The aim, he said, was to coordinate the administration and the military in the expectation of defense 
operations. See Nakamura, "General Imamura and the Early Period of Japanese Occupation," p. 20. See 
also Kishi Koichi et al., eds., Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia (JPRS), p. 109, which makes the 
point that the Japanese officials were needed owing to a shortage of trained Indonesian officials and the 
difficulty of employing Dutch and Eurasians.
28 Interview, Colonel Miyamoto Shizuo, Tokyo, April 8, 1999.
29 Although a number of Japanese interviewees spoke of their earlier service in Taiwan, in no case did 
anyone refer to prior service in Korea, where Japanese rule was infinitely harsher than it was in Taiwan, 
mainly because the Koreans put up more resistance. The situation in Northern China was terrible because 
of war conditions and massive resistance. I am indebted to Ben Anderson for making this point.
30 Kuroda Hidetoshi, Gunsei [Military Government] (Tokyo: Gakufu-shoin, 1952), pp. 82-83, 219, cited in 
Nakamura, "General Imamura and the Early Period of Japanese Occupation," pp. 25-26.
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Poverty Sphere and the hearts of the indigenous people were rapidly turning against 
Japan."31
Unlike the Dutch, who had sought to advance their economic interests under a 
cloak of orderly calm, the Japanese were to pursue a policy of mass mobilization, 
hoping thereby to energize the population in the interests of the war effort. This was to 
have major consequences in the years ahead. The Japanese came to see that if they 
were to mobilize the masses of Java, they would have to use the best-known nationalist 
leaders.32 Sutan Sjahrir, a young West Sumatran nationalist, chose to remain aloof from 
the Japanese, whom he despised. But Sukarno and Hatta cooperated with them and 
were to use their positions skillfully to advance the nationalist cause, making radio 
broadcasts and addressing mass rallies, thereby building support down to the village 
level. This development was crucial and helped foster the nationalist impulse the 
Japanese had always been so eager to contain.
Becoming a Policeman
Soeharto was aware, as he lay bedridden in Wuryantoro, that he could not stay 
with his relatives once he recovered. That, he felt, would impose "an extra burden to 
those who were already struggling to make ends meet."33 Towards the end of 1942, he 
set out for Yogyakarta, hoping to find employment of some kind. In the event, there 
was no suitable work in the city for a twenty-one-year-old former KNIL sergeant. At 
loose ends, but with some money still in hand, he took a typing course in Patok, a 
densely settled district a short distance from the former Dutch governor's palace, now 
the official residence (chokan-tei) of the Japanese governor, Brigadier General 
Yamanouchi. While here, Soeharto fell ill again. "It was really a trying time, teaching 
me to be patient, the kind of self-control that I would need later." As it turned out, the 
typing courses were held in a building opposite the police station. In November 1942, 
"jobless and at a loss," Soeharto saw an announcement that the Japanese were seeking 
Indonesian police recruits. "I hesitated for a moment," he recalled, afraid the Japanese 
would discover he had been in the KNIL. That, he thought, might put paid to any 
hopes of joining the police. Worse still, it might lead to imprisonment. "Would I be safe 
in full view of the Japanese? I decided to take the risk and joined."34 At the police 
interview, Soeharto said nothing about the KNIL.
Soeharto's claim that he managed to keep the Japanese in the dark about his service 
in the KNIL seems to strain credulity. After all, the Japanese followed strict procedures 
when it came to police recruitment in their colonies and overseas territories, based on 
the experience they had gained in Taiwan. To gain admission to the police force, a 
candidate had to pass a background check, a physical examination, and an academic 
test.35 In the normal course of events, Soeharto would have been required to furnish
31 ibid.
32 Riddefe, A History of Modern Indonesia Since c. 1200, p. 251.
33 Soeharto, My Thoughts, p. 18.
34 See Soeharto, "Watashi no rireldsho"; and Soeharto, My Thoughts, p. 18.
35 See Cliing-chih Chen, "Police and Community Control Systems in the Empire," in The Japanese Colonial 
Empire, 1895—1945, ed. Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peathe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1984), p. 236.
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references—his uncle in Wuryantoro would have been one logical referee—and these 
would have been checked with great care, probably at that time by the Kenpeitai, an 
organization widely and justifiably feared, even within the Japanese army. But it seems 
that Soeharto did, indeed, pull off the deception. Many years later, a former Sixteenth 
Army intelligence officer was asked whether the Japanese police had known of 
Soeharto's service in the KNIL. "In the beginning," he replied, "they didn't know."36
Having passed this first hurdle, Soeharto was given a medical examination, which, 
to his relief, failed to detect any trace of malaria. He was then instructed to sit for an 
entrance test. In Taiwan and Korea, where almost every candidate had a thorough 
knowledge of Japanese, the exam included questions on Japanese language, 
composition, history, geography, and arithmetic.37 In Java, there was little emphasis on 
Japanese-language skill, at least for the time being, there being so few people who 
knew much Japanese. Soeharto passed the test and was signed on as a police recruit. 
He was issued a Japanese-style police uniform and a service cap that featured the 
Japanese flag. Shortly afterwards, he was sent on what was in all likelihood a rigorous 
three-month police training course. Here, if the Taiwan model is anything to go by, the 
recruits' courses would have included lessons in ethics, law, police administration, 
criminology, sanitation, fire prevention, martial arts, and military drill, as well as 
courses in the Japanese language.38 Curiously enough, it is the drilling that Soeharto 
seemed to remember most vividly. "Before long," he wrote in his autobiography, "I 
started a three-month training course. It wasn't difficult, as most of the drilling practice 
consisted of marching, similar to what I'd already experienced during my training for 
sergeant. I even passed with the highest marks. And because I was rated number one, I 
was given the job of courier and told to learn Japanese."39 This, it is worth noting, is at 
least the third time in nineteen pages that Soeharto tells his readers he ranked at the 
very top of his class in school or on some course. Nor was it the last such claim he was 
to make.
In Yogyakarta, Soeharto was to observe firsthand the dramatic changes that were 
taking place under the Japanese. As Benedict Anderson has noted, the Dutch had ruled 
in "a calm, businesslike, bourgeois style, buttressing their authority with the myths of 
white superiority, rationalism, technological prowess, and the historic world mission 
of Western civilization."40 With the defeat of the Dutch, those myths had been 
dethroned.
In their place new myths appeared—myths of spiritual power, of the ascendant 
East, and of self-sacrificing valor. The style of Japanese rule derived not from 
the utilitarian calculus of tropical capitalism, but from the military and imperial 
traditions of Japan, and from the violent and radical thought of the Young
36 Interview, Tsuchiya Kiso, February 2,1999. Although the Japanese put great store by efficiency, both in 
Japan and in occupied territories such as Taiwan and Korea, the recruitment process used in Java shows 
anything but efficiency on the part of the Japanese, who were operating under wartime conditions and 
struggling with language problems.
37 Chen, "Police and Community Control Systems," p. 236.
38 Ibid., p. 237.
39 Soeharto, My Thoughts, p. 19.
40 Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944—46 (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1972), p. 31.
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Officers of the 1930s, not a few of whom served in the Sixteenth Army in Java. 
It was a profoundly theatrical style, compounded of pageantry, military 
discipline, public violence, and inexplicable silences.41
In some ways, it might be argued, the Japanese were every bit as utilitarian and 
calculating as the Dutch when it came to exploiting the resources of Java, although the 
Japanese were to be let down by their own inefficiency, incompetence, and callous 
disregard of others. Resources were what they wanted, and resources were what they 
intended to get. Nothing was to stand in the way of that. But Anderson's observation 
eloquently captures the sense that a new power existed in the land, one which was not 
only dangerous and unpredictable, but which was shaking loose a society hitherto kept 
in a state of semi-somnolence by dour European administrators and a complacent 
native elite. It was a world in which opportunities presented themselves for young 
men like Soeharto, men who were "not propp'd by ancestry" but who were clever and 
quick to adjust to changing circumstances.
Soeharto may have stumbled by accident on the police job, which he was to hold 
for the best part of a year, rather than six months, as he later claimed.42 But as a young 
man seeking preferment, he could hardly have done better had he tried. He had not 
only moved, almost effortlessly and with only an eight-month break, from the service 
of one colonial power to that of another; he had landed a job that was to bring him to 
the attention of senior Japanese police officers in Central Java. They, in turn, would 
pass him on to important Japanese army officers, putting him back on the fast track to 
military advancement. Nor could his timing be faulted. In November 1942, the police 
force on Java was undergoing a thorough makeover.
A Deeply Unpopular Institution
Early in the twentieth century, the Dutch had moved to centralize control over 
what had hitherto been a variety of local police forces. But at the time of the Japanese 
invasion, the police force remained divided into three separate branches—the Urban 
Police (Stadspolitie), the Field Police (Veldpolitie), and the political police, or General 
Investigation Bureau (Algemeene Recherche Dienst, ARD).43 The second and third of 
these branches are of particular interest. The Veldpolitie, created in response to a 
general feeling of insecurity among Europeans, consisted of mobile units of twenty to 
sixty men, stationed in eighty-three centers in Java and Madura.44 It was expected to
41 Ibid.
42 In his memoirs, Soeharto claims that he enlisted in the volunteer army "soon after" he joined the police 
force. See: Soeharto, My Thoughts, p. 19. This is demonstrably untrue. According to an authorized 
biography, Soeharto joined the police force on November 1,1942. See O. G. Roeder, The Smiling General: 
President Soeharto of Indonesia (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1969), p. 193. He was in the police force until at 
least October 8,1943.
43 See Cribb, Historical Dictionary, pp. 375-76; Takashi Shiraishi, "A New Regime of Order: The Origin of 
Modern Surveillance Politics in Indonesia," in Southeast Asia over Three Generations: Essays Presented to 
Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, ed. James T. Siegel and Audrey R. Kahin (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Southeast Asia Program Publications), pp. 47-74; and M. Oudang, Perkembangan Kepolisian di Indonesia 
(Jakarta: Mahabarata, 1952), pp. 15-17. Oudang, a Pembantu Komisaris Besar Polisi (Assistant 
Commissioner of Police) in 1952, married a sister of Madame Soeharto.
44 See Elsbeth Locher-Scholten, "State Violence and the Police in Colonial Indonesia Circa 1920: 
Exploration of a Theme," in Roots of Violence in Indonesia: Contemporary Violence in Historical Perspective, ed.
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act as a quick response unit, supervising the roads, combating the theft of cattle and 
field crops, and arresting important criminals, thereby avoiding any need for recourse 
to military assistance.45 It was unlike a typical police force in that it was heavily armed. 
The ARD was a successor to an earlier political intelligence body, Politieke 
Inlichtingendienst (PID, Political Intelligence Bureau), which, during its brief existence 
between 1916-19, had monitored the activities of foreigners and local nationalists.46 
The ARD, still widely referred to in the 1920s and 1930s as the PID, was responsible for 
providing political intelligence to the colonial authorities; in the course of gathering 
that intelligence, it was able to intimidate many who might otherwise have created 
difficulties for the authorities.47
The Sixteenth Army Military Administration, responsible not for a vast colonial 
possession but only for the "rump" of Java, had decided to abolish the three-branch 
police system and replace it with a unified police structure, one that was highly 
centralized and quite separate from the general administration.48 These structural 
changes were accompanied by a dramatic shake-up in police personnel. In Dutch 
times, the police force had been top-heavy with European superintendents and 
inspectors, with a large number of Indonesian officers serving beneath them. After 
their lightning conquest of Java, the Japanese had disarmed and interned the Dutch 
police officers and put the restoration and maintenance of law and order in the hands 
of front-line army units, operating in conjunction with field units of the Kenpeitai. But, 
as has been noted, it was Japanese policy to keep most of the Dutch administrative 
system in place "to avoid provoking the natives by making drastic changes."49 
Indonesian policemen, even high-ranking officers who had been pro-Dutch, were 
allowed to stay on in their jobs. That meant, however, that for the first few months 
there were no senior civil police officers.50
In October 1942, a new central police department (Keimubu) in the Sixteenth Army 
Military Administration Headquarters took over the task of civilian policing from the
Freek Colombijn and J. Thomas Lindblad (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002), pp. 93-94; and Sidney tones, Rortny 
Lihawa, Santiago Villaveces-Izquierdo, and Ignatius Priambodo, "Reforming the Indonesian Police Mobile 
Brigade (BRIMOB)," Partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia, February 16, 2004, p. 6, accessed on 
October 2, 2008, at www.kemitraan.or.id/
45 Colonel C. A. Heshusius, a retired KNIL officer, has claimed that, in the Outer Islands at least, the police 
presence was small and responsibility for meeting serious challenges to public order rested with the army. 
Interview, Colonel C. A. Heshusius, Den Haag, April 23, 2001.
46 Harry A. Poeze, "Political Intelligence in the Netherlands Indies," in The Late Colonial State in Indonesia: 
Political and Economic Foundations of the Netherlands Indies, 1880-1942, ed. Robert Cribb (Leiden: KITLV 
Press, 1994), pp. 230-31.
47 Takashi Shiraishi, "A New Regime of Order," p. 71. In Yogya, as in other parts of the NEI, the political 
police kept detailed dossiers on nationalist politicians. When the )apanese came, they went to the ARD 
office, and everything there was at their disposal. Interview, Selo Soemardjan, Jakarta, September 2,1997. 
Ben Anderson has noted that the Japanese took over almost intact the ARD network of informers, which 
enabled the Japanese to roll up the underground PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia, Indonesian Communist 
Party) very fast. Personal communication.
48 See Kishi Koichi et al., eds, Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia (JPRS), pp. 138 and 177-78. For 
further details about the Japanese-run police force during the Occupation, see Oudang, Perkembangan
Kepolisian di Indonesia, pp. 32-47.
49 See Kishi Koichi et al., eds., Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia (JPRS), pp. 122-23,177. See also 
Nihon Kenpei Seishi, p. 1026.
50 Ibid.
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Kenpeitai, although the "latent leadership" of that organization continued and 
Kenpeitai officers were to intervene often in matters of military administration 
throughout the Japanese occupation.51 To fill the places formerly held by Dutchmen, 
the military authorities brought in a large number of senior Japanese civil police 
officers, most of them with long experience in Taiwan.52 These changes were not only 
to have a profound impact on police practices in Java. They meant that senior Japanese 
police officers, some of whom Soeharto was to have close contact with for the best part 
of a year, arrived in Java with fixed ideas about the maintenance of law and order, 
based on their experiences both in Japan itself and in a tightly run Japanese colony.
Although Soeharto makes no mention of the fact in his memoirs, he had joined an 
institution that was deeply unpopular.53 In the pre-war period, the police force had 
been widely feared and resented on Java, more so than the KNIL, which had tended to 
keep largely to itself. In the Princely Territory of Yogyakarta, the Dutch maintained a 
police presence in each of the six regencies (kabupaten), usually with two Dutch police 
officers stationed in an outlying regency capital, with Javanese policemen below them. 
When Selo Soemardjan was a member of the pre-war police force in Yogyakarta, 
village people tended to say that Merdeka (independence) meant there would no longer 
be a police force to make their life a misery.
Because the Dutch police force in the countryside was very much feared. 
Because they were right there in the peaceful atmosphere of the villages and 
they have their motorcycles [with their revving engines]. That thing was 
already frightening. And when they came there must be something wrong. If 
the Dutch police came at that time there must be something wrong. It must be 
... to arrest people. So [the people] were very much afraid. So much so that 
mothers said to their children, "Behave yourself! If you don't behave, I'll tell the 
Dutch police!" ... So when people said "Merdeka!,"  [they thought] "No police!" 
They called it Veldpolice [sic]. Field Police.54
For the pre-war Indonesian nationalists, a still greater problem had come in the 
guise of the Dutch political police, which maintained a network of informers and
51 Kishi Koichi et al., eds., Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia (JPRS), p. 178. In October 1944, the 
Keimubu changed its name to Chianbu.
52 If, as it appears, it was Japanese policy to recruit men who had served in Taiwan, rather than in Korea, 
then Indonesia was lucky. It should be noted, however, that the Kenpeitai recruited heavily among 
Koreans and that some of the most sadistic Kenpei were Koreans (who had been forced to take Japanese 
names). I am indebted to Ben Anderson for making this point.
53 Interview, Selo Soemardjan, Jakarta, September 2,1997. According to a perhaps less objective Japanese 
naval source, Dutch officials and police authorities had been "dreaded ... and greatly abhorred by the 
Indonesians-at-large as the direct perpetrator [sic] of exploitations." See "Appreciation of Political 
Developments by Kaigun (Japanese Navy)," Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie [hereafter 
abbreviated NIOD], Indische Collectie [IC], No. 005802-005806. This typed, five-page document, which is 
unsigned and undated, appears to have been written by Vice Admiral Maeda Tadashi, the Jakarta-based 
liaison officer between the Sixteenth Army and the naval administration in Makassar. Maeda, a senior 
Navy intelligence officer, was to play an important political role in the period before the Indonesian 
proclamation of independence. A handwritten entry at the top of the first page says, "bp 26/9/1945 opgesteld 
door Maeda" ["bp September 26,1945, drawn up by Maeda"]. R. E. Elson has questioned the claim that the 
Dutch police were deeply unpopular. Personal communication.
54 Interview, Selo Soemardjan, Jakarta, September 2,1997.
14 David Jenkins
which monitored all significant political meetings, not least in Yogyakarta, a city in 
which the nationalist flame burned with considerable intensity.55
The Japanese-run police force was even more feared than its Dutch-run 
predecessor, and with good reason. One problem was that the Kenpeitai, which had 
controlled all police functions for the first seven months, was never completely 
divested of its powers in civilian policing on Java. In the period that Soeharto spent as 
a policeman, the Kenpeitai could, and did, intervene at will in civil police matters. As 
one former Japanese army officer put it, "The Kenpeitai in Java, being under the direct 
supervision of the Sixteenth Army, was always superior to the civil police, which was 
supervised by the military administration."56
Founded by the Meiji government in 1881 to police the army and to monitor 
growing unrest among those subject to conscription, the Kenpeitai had acquired 
immense powers, both in Japan itself and in its overseas possessions.57 In occupied 
territories, the Kenpeitai "censored the press, monitored suspected subversives, 
eradicated networks of spies, and maintained an undercover surveillance of post 
offices, railway stations, hotels, schools, temples, and other public gathering places. For 
disobedient civilians, it meted out punishments that were swift and harsh."58 On Java, 
Kenpeitai officers made widespread use of their power to make arrests, to conduct 
searches, and to confiscate property. They used torture as a matter of course. In nearly 
three hundred cases they resorted to execution without trial, a practice approved by a 
subsequent Sixteenth Army commander, Lieutenant General Harada Kumakichi.
To assist it in its work, the Kenpeitai recruited and trained in Jakarta nearly one 
hundred educated young Indonesians. When the training was over, groups of five to 
ten of these men were attached to each of the main Kenpeitai units on Java. They 
served as non-commissioned officers (Kenpeiho) in the Imperial Japanese Army and 
wore Japanese uniforms and Japanese insignia. In the Kenpeitai office in Malang, for 
example, there were seven Kenpeiho. In Yogyakarta, a city with many high schools, the 
number was said to be greater. Teramoto Masashi, a Kenpeitai sergeant who was in
55 Yogyakarta was the home of two important Indies-wide institutions: the Taman Siswa school system 
and the Muhammadiyah, a modernist Islamic social and educational organization.
56 Written communication, Tsuchiya Kiso, May 29, 2002. According to a post-war study, "the police 
strongly tended to be subservient to the Military Police." Kishi Koichi et al., eds., Japanese Military 
Administration in Indonesia (JPRS), p. 180. Even within the army, the Kenpeitai cast a long shadow. When 
Sukarno and Hatta were kidnapped in August 1945 by young Indonesians demanding an immediate 
proclamation of independence, they (Sukarno and Hatta) asked Major General Nishimura Otoshi, the chief 
of the general affairs department, to ensure that the Kenpeitai would take no action against the 
kidnappers. Nishimura, one of the most senior army officers in Java, replied that he did not have 
"authority to control Kempei [sic]." See "Points of Talks" [sic], Netherlands Forces Intelligence
Service/Centrale Militaire Inlichtingendienst [hereafter NEFIS/CMI], 1942-49, Ministerie van 
Buitenlandse Zaken [hereafter BZ], No. 2016, August 16,1945, p. 3.
57 See Theodore Friend, "Hellcraft, Nostalgia, and Terror: Thoughts on Memoirs of the Kenpeitai in 
Wartime Indonesia," in The Kenpeitai in Java and Sumatra (Selections from Nihon Kenpei Seishi), trans. Barbara 
G. Shimer and Guy Hobbs (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Publication No. 65,1986), p. 12; 
and Theodore Friend, The Blue-Eyed Enemy: Japan Against the West in Java and Luzon, 1942-1945 (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 186.
58 Friend, "Hellcraft," p. 13. On Java, according to a former Kenpeitai officer, the military police had three 
central responsibilities: the maintenance of peace and safety; the prevention of Allied espionage and 
propaganda; and the suppression of those people, "including natives," who had hostile feelings towards 
the Japanese. Interview, Taniguchi Taketsugu, Tokyo, February 1,1999.
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charge of giving additional training to those Kenpeiho assigned to Solo, said, "They 
were the most capable group of young men!"59 Many Kenpeiho were from the middle 
or lower levels of the priyayi, the so-called "salaried officialdom" of Java.60 A number 
were Christians.
Kenpeiho routinely witnessed Japanese military police torturers at work, given that 
the Japanese used Kenpeiho as interpreters during the interrogation and torture of 
Indonesian prisoners. However, the Indonesian assistants were not always passive 
observers of such torture. Many were enthusiastic, and indeed sadistic, participants. 
Major General Sukotjo Tjokroatmodjo, a former deputy head of the Military Police 
Corps (1974-78), was attached to an Indonesian military police unit in East Java late in 
1945, during his cadet training. "I came away full of revulsion at what these ex- 
Kenpeiho were doing," he said.61 Their torturing was "abominable." 'They were active
59 Interview, Teramoto Masashi, Inba-mura, Chiba Prefecture, February 12,1999.
60 One prominent ex-Kenpeiho was Major General Parman Siswondo, a former medical student who was 
to serve as the commander of the Indonesian Military Police Corps (Corps Polisi Militer, CPM) between 
1950-53 and as the head of Indonesian Army intelligence from June 1962 until his death in the abortive 
coup of October 1,1965. He was attached to the Yogyakarta Kenpeitai office between 1943-45. As such, he 
would have served for a time under the brutal First Lieutenant Sato Heikichi, no doubt gaining a working 
knowledge of Kenpeitai operational methods. Parman's CV lists him as "Penterjemah [translator] 
Kenpeitai Yogyakarta 1943-45." See Harsja Bachtiar, Siapa Dia?: Perwira Tinggi Tentara Nasioml Indonesia 
Angkatan Darat (Jakarta: Djambatan, 1988), p. 238.
Seen by the Japanese as a man of ability and promise, Parman was sent to Tokyo, apparently as a 
"Grade One" Kenpei student (Kenpei Koshu Gakusei) at the Army Kenpei School. As such, he probably 
spent twelve months at the school. Given that there were practically no foreigners in the course, this was 
an extraordinary, if somewhat tainted, distinction for Parman. According to the Military Archives Library 
of the National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo, it is not possible to confirm that Parman was at the 
school. (Written communication, Kartno Naoki, June 17, 2009.1 am indebted to Ken Ward for translating 
this letter.) However, Parman's presence at the school is accepted as a fact by the authors of an official 
Indonesian Army biographical study, who seem at some pains to explain Parman's decision to join the 
Kenpeitai:
During the Japanese occupation, Parman also witnessed the cruelty of the Japanese troops, 
especially the Kenpeitai. He wanted to investigate the cruel actions of the Kenpeitai, so he did not 
hesitate to join it. Almost no one in his family supported him in this. The Kenpeitai was hated by all
the people.
Because he entered the Kenpeitai with a certain intention, he fell under Japanese suspicion. He 
was later arrested and interrogated, but was found not guilty and released. To increase his 
knowledge, he was sent to Japan to study at the Kenpei Kasya Butai [sic]. On his return to his 
homeland he continued to work for the Kenpeitai.
See "Letnan Jenderal S. Parman (1918-1965)," Biografi Pahlawan Nasional Dari Lingkungan ABBJ (Jakarta: 
Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, 1988), p. 60. There was, in fact, no Kenpei Kasya Butai; this 
appears to be a garbled reference to Kenpei Koshu Gakusai.
Several prominent Indonesian civilians who were acquainted with Parman had no idea that he had 
served with the widely feared Kenpeitai. On learning that he had, they seemed quite unconcerned, saying 
they had liked him anyway. Former military police colleagues say that Parman was not like the "average" 
Kenpeiho, who was often brutal.
Some other former Kenpeiho also rose to high office in the post-war Indonesian Army. Major General 
Suiberthus Sudarman, a Roman Catholic who served as a sergeant in the Yogyakarta Kenpeitai between 
1942M5, was the head of the Military Police Corps between 1968-72. Major General Gatot Suwagio, who 
was a member of the Kenpeitai Special Higher Police section in Jakarta, served as Inspector General of the 
Interior Ministry during 1966-67.
61 Major General Sukotjo Tjokroatmodjo, personal communication, August 18, 2009. Sukotjo said that 
although the actions of former Kenpeiho NCOs had been abominable, "as soon as they became officers, 
they behaved themselves."
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[in torturing]! Oh yes! Oh, definitely! Yes!"62 Significantly, the Indonesians who served 
in the Kenpeitai did not form a post-war association of former Kenpeiho. This was due 
to an abiding repugnance in Indonesian society over the behavior of the Japanese 
Military Police Corps. There were no such inhibitions among men who had served in 
the Japanese-sponsored volunteer self-defense force (Peta) and various other mass 
bodies set up by the Japanese. On the contrary, they were proud of their association 
with these institutions.
Throughout Soeharto's time as a policeman in Yogyakarta, the commander of the 
local Kenpeitai buntai (detatchment) was First Lieutenant Sato Heikichi.63 Sato, who 
was born in Miyagi Prefecture, north of Tokyo, in 1897, was one of the oldest 
detachment heads in the Kenpeitai. A man with a square face and a solitary manner, he 
had worked his way up from the rank of private but appears to have led a life that was 
irredeemably gloomy.64 According to Taniguchi Taketsugu, a former teacher who 
headed the Military Police detachment in Bogor (and who was afterwards sentenced to 
fifteen years in jail on war-crimes charges), Sato was an honest and affable officer who 
did not drink and who could often be found sitting cross-legged, "like people do when 
they meditate."65 To Taniguchi, "he looked like a Buddha." But there was something 
about Sato that set him apart from his colleagues. "He was a little different—in a 
negative way, if I may say so—from the buntaicho [detachment commander] pattern. 
He was conservative and deeply serious."66 According to many non-Japanese, Sato was 
a monster who did not hesitate to torture and kill his opponents. After the Japanese 
surrender, Sato was brought before a Dutch war-crimes tribunal and charged with 
"systematic terror" and the "torture of citizens."67 He was found guilty and hanged in 
1948.
62 For claims that Kenpeiho in Blitar beat detainees, especially alleged Communists, as a matter of course, 
see Soeryana, "Blitar: The Changing of the Guard," translated and annotated by David Bourchier, in Local 
Opposition and Underground Resistance to the Japanese in Java, 1942-1945, ed. Anton Lucas, Monash 
University Papers on Southeast Asia, No. 13 (Clayton, Victoria: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1986), 
pp. 283-87.
63 Sato took up his appointment in April 1942, shortly after the Japanese landings on Java, and remained in 
the post for more than two years, at which time he was transferred to Surabaya. The Kenpeitai unit in 
Yogyakarta, which controlled subunits in Purworejo and Magelang, had a staff of thirty-three to thirty-five 
Japanese. Written communication, Captain Kawano Teruaki, Military History Department, National 
Institute for Defense Studies, Tokyo, February 21,1997, based on a conversation with Taniguchi 
Taketsugu. See also "Schema van de Plaatselijke K.P.T. Djokdjakarta," ARA ASDGA, No. 5192. Additional 
information about Sato's military career and trial was provided by Rolf Utermohlen of NIOD. Written 
communication, July 14,1997. NIOD staff have been unable to locate Sato's file. No fewer than 199 of the 
538 Kenpei stationed in Java at the end of the war were convicted at the subsequent war-crimes trials in 
Jakarta. Forty received the death sentence. Only fifty-eight non-Kempei soldiers were convicted from a 
pool of twenty thousand regular army soldiers. See The Kenpeitai in Java and Sumatra, translators' preface,
P-17.
64 Interview, Taniguchi Taketsugu, Tokyo, September 5, 2003.
65 Interview, Taniguchi Taketsugu, Tokyo, February 1, 1999. Taniguchi provided additional information 
about Sato on September 5, 2003.
66 Ibid.
67 The charges related to the treatment Sato meted out to the Dutch governor of Yogyakarta, to members of 
the Roman Catholic clergy, and to employees of the Gondang Lipuro sugar mill, as well as to his 
ruthlessness in investigating the wrecking of the railway in Tugu. In Surabaya, it was said, Sato did 
nothing to curb the excesses of his subordinates. Written communication, Rolf Utermohlen, NIOD, July 14, 
1997.
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It is difficult to believe that Soeharto was unaware of Sato's practices, although 
there was, of course, nothing Soeharto could have done about them. In Yogyakarta, 
"everybody was afraid of the Kenpeitai."68 On one occasion, a subdistrict head was 
taken in for questioning at the Kenpeitai headquarters in Yogyakarta. "And they were 
cruel," one of his friends recalled. 'That's what he said. They were cruel. And I could 
believe it because he was terribly afraid. Terribly afraid to think back on the 
Kenpeitai."69 On another occasion, a subdistrict head from East Java was taken to 
Jakarta and accused of spying for the Dutch. From time to time, he was beaten. But that 
was not the worst of it. For two months he was kept naked and cross-legged on a tiled 
floor, with his face up against a wall, amid the stench of his own urine and feces.70 
Brutality of this kind generated intense hatred towards the Japanese forces. In the 
words of a Japanese army special intelligence officer who served in Java, 'The reason 
why the Kenpeitai was feared like a demon [akuma] by local people was, I believe, 
because it abused its powers."71
Within the Kenpeitai there was a Special Higher Police (Tokko-ka) section, 
sometimes known as the "thought control" police. On Java, this body had a daunting 
list of responsibilities. As well as keeping watch over the local population "and their 
attitude towards the Japanese Military Administration," it sought to learn all it could 
about the Indonesian Communist Party, the Indonesian independence movement, 
"subversive movements" within Islamic societies and religious organizations, and 
potential disturbances to public peace.72 The Tokko-ka paid particular attention to 
nationalist leaders such as Sukarno and Hatta. It also sought information on the 
political sympathies of the traditional rulers of Central Java, censored letters, and 
controlled broadcasting. The best and brightest of the young Indonesian Kenpeiho 
were attached to the Tokko-ka.73
A second reason why the Japanese-run civilian police force was much feared had to 
do with its ethos and practices. Established in the late 1800s, Japan's unified national 
police system had been likened by its founder, Kawaji Toshiyoshi, to a family "with the 
government as parents, the people as children, and the police as nursemaid."74 Not 
surprisingly, the attitude of civilian police officials towards the people had always 
been paternalistic. They were concerned, it is true, about the education and welfare of 
the people, but they also harbored "feelings of superiority and authority, with the
68 Interview, Selo Soemardjan, Jakarta, September 2,1997.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 Written communication, Tsuchiya Kiso, May 29, 2002.
72 See "Interrogation of Lieutenant Onishi Kyutaro, Glodok Jail, Batavia, May 17,1946," ARA ASDGA No. 
5280. Theodore Friend notes that the "Japanese army in general and the Kenpeitai in particular tended to 
replicate Dutch fears about communism and Islam. They distrusted them both as blind faiths, fanatical 
and unpredictable" (Friend, The Blue-Eyed Enemy, p. 206, citing Nihon Kenpei Seishi, p. 1038). For most of his 
presidency, it might be added, Soeharto was to harbor an identical fear of communism on the left and 
political Islam on the right, which allowed him to claim, conveniently but somewhat implausibly, that he 
was a man of the political center. Above all, the Kenpeitai had "supreme responsibility for army 
discipline." See Friend, The Blue-Eyed Enemy, pp. 186-87.
73 Interview, Teramoto Masashi, February 12,1999.
74 Elise K. Tipton, The Japanese Police State: The Tokko in Interwar Japan (Flonolulu, HI: University of Hawai'i 
Press, 1990), p. 47.
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expectation of obedience and submission."75 Japanese police believed that compliance 
could be obtained by force, and they had become known very early for their arrogance 
and condescension towards the public.76 The Japanese civilian police were equipped 
with pervasive powers and not shy about using torture. Nor did the police concern 
themselves solely with routine law-and-order matters. At the apex of the civilian police 
structure was the Special Higher Police (Tokubetsu Koto Keisatsu, or Tokko) section, 
which had functions broadly similar to those enjoyed by the Tokko division within the 
Kenpeitai.77 Inspired partly by the police and prison systems in nineteenth-century 
France but partly, too, by the administrative practices of the British colonial police in 
East Asia, the Tokko had carved out a place in Japan as the most important and 
prestigious branch of the police force, with sweeping powers over political 
organizations, public meetings, and newspaper censorship.78
Japanese civil police officers had, if anything, become even more arrogant and 
authoritarian when they found themselves dealing with non-Japanese people. On 
Taiwan, which was seen in Tokyo as a model for policing in Japanese colonies and 
occupied territories, the police force was "highly centralized and widely dispersed in 
the countryside, with awesome authority to manage and to intervene in the life of the 
Chinese."79 As "enforcers of law and defenders of colonial public order, the police 
officers censored publications, supervised public rallies, controlled firearms and 
explosives, rendered summary judgment in minor criminal cases, curbed illegal entry 
of laborers, kept domiciliary records, managed fire prevention, supervised pawn 
shops, bathhouses, hotels, restaurants, slaughterhouses, licensed prostitution, 
administered sanitation matters," and so on.80 They also helped local governments 
with tax collection and with the construction and maintenance of roads, enforcement of
75 Ibid., p. 48.
76 Ibid., pp. 48-49.
77 This elite unit had the mission of protecting the kokutai, Japan's ostensibly unique "national structure," 
through "the proper guidance of thought" (see Tipton, The Japanese Police State, p. 153). During the 1930s, 
the Tokko had dealt ruthlessly with left-wing and labor groups, while fighting a rearguard and 
increasingly unequal battle with the Kenpeitai, which was interfering more and more in civil police 
matters. Nor was Java spared the attentions of the Japanese political police. A Tokko division was set up in 
Jakarta, with a branch in Yogyakarta.
The Kenpeitai had three divisions, namely, Tokko, Keimu (police affairs), and Shomu (general affairs.) 
Organizationally, the Kenpeitai belonged to the Ministry of the Army (Rikugun-sho), while the police 
reported to the Minister of Internal Affairs (Naimu-sho). According to a former Kenpeitai officer who 
served in Java, in Japan the main task of the Kenpeitai's Tokko section was the control (torishimari) of spies 
(ichoja) and cabals (inbodan) from outside Japan. The Tokko section of the civil police, on the other hand, 
concentrated on identifying communists. However, in overseas territories such as Java, he said, the two 
groups had more or less the same function. Nevertheless, the Kenpeitai chief was higher than the police 
chief and could give orders to the latter. Telephone interview with Taniguchi Taketsugu, May 13, 2003.
78 It has been argued that the Tokko drew its inspiration from Joseph Fouche, the former terrorist and 
intriguer who founded Napoleon's political police. See Tipton, The Japanese Police State, p. 45, citing Brian 
Chapman, Police State (New York, NY: Praeger, 1970), pp. 27-29. However, as Umemori Naoyuki has 
shown, the Meiji government sent officials not only to European countries but also to British colonial East 
Asia (Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Singapore) to research their police and prison systems. The institutions 
and practices of the Metropolitan Police Office were influenced by the practices of the British colonial 
police in several important aspects. See Umemori Naoyuki, "Modernization through Colonial Mediations: 
The Establishment of the Police and Prison System in Meiji Japan" (PhD dissertation, The University of 
Chicago, 2002), pp. 13-14.
79 Chen, "Police and Community Control Systems," p. 218.
80 Ibid., p. 227.
Soeharto and the Japanese Occupation 19
public health measures, management of irrigation and water control, promotion of 
industry, cultivation of crops, and recruitment of colonial laborers and military 
volunteers. Nothing, it seemed, escaped their attention or was beyond their control.81 
In short, the police were "the hands and feet of the governor-general in direct contact 
with the people."82 On Taiwan, said Koizumi Saburo, a Japanese police inspector who 
had served on the island before his appointment as chief of the Special Higher Police 
section in Yogyakarta, the police were almighty and did everything.83
It was hardly surprising, then, that the Japanese civil police officers who came to 
Java brought with them not just the paternalistic assumptions that were common 
among all Japanese police officers, but also the top-down approach of a tightly run 
Japanese colony. "We thought sending policemen from Japanese-occupied Taiwan was 
a good idea because they were experienced in dealing with people from other 
cultures," said Colonel Miyamoto Shizuo, who was a senior staff officer at Sixteenth 
Army headquarters in the latter part of the war. "But in hindsight, it would have been 
better if we had chosen people who were new and fresh. Those policemen from 
Taiwan were already full of preconceptions about the people under Japan's colonial 
rule. They had learned to look down on the natives before they were posted to Java. 
Had they not been from Taiwan, the consequences of Japanese occupation in Java 
could have been different, could have been better."84
The Japanese wasted little time in putting their distinctive—and frequently harsh— 
stamp on civil police practices in Java. They took over the Dutch colonial police school 
at Sukabumi, in West Java, and established, in each residency, a permanent course for 
the training of police personnel.85 They conducted regular propaganda courses to 
imbue those already in the service "with the Greater East Asia ideals" and to impress 
on them the might of Japanese power. "As a result of this propaganda," a post-war 
Dutch report noted,
the police force soon changed in outlook and behaviour. The Japanese system
of corporal maltreatment, administered on the spot or at the police station, for
81 It was the police who directed the planting of sunflowers alongside roadways when the Japanese 
governor-general decided to promote the production of quality sunflower oil. It was the police who 
ordered unwilling villagers to cut down their bamboo thickets when the governor-general decided that it 
was important to eliminate mosquitoes. According to Koizumi Saburo, the police could have left the job to 
specialists, but people would not cooperate unless they were forced to by policemen (omawarisan). Indeed, 
on Taiwan the policeman was all-powerful. Koizumi said, "I doubt if Taiwanese liked us from the bottom 
of their hearts. But, anyway, Japanese policemen in Taiwan in my day were treated like celebrities in each 
community. We were often invited to a wedding reception of local people, too." For all that, Koizumi 
"didn't see much in common between policing in Taiwan and Yogya except that both Taiwanese and 
Javanese seemed obedient." Koizumi Saburo, telephone interview, June 13, 1999. Koizumi arrived from 
Taiwan in early 1944 to become chief of the Special Higher Police section of the Yogyakarta Princely 
Territory civil police department. For details of Japanese policing methods in Taiwan, see Chen, "Police 
and Community Control Systems," pp. 213-19.
82 Ibid., p. 239.
83 Interview, Koizumi Saburo, June 13, 1999.
84 Interview, Miyamoto Shizuo, April 8, 1999.
85 "The Japanese Occupation of the Netherlands Indies, prepared statement of K. A. de Weerd, Attorney - 
at-Law, Major RNIA, International Prosecution Section, Netherlands Division," November 1946, The 
National Archives of the UK/ Public Record Office [hereafter TNA: PRO], WO 325/111, p. 39. Major Klaas 
de Weerd, who had practiced law in East Java, Bali, Southeast Borneo [Kalimantan], and North Sumatra 
between 1929-41, was a reserve officer in the KNIL. He spent the war as a POW in West Java.
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the settlement of a minor infraction and thereby sidestepping further legal 
procedure, was introduced. Maltreatment as a punishment for insignificant 
offences could be witnessed daily in the streets. The legally powerless position 
of the population was thereby clearly demonstrated ... Moral standards of the 
police force were seriously shaken by this training. Examples set by the Kempei 
[s/c] in the maltreatment of defenceless suspects were emulated by a certain 
section of the Indonesian Police Force.86
Nor was the civilian police force lacking in resources. As well as its uniformed and 
plainclothes officers, the Tokko section of the civilian police force had a Special Police 
Strike Force (Tokubetsu Keisatsutai) with one company in each regency on Java and 
under the command of the regency police chief.87 Each company had between 60 and 
150 personnel, with more in the major cities. Well-trained and well-equipped, with 
carbines, machine guns, and armored vehicles, these units were designed to respond to 
any major threat to security, including demonstrations, riots, and armed robbery.88 
They also had a combat capacity.89 Beyond this, senior police officers controlled a 1.3- 
million-strong Civil Defense Corps (Keibodan), which was in effect an auxiliary police 
force with a presence in every village and municipality. The Keibodan was designed to 
counter enemy espionage activities, to serve as an air and coast watch, and to 
investigate robberies and other crimes.
The Japanese may have abolished the three-branch police system operated by the 
Dutch, but the abolition was more apparent than real. In the blink of an eye, the 
powers and responsibilities of those three branches had been replicated, and vastly 
expanded, in the Keimubu, especially in its Tokko section, with its sweeping powers of 
surveillance and its Special Police Strike Force. In short, Soeharto was entering a world
86 "The Japanese Occupation of the Netherlands Indies, prepared statement of K. A. de Weerd," p. 39.
87 The strike force was set up in April 1944. For details, see Situs Brimob Polri, 0.1 Sejarah Brimob, 
http: / /brimobpolri.wordpress.com/sejarah-brimob/ (accessed on October 2, 2008); M. Oudang, 
Perkembangan Kepolisian di Indonesia (Jakarta: Mahabarata, 1952), pp. 46-47; and Jones et al., "Reforming the 
Indonesian Police Mobile Brigade (BRIMOB)," p. 6. The details in the main text about the Tokubetsu 
Keisatsutai arsenal and duties are from the Brimob Polri site.
A number of Indonesians who had earlier served in the KNIL joined the normal civilian police force 
or the Tokubetsu Keisatsutai. One of them was Major General R. M. Soerjosoerarso, an aristocrat from the 
Mangkunegaran court who had attended the Royal Military Academy (Koninklijke Militaire Academie, 
KMA) at Breda in the Netherlands. Another was Lieutenant General A. J. Mokoginta, who had attended 
the KMA in Bandung.
88 The heavily armed mobile units of the Japanese-era Special Higher Police became, after the proclamation 
of independence in 1945, the Indonesian Special Police (Pasukan Polisi Istimewa), evolving, in 1946, into 
the Police Mobile Brigade (MOBRIG, later BRIMOB). To this day, BRIMOB is used primarily for military- 
type operations. It is not known whether the Polisi Istimewa and its successors inherited the unique and 
all-embracing powers of the Tokko section of the Japanese civilian police force or just those of its well- 
equipped mobile strike force. It has been suggested that today's BRIMOB is in some ways the direct heir of 
the NEI Veldpolitie; see Jones et al., "Reforming the Indonesian Police Mobile Brigade (BRIMOB)," p. 6. It 
is quite likely that the Dutch-era Field Police was, institutionally, a forebear of BRIMOB. But in terms of 
police practices, the Japanese lineage appears to be of greater significance. Although the Field Police was 
well-armed, it was set up to deal with criminal activity. The Tokubetsu Keisatsutai was given combat 
training, and during the Revolution, Special Police units performed as well as normal army infantry units. 
In practice, BRIMOB traces its descent from the powerful and repressive Japanese-era Special Police Strike 
Force in much the same way that the Indonesian Army's Military Police Corps (CPM) traces its lineage 
back in some ways to both the Yugekitai, the Japanese-sponsored Special Guerrilla Force, and to the 
Kenpeitai.
89 Lieutenant General Purbo Suwondo, personal communication, April 22, 2009.
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in which discipline was rigid, brutality a fact of life, paternalism taken for granted, and 
police influence all pervasive.
A Claim Greeted with Disbelief and Derision
Not long after he began his career as a policeman, Soeharto was "assigned as 
assistant [toban] to the Japanese police chief" in Yogyakarta,90 serving, it has been 
suggested, "almost like a secretary" to him.91 With obvious pride and probably no 
exaggeration, the future president recalled that his new boss had informed him his 
"entrance test score and attitude had been rated the best among all applicants."92 In 
Yogyakarta at that time there were, in fact, two Japanese civil police "chiefs," operating 
at different levels. One of them, Lieutenant Colonel Takeoka Kenji, a mild-mannered 
man who had once been a senior official in the Japanese Internal Affairs Ministry, was 
the head of the police department (keisatsu bucho) of the entire Princely Territory of 
Yogyakarta.93 As such, he was one of three important officers immediately under 
General Yamanouchi, a seasoned bureaucrat who had once governed a Japanese 
prefecture. The other police chief, one of about ten police station commanders (keisatsu 
shocho) under Takeoka, was Superintendent (Keishi) Okamoto Juko, who was 
responsible for police matters within the city of Yogyakarta itself.94
Soeharto provides no details about the office in which he worked. Nor does he 
name the man for whom he worked. But a careful review of the evidence suggests that 
he served as an assistant to Okamoto, an experienced and deeply serious man who, 
from his headquarters in central Yogyakarta, presided with great watchfulness over 
the affairs of numerous police substations.95 A native of Okayama Prefecture in 
southwest Honshu, Okamoto had come to Java directly from Taiwan, as had so many 
of his Japanese police colleagues. He was nearly fifty years old, which meant that he 
was almost two and a half times Soeharto's age, and he seems to have been impressed 
by his young Javanese assistant, who was polite and clever and quick to learn.96
Soeharto would have learned much from his time as an assistant to such a senior 
police officer. He would have gained an insight into everyday Japanese police 
practices, which were not only far-reaching but closely supervised, with swift
90 Soeharto, "Watashi no rirekisho."
91 Interview, Tsuchiya Kiso, February 2,1999. There must have been at least one Japanese secretary as well.
92 Soeharto, "Watashi no rirekisho." As noted in footnote 39, Soeharto also mentioned this in his 
autobiography.
93 Telephone interviews, Lieutenant Colonel Uchida Takefumi, February 12,1999, and September 5, 2003.
A former judge of the Yokaichiba District Court in Chiba Prefecture, Uchida was the head of the police 
department in the Yogyakarta Princely Territory from April 1944 until the end of the war, having 
succeeded Takeoka Kenji. Uchida was not aware in 1999 that Soeharto had once worked as a policeman in 
Yogyakarta. Nor did Takeoka, whom Uchida met for the first time at post-war gatherings of the Jawa no 
kai (Java Society), ever mention Soeharto's name. Former civilian police officers, most of whom had served 
in Taiwan, were given military rank before they took up their new positions in the civilian police force in 
Java.
94 Other major police stations were in towns such as Wates and Wonosari.
95 According to Tsuchiya, "Soeharto was a policeman [keisatsukan] working under the Japanese police 
station commander [keisatsu shocho]." I am indebted to Yamaoka Yasuko for her help in establishing the 
police chain of command in Yogyakarta at this time.
96 The details of Okamoto's career come from the February 12,1999, interview with Uchida Takefumi.
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disciplinary action taken against those guilty of conduct "damaging police honor and 
public confidence in the police."97 He would have observed the arrogance and almost 
casual brutality of Japanese police officers, who beat and tortured suspects as a matter 
of course. He would have learned something about the seamier aspects of local society 
and come to know a good deal about those who made their living on the wrong side of 
the law. Nor could he have avoided learning something of the practices of the 
Kenpeitai, an organization that outdid the civil police when it came to using torture to 
extract information. He would no doubt have watched with some interest the 
bureaucractic struggles between the Kenpeitai and the civil police, struggles in which 
the military police always held the upper hand.
In later years, Soeharto appeared to suggest that he had attained the rank of 
assistant police inspector (keibuho) under the Japanese. This claim, which was accepted 
and repeated by many writers, is so extraordinary that it raises serious questions about 
his credibility.98 Keibuho was the fourth rank up the promotional ladder, after 
policeman (junsa), senior policeman (junsacho), and police sergeant (junsabucho). In 
Japan, assistant inspector was a rank open only to a police officer with many years' 
experience or to a young man with a university degree, almost invariably from Tokyo 
Imperial University.99 It was not a rank that would have been lightly awarded to a 
twenty-one-year-old Javanese who had never even started, let alone finished, junior 
high school, and who had only limited work experience. It is true that one or two 
Indonesian policemen did become assistant inspectors under the Japanese, but they 
were educated men, usually well into their thirties or forties, who had held responsible 
positions in the Dutch colonial police force. One such man was Assistant Inspector 
Soedarsono, who would, within three years, become Soeharto's immediate superior in 
the post-war Indonesian army; he served as a member of the Special Higher Police 
(Tokko) section in Yogya.100
There are strong grounds for believing that Soeharto did not reach the rank of 
assistant inspector, and his apparent claim that he did has been greeted with disbelief 
and derision by former Kenpeitai and Japanese civilian police officers who served in 
Java. According to Taniguchi Taketsugu, the former chief of the Bogor Kenpeitai, it is 
"almost unthinkable [kangaerarenai] ... hard to imagine" that an Indonesian in his early 
twenties could have achieved such a rank.101 An identical view is expressed by 
Teramoto Masashi, a former Kenpei sergeant in Solo. "I don't recall any Indonesian in 
the number-two position in the Yogya police being given the title of keibuho in the
97 Chen, "Police and Community Control Systems," p. 238.
98 In his biography of Soeharto, Robert Elson writes that Soeharto carried out his police duties "apparently 
at the rank of keibuho." See R. E. Elson, Suharto, A Political Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), p. 9.
99 Tipton, The Japanese Police State, pp. 98-100.
100 Koizumi Saburo interview, June 13,1999. Koizumi, a former police inspector (keibu) in Yogyakarta, 
worked closely with Soedarsono. Soeharto was ordered to arrest Soedarsono at the time of the July 3 
Affair in 1946. Another man, who went even further, was a Javanese officer who also happened to be 
named Soeharto. According to a former Japanese chief of police in the Princely Territory of Yogyakarta, 
there was "a very capable Indonesian police officer everyone called Soeharto Keibu (Inspector Soeharto), 
who worked in the Yogya police station." However, this was "definitely not the same Soeharto who later 
became the president, for he was at that time already thirty-seven to forty years old." Interview,
Lieutenant Colonel Uchida Takefumi, February 12,1999.
101 Interview, Taniguchi Taketsugu, Tokyo, February 1,1999.
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Japanese sense of the term," he said. "It is unthinkable."102 Koizumi Saburo, a former 
police inspector in Yogyakarta, is of the same opinion. As he put it, "I don't think there 
were very many Indonesian keibuho in those days."103 Tsuchiya Kiso, a former head of 
the Yogyakarta branch of Beppan, the Sixteenth Army's special intelligence section, 
and the man who was later to recruit Soeharto into the Japanese-sponsored volunteer 
army from the police force, does not recall the rank the future president held at that 
time. But he shares the skepticism of his former colleagues. "I think assistant inspector 
is pretty high up the ladder," Tsuchiya noted. "Even a Japanese has to start off as a 
policeman before becoming a senior policeman and then assistant inspector. If he really 
were an assistant inspector, he would have been the youngest. There are few twenty- 
year-old keibuho in the Japanese police force. None! If you are twenty, you can't be 
anything more than a policeman."104 All the same, Tsuchiya is unwilling to rule out the 
possibility that Soeharto may have held such rank. Soeharto, "because he was very 
capable," had been appointed deputy director (fukukan) very quickly, and it was not 
impossible that he had been given the rank of keibuho. Although it was "pretty 
unlikely" that a man of Soeharto's age was made an assistant inspector, his Japanese 
superior "had the rank of superintendent, a rank above inspector. So it is possible that 
[Soeharto] was keibuho. I suspect his boss may have wanted his secretary to be not just 
a policeman, so it is possible he made him keibuho and gave him this exceptional 
promotion."
As it happens, Soeharto's critics may have judged him unfairly on this point. 
Soeharto may not have intended to claim that he held such a rank under the Japanese. 
A close reading of the relevant material suggests that a misunderstanding may have 
arisen, because, by 1969, the president seems to have been laboring under the 
extraordinary delusion that the word "keibuho" was the name of the Japanese 
occupation police force, rather than simply a Japanese police rank.105 It is possible that 
Soeharto, and the others who seem to have taken their lead from him without 
checking, somehow mistook the word keibuho for keimubu (police department). If this 
explanation is correct, then Soeharto should be seen not as a man who was willing to 
claim an elevated rank to which he was not entitled but as someone whose normally 
prodigious memory had simply let him down and who had surprisingly little interest 
in fact-checking.
102 Interview, Teramoto Masashi, February 12,1999.
103 Koizumi Saburo interview, June 13,1999.
104 Interview, Tsuchiya Kiso, February 2,1999.
105 There is evidence for this view in Roeder, The Smiling General. Roeder says (p. 96) that Soeharto enlisted 
as a volunteer "in the Japanese-sponsored police force, KEIBUHO." An official curriculum vitae published 
during Soeharto's presidency said that in 1942 Soeharto joined the "police (Keibuho) in Yogyakarta." See 
Almanak "Antara," 78/79, Edisi Ke-III, 1978/1979 (Jakarta: Antara, [1978?]), p. 79. In his 1988 autobiography, 
Soeharto wrote that he saw an announcement that "Keibuho, the police" wanted new recruits (see 
Soeharto, My Thoughts, p. 18; in the Indonesian-language version, Pikiran, Ucapan, dan Tindakan Saya, on 
page 22, Soeharto writes "bahwa Keibuho, Polisi, menerima anggota baru"). See also Hasja W. Bachtiar, Siapa 
Dia?, p. 341.
24 David Jenkins
"The Indonesians are Swaggering About"
As Superintendent Okamoto tightened Japanese police control over everyday 
Yogyakarta life from his office on Kantoorlaan (now Jalan Reksobayan), attended by 
his diligent young Javanese assistant, two Japanese army officers were presiding over 
the local branches of separate, and mutually hostile, military agencies. One of those 
officers was First Lieutenant Sato, the head of the local Kenpeitai branch. The other 
was First Lieutenant Tsuchiya Kiso, the local Beppan head. In much the same manner 
as his military and civilian police counterparts, Tsuchiya was building up a network of 
Javanese spies and informers in the city and in the areas beyond, paying particular 
attention to developments within the Kraton (Royal Palace) of the Sultan. The Japanese 
were nothing if not watchful, as the Dutch had been before them and as the Soeharto 
government would be in the future. On Java, three intensely competitive bodies—the 
Kenpeitai, the civilian police force, and Beppan—were now running networks of 
Indonesian informers and gathering information, much of it mundane.
First Lieutenant Tsuchiya Kiso in uniform.
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After the Japanese landings on Java, Beppan had been given the task of monitoring 
political, social, and economic conditions. To this end, it set up offices in Jakarta, 
Bandung, Yogyakarta, and Surabaya, each of which filed monthly reports to army 
headquarters. These reports, a few of which survive in an archive building on one of 
Amsterdam's most elegant canals, are written in a telegraphic style that is sometimes 
irritatingly oblique.106 But they provide a revealing—and surprisingly frank—picture of 
conditions in the turbulent world of occupied Java at a time when Soeharto was a 
member of the Japanese-run police force. In April 1943, a year into the occupation, 
Beppan had mixed news for Sixteenth Army headquarters. Some developments were 
positive. "Under the leadership of the Japanese," the Bandung office reported, 
"progress is noticeable daily, and there is cause for satisfaction in the fact that they 
[Indonesians] now regard the Dutch rule in NEI as a thing of the past."107 Sukarno was 
playing an increasingly important role and had become "head man in control of 
concentration and movements and more confidence is being placed in him." But there 
was bad news, too. The "lower classes" were worried about the high cost of living. The 
drivers of becaks (pedicabs) and horse-drawn vehicles were complaining of the 
difficulty of earning their livelihood now that all Dutch citizens had been interned. 
Some Muslims were "still not burying their dead with the top pointing to Tokyo and 
the bottom to Mecca."108 "Lower-class police officials" were complaining that they 
would have to be promoted to compensate for recent pay cuts. Corrupt practices were 
creeping in. Some of the police were "abusing their powers and doing unfair things."
There were problems, too, with the ethnic Chinese. According to Beppan, the 
Chinese were jealous of the progress made in all ways by the Indonesians and did not 
like being treated as enemy aliens. "The Indonesians are swaggering about saying they 
are the spearhead of the Japanese, but [the Chinese are saying] we Chinese are nearer 
to the Japanese in speech and everything ... They do not like their children to be 
educated with Indonesian children ..." For their part, the Europeans and Eurasians 
remained deeply hostile towards the Japanese. Dutch women in the internment camps 
had been having great difficulty getting food and had been spreading anti-Japanese 
propaganda. Eurasian women were saying that "when they have no money to buy 
food they will be forced to sacrifice their chastity." Many Eurasians were insulting the 
Japanese flag. "It is regretted," Beppan reported somberly, "that a Japanese flag was 
found being used in the W.C. of a Eurasian house [that was] searched ... The practice 
of calling Japanese 'monkeys' has sprung up lately." Eurasians were saying that there 
was "no need to hoist the Japanese flag as the Japanese Occupation of Java will not last 
forever and they will be defeated ..." With no reliable information in the strictly 
censored newspapers, rumors gained a life of their own, many of them conveying a 
sense that the Japanese war effort was in trouble. Beppan noted these rumors carefully: 
there was an acute shortage of materials in Japan; the defeat of the Japanese army was
106 The documents are to be found in the Indische Collectie of the Nederlands Instituut voor 
Oorlogsdocumentatie on Herengracht. Copies of some of these documents are also held at the Algemeen 
Rijksarchief in The Hague.
107 "Staff Beppan Isum for April. 30 April, 1943. Bandung branch of Beppan," JAVINT 3117/14, SEATIC 
Det. 23 Ind. Div., 28 Nov. 1945. ARA ASDGA No. 5197, p. 1.
108 Ibid., p. 2. The Japanese do not appear to have widely pushed these burial instructions, which would 
have produced a furor wherever they were introduced. Muslim dead should be buried with their face 
towards Mecca.
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imminent; the British and Americans would certainly attack; the German army had 
been defeated [presumably at Stalingrad, in February]; the Japanese army has been 
"defeated" in Burma.109
On April 29, 1943, Soeharto would have joined Japanese and Indonesian police 
officers in celebrations marking the forty-second birthday of Emperor Hirohito. But the 
event does not seem to have greatly moved those living in the cities and towns of Java. 
"The customary celebrations of the Emperor's birthday were carried out, and were 
everywhere on a reduced scale, the only people showing any great enthusiasm being 
villagers," the Bandung office noted.110
Fourteen months after the Dutch surrender, life on Java was harsh and getting 
harsher. Those foolish enough to complain could be picked up, either by the Kenpeitai 
or the civilian police. They could be beaten or tortured. Some were killed. Soeharto was 
deeply embedded in the police force at this time, perhaps by now having no choice in 
the matter. In less than six months, however, the Japanese were to recruit and train 
men for a new self-defense force on Java. When that time came, Soeharto decided to 
apply for selection as an officer cadet.
Part Two: A Soldier for the Japanese Army
"The Whole Island was Ablaze with Enthusiasm"
On Friday October 8, 1943, on the advice of his Japanese superior, Superintendent 
Okamoto, Soeharto presented himself at a temporary army recruitment center in 
Yogyakarta.111 Wearing a kain, white shirt, and sandals, rather than his police uniform, 
he joined about four hundred other young men who had gathered on the grounds of 
an elementary school in the heart of the city.112 The Sixteenth Army had decided to set
109 "Staff Beppan Isum," April 1943.
110 Ibid. The report added, almost in passing, what is probably one of the earliest surviving references to 
the wartime practice of enforced prostitution (sexual slavery) carried out by both the Imperial Army and 
the Imperial Navy, under which more than 100,000 "comfort women" were sent to officially approved 
brothels across Asia.
April 29: Emperor's Birthday. Great congratulation ceremony. Meeting to urge complete destruction 
of England and America. Show put on by native women, comforts [sic] girls of the Army, Hospital 
and Army comforts girls." (See "Staff Beppan Isum," April 1943, p. 1.)
Japan's so-called "comfort stations" were supervised by the Kenpeitai.
111 Soeharto makes it clear that he was "advised" (susumerareta) by his police superior to apply to join the 
self-defense force. Soeharto, "Watashi no rirekisho," Part 5, January 6,1998.
112 That, at least, is what Tsuchiya Kiso, the Japanese army officer who recruited Soeharto that day, 
remembers him wearing. Soeharto, he feels certain, was not wearing his police uniform (Tsuchiya Kiso, 
personal communication). How reliable is Tsuchiya's memory, both on minor matters such as this and on 
matters of substance? In a series of interviews, and in subsequent correspondence, Tsuchiya came across 
as an intelligent, objective, and honest man, proud in an understated way of the role that he and his 
colleagues had played in forging an Indonesian self-defense force, but with no wish to overstate the case 
or downplay negative aspects of the Japanese occupation or, indeed, his wartime disagreements with
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up a volunteer self-defense force on Java to augment its own overstretched units, and it 
was looking for officer cadets. Soeharto was determined to be a part of the new body.
Some of those waiting to be interviewed that day had impressive credentials; they 
came from a priyayi background and had attended Dutch high schools, some of them 
quite prestigious. These applicants were relatively healthy, well-fed and well-dressed. 
They included schoolteachers, policemen, public servants, and high school students. 
Others who waited patiently in the sun were less well qualified for the positions on 
offer. Most were barefoot. Many were in poor health (the most common medical 
complaints were skin diseases and TB). Many had only the most rudimentary 
education. Inside the hall, where they were called in one at a time, a twenty-six-year- 
old Japanese intelligence officer, First Lieutenant Tsuchiya Kiso, sat at a table choosing 
officer cadets for the new force. Tsuchiya and his superiors had already consulted 
widely, seeking the names of potential recruits, and some of those waiting in the 
courtyard bore letters of recommendation from Japanese or Indonesian officials. But 
there were many men who came forward of their own volition, fired by a sense that 
this was a defining moment in the nationalist struggle. As Tsuchiya recalled:
The whole island of Java was ablaze with enthusiam after the Japanese military 
commander announced that the Peta [Pembela Tanah Air, Defenders of the 
Fatherland, or Java Volunteer Defense Force] was being organized and everybody, 
the young and the old, was so willing to defend the country that a lot of people 
came to apply without much effort on our part.113
The men Tsuchiya chose in Yogyakarta that day, and in other cities over the next 
nine days, would form the core of what was to become in time the powerful Central 
Java Diponegoro Division. A number of them, including Soeharto, were to play a key 
role, too, in the post-war Indonesian National Army (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, 
TNI).
A Dilemma for the Japanese
The Japanese had had much to celebrate in the days after the Sixteenth Army 
landed in Java in March 1942. The island at the heart of the Dutch East Indies had 
fallen into their hands after a land campaign lasting a mere eight days. Elsewhere, the 
forces of the Imperial Army and the Imperial Navy were carrying all before them, from 
the Andaman Islands in the Bay of Bengal to the Solomon Islands in the South Pacific.
fellow Japanese officers. His memory proved to be excellent on matters of substance that are easily cross­
checked. After the war, Tsuchiya was arrested by the Allies and interrogated at length. The detailed 
account he provided in 1999, when he was eighty-two, and in subsequent years, is remarkably consistent 
with the account he gave Allied interrogators in 1945-47. It is in accordance, too, with the picture that 
emerges from Morimoto Takeshi, ]awa boei giyugun-shi [History of the Java Volunteer Defense Force] 
(Tokyo: Ryukeishosha, 1992), the 783-page semi-official Japanese history of the Indonesian self-defense 
corps, and with the memories of a significant number of Indonesian officers who served in that force. At 
the same time, Tsuchiya readily acknowledged in 1999 that he could not recall a great deal about Soeharto 
from 1943. He told Ruth McVey in 1980 that he really couldn't remember Soeharto. Ruth McVey, notes 
from interview with Tsuchiya Kiso, Osaka, October 1980 (private collection). The 1980 claim appears to 
overstate the case somewhat, given the substantial evidence to the contrary.
113 Tsuchiya Kiso, written communication, May 6, 2003.
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But success in war is often fleeting, and by mid-1942 the war was starting to go 
badly for Japan. An almost unbroken string of Japanese military triumphs had come to 
an abrupt halt at the Battle of Midway in early June, almost six months to the day after 
the opening strike against Pearl Harbor and only three months after the Japanese 
landings in Java.
As 1942 wore on, the Japanese Southern Army, which had primary responsibility 
for Burma, Malaya, Sumatra, Java, British North Borneo, and the Philippines, and 
which maintained garrison armies in French Indochina and Thailand, found itself 
increasingly cut off from the Japanese home islands as a result of US submarine attacks 
on Japanese merchant shipping. As a result, Java assumed even greater importance as 
a supply base, for food, raw materials, and manpower.114 But as the Japanese were well 
aware, Java was itself vulnerable. In early 1943, the Sixteenth Army still feared an 
imminent Allied attack on Java from bases in Australia.115 And, as it knew only too 
well, the Japanese forces on the island were insufficient to withstand any such attack.
At the time of the landings in March 1942, the Sixteenth Army had been a force of 
55,000 men, built around two divisions, with about twenty-two battalions. Five months 
later, it had been pared back to eight battalions. The 5,200-strong Sakaguchi Task 
Force, which had swept westward through the heartland of Central Java in early 
March, had been sent, by the end of the month, to Burma. At the end of August, the 
powerful Second Division had been sent, together with two other units, from West 
Java to support operations at Guadalcanal, where the Japanese and Americans were 
locked in a grinding land and sea battle. That had robbed Java of another 24,000 front­
line troops. In early November, the Forty-Eighth Division had been sent from East Java 
to defend Timor and islands in the Arafura Sea.116
Nor had General Imamura been given suitable replacements. As he noted bitterly 
at the end of the war, to make up for the units that had been redeployed he was sent 
"ten battalions of aged soldiers, in all, under thirty thousand men, and with this small 
military force I had to defend Java."117 In some ways, the situation seems to have been 
even worse than that. According to a senior Japanese staff officer, the redeployments 
left the Sixteenth Army "with a total force of two regiments (consisting of fifteen 
thousand military men, of whom 8,500 were combat forces, and fifteen thousand 
Japanese civilians seconded to the army)."118 Not surprisingly, the Japanese were 
"acutely aware" of the limitations of their military strength. If they were to concentrate
114 Miyamoto Shizuo, "Jawa shusen shori-ki" [An Account of the Cessation of Hostilities in Java], in The 
Japanese Experience in Indonesia: Selected Memoirs of 1942-1945, ed. Anthony Reid and Oki Akira, 
Monographs in International Studies, Southeast Asia Series, No. 72 (Athens, OH: Ohio University, 1986), 
p. 220. A more literal translation of Jawa shusen shori-ki is "An Account of the Management of the End of 
the War in Java."
115 Interrogation of General Imamura Hitoshi, "Supplement," p. 1 (translation.)
116 See Military History Department, National Institute for Defense Studies, Defense Agency, Senshi Sosho. 
Ranin koryaku sakusen, No. 3 [War History Series, Volume 3. Occupation of the Dutch East Indies] (Tokyo: 
Asagumo Shimbunsha, 1967), pp. 76, 570-71; and Military History Department, National Institute for 
Defense Studies, Senshi Sosho. Nanseihomen Rikugun sakusen: Marei Ranin no boei, No. 92 [War History 
Series, Volume 92. Army Operations in the Southwestern Theatre: The Defense of Malaya and the Dutch 
East Indies] (Tokyo: Asagumo Shimbunsha, 1976), p. 48.
117 Imamura "Supplement," p. 2 (translation).
118 Miyamoto Shizuo, "Jawa shusen shori-ki," p. 220.
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their meager forces to oppose an Allied landing, they would have no troops in reserve 
to maintain public order, a prospect that deeply troubled Imamura, who remembered 
so clearly the outbreak of lawlessness that followed the Dutch surrender. As he said 
after the war, "I could not but preconceive the occurrence of such similar plunderings 
and violence when the Japanese army concentrated its forces in the event of an Allied 
landing on Java."119
One solution to the manpower problem was to create an indigenous army of some 
kind, using either conscripts or volunteers, as the Japanese had done when they 
founded the Indian National Army and the Burma Independence Army at the end of 
1941.120 But the Japanese were not at all sure that Indonesians were physically or 
temperamentally suited to military service. In an attempt to resolve the matter, they 
turned, in November 1942, to Beppan, the special intelligence section of the Sixteenth 
Army. It was a move with far-reaching consequences, not least for Soeharto, who at 
that time had just been accepted into the Japanese-run police force in Yogyakarta.
The Secret Work of Beppan
The work of Beppan has gone largely unrecorded, but this body was to have a 
lasting impact on Indonesia's military and political life. In less than two years, Beppan 
was to recruit and train a 37,500-strong Indonesian volunteer self-defense force, the 
basis of the future Indonesian National Army. It was to recruit and train a small but 
potent Special Guerrilla Force (Yugekitai), the embryo of the Indonesian Army 
intelligence service and, in East Java at least, of the TNI's powerful Military Police 
Corps.121 Beppan was also to recruit and train five hundred young Indonesian Muslims 
as leaders of the Barisan Hizbullah (Army of God), a paramilitary force designed to 
harness Islamic support behind the Japanese at the time of an expected Allied invasion 
of Java.122 Hizbullah would later play a central role in the bitter post-war drive to make 
Indonesia an Islamic state.
119 Imamura "Supplement," p. 2 (translation). Although self-serving in some respects, Imamura's 
statement captures well the Japanese dilemma.
120 About half of the 45,000 British Indian troops who had surrendered in Singapore volunteered to join the 
INA within two months of its formation.
121 Created at the end of 1944, the Yugekitai was an undercover force designed to gather intelligence and 
conduct guerrilla operations behind the lines in the event of an Allied landing on Java. Six hundred 
recruits enrolled in January 1945 and a further 600 in July.
122 A Barisan Hizbullah training camp was officially opened in West Java on February 18,1945. For details 
about Hizbullah, see "Statement by Capt. YANAGAWA, dated 14 Dec 1945," Javint 3132/2, SEATIC Det., 
GSI, 23 Ind Div., 15 Jan 45," ARA ASDGA (1942-1950), No. 5190. The 21-page Yanagawa "Statement," 
which contains invaluable details about the establishment and training of Peta, the Yugekitai and 
Hizbullah, is in three parts: Part I (8 pp.), Part II (9 pp.), and Part III (4 pp.). A three-page attachment gives 
an account of Yanagawa's actions after the Japanese surrender. Page 1 of Part II of the "Statement" is 
missing from the file held at the ARA. However, Part II of the "Statement" can be found in the Indische 
Collectie of the Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie (NIOD IC No. 006508-006516). In the 
"Statement," the translator has erred in rendering Yanagawa's given name as "Munenari," a common 
mistake. It should be Yanagawa Motoshige. The same error appears in Joyce C. Lebra, Japanese-Trained 
Armies in Southeast Asia: Independence and Volunteer Forces in World War II (Singapore: Heinemann, 1977); 
and in Mitsuo Nakamura, "General Imamura and the Early Period of Japanese Occupation," pp. 1-26. 
Nishihara Masashi, The Japanese and Sukarno's Indonesia: Tokyo-Jakarta Relations, 1951-1966 (Honolulu, HI: 
University of Hawai'i Press, 1976), refers throughout to Yanagawa Tomoshige, although this may be a 
typographical error.
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Beppan came out of a distinctly unsavory tradition. Before and during World War 
II, Japanese army intelligence and covert action work was conducted by three separate 
bodies—the conventional tactical and combat intelligence G2 units; the Kenpeitai for 
counterintelligence and security functions; and a great many Tokumu Kikan, or 
"special task agencies," for clandestine operations (boryaku).123 The latter were 
responsible for softening up and penetrating target national groups, supporting and 
training puppet national armies, preparing propaganda material, and spinning 
intelligence-gathering webs designed to help the conventional forces maintain the 
subjugation of occupied areas. These Tokumu Kikan tended to obtain the best-trained 
personnel, both military and civilian, drawing especially on recent graduates of the 
Nakano Gakko, the prestigious Army Intelligence School, which had been set up in 
Tokyo in 1938. Brutal in its methods, especially in China and Manchuria, the Tokumu 
Kikan was hated and feared almost as much as the Kenpeitai.124
On the eve of the Pacific War, the army had sent about a thousand intelligence 
agents, many of them Nakano Gakko graduates, to Southeast Asia under cover as 
consular officials, shipping agents, bankers, journalists, migrants, students, and 
businessmen.125 Other Nakano School graduates, including some who had been posted 
for a time in Japanese-occupied Taiwan, arrived in Southeast Asia later with the 
invading Japanese forces. While on Taiwan, a group of young Nakano Gakko 
graduates in the Tokumu Kikan had found themselves working in a remodeled 
warehouse, there being no room for them in the overflowing General Staff office of 
Army Headquarters. They decided to call themselves Beppan, a word derived from 
betsu, meaning "separate" or "different," and Han, meaning "group" or "section."126 
They continued to use this name when they were in Java, mainly to avoid the negative 
connotations of the term Tokumu Kikan, and before long it became the practice 
throughout the so-called Southern areas (Nanpo) for army intelligence agencies 
consisting mainly of Nakano School graduates to be called Beppan.127 On Java, at least,
123 See "Intelligence in the New Japan," CIA website, www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of- 
intelligence/ kent-csi/ docs/ v07i3a01p_0005.htm, pp. 5-6, on which this and the following two sentences 
are based (accessed on September 20, 2007). "Tokumu" means "special task," while "kikan" is 
"organization" or "system."
124 Written communication, Tsuchiya Kiso, May 29, 2002.
125 See, for example, Lebra, Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia, p. 6.
126 Written communication, Tsuchiya Kiso, August 20, 2002. The transformation from han to pan is 
explained by phonetics.
127 During its five-month stay in Bandung, the Second Division used the term "Isamu Bunshitsu" or 
"Isamu Gunshitsu" ("Isamu" was the code name for the Second Division; "Bunshitsu" means "detached 
office"). See Lebra, Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia, p. 91. In Jakarta, the name Beppan was used. 
First Lieutenant Yanagawa Motoshige, who set up the Bandung Bunshitsu, said it was a branch of the 
Tokumu Kikan, adding that the functions of the Bunshitsu in Bandung and the Beppan in Jakarta were the 
same. "Bunshitsu" was the usual word, having been used in Manchuria and elsewhere, but some people 
thought it had acquired a bad name, which is why the Jakarta group was called Beppan. Ruth McVey 
interview with Yanagawa Motoshige, Jakarta, November 13, 1980. The Isamu Bunshitsu had its offices in 
the former Dutch political police (Politieke Inlichtingendienst) building in Bandung. According to Togashi 
Tomoshige, another former member of Beppan, the name Beppan came into general use a month or so 
after the Japanese occupation of Java. When the Second Division was transferred to Guadalcanal, he said, 
the former Isamu Bunshitsu was put under the control of the Sixteenth Army and was known as Beppan. 
Ruth McVey interview with Togashi Tomoshige, Tokyo, October 1980.
In a post-war interrogation, Captain Yoshitake Chikao gave a somewhat different account. He said 
that when the Sixteenth Army headquarters was transferred from Bandung to Jakarta, an intelligence 
room (Joho-shitsu) was set up. Then, as contacts with "the native population" gradually increased, an office
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Beppan seems to have largely eschewed the sort of practices that had given the 
Tokumu Kikan such a bad name.
Beppan was a body with high-level connections in the Japanese army. The "big 
boss" (o bosu) of the organization was Major General Kokubu Shinshichiro, the chief of 
staff of the Sixteenth Army.128 He had been "directly appointed" to this position by 
Japan's wartime prime minister, Lieutenant General Tojo Hideki, who was also 
minister of the army, a clear sign that Tojo considered Java crucial.129 There was "a 
strong trust relationship" between the two generals, forged in the days when Kokubu 
had been a battalion commander in a regiment commanded by Tojo.130
Those connections seem to have served the agency well. Although initially a very 
small organization, with only two dozen officers and men on Java, Beppan had an 
unusual degree of autonomy.131 This won it no friends in the Kenpeitai, an
was established outside the headquarters building "on account of headquarters' prohibition of natives 
frequenting their premises, partly from the point-of-view of prevention of espionage, partly because of the 
complicated nature of its work." This office, which was staffed by a small number of Japanese army 
officers and interpreters and which took over premises at Prapatan Gambir 64 and, later, at Jalan Kebon 
Sirih 44, was always a part of the intelligence section of the Sixteenth Army headquarters. But to avoid 
confusion, it was called the "Separate Intelligence Room" (Betsu no Joho-shitsu) or "Separate Section" 
(Beppan) for short. See "Captain YOSHITAKE, The Beppan of the General Staff," Kantoor voor Japansche 
Zaken, Batavia, undated, p. 2, ARA ASDGA (1942-1950), No: 5300. Yoshitake joined the "outside" office 
around May 1942. Asked by his interrogators to explain the difference between Beppan and the Tokumu 
Kikan, Yoshitake said he remembered hearing the name of the latter body but claimed, implausibly, to 
have "no knowledge of its intrinsic nature."
128 Written communication, Tsuchiya Kiso, May 29, 2002. Kokubu was chief of staff from June 1943 to 
November 1944.
129 Colonel Miyamoto Shizuo, in a reply given in response to written questions from the author, May 25, 
1999. See also "Miyamoto Shizuo no hanashi" [Miyamoto Shizuo's Story], the last four chapters of Ara 
Kenichi, jakaruta yoakemae: Indonesia dokuritsu ni kaketa hitotachi [Jakarta before the Dawn: Those Who 
Staked All on Indonesian Independence] (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 1994), pp. 195-217. In compiling this book, 
Ara interviewed four people, including Miyamoto, Kaneko Tomokazu, and Zulkifli Lubis. He presented 
their stories in a first-person narrative style.
130 Kokubu later served under Tojo in the Ministry of the Army.
131 At the start, Beppan had about ten staff members in Jakarta and about five in each of its three branch 
offices, which had been established in Bandung, Yogyakarta, and Surabaya. See "Written Statement of 
Kempeitai [sic] Capt. Yoshitake," Item 2047, Southeast Asia Translation and Interrogation Centre (SEATIC) 
Intelligence Bulletin, No. 225, January 4,1946, TNA/ PRO WO 203/ 6303. The claim that Yoshitake was a 
member of the Kenpeitai is a glaring error; he was a member of Beppan. See also "Captain YOSHITAKE, 
The Beppan of the General Staff," p. 4. By the end of the war, Beppan appears to have had a staff of about 
three hundred people.
Yoshitake went on to head the Nami Kikan (Wave Agency). This body had two responsibilities. First, 
it was to report all enemy naval movements, including those of submarines; to this end, it operated small 
vessels along the coast. Second, it was to destroy enemy shipping during an Allied landing. As cover, 
Nami Kikan vessels transported Sixteenth Army cargo. See "VERKLARING. Afgelegd door: Kapitein 
TSUCHIYA Kiso," "Statement of Capt. TSUCHIYA Kiso, member of the 'Beppan' (NANSEITAI) Staff," 
Cipinang Jail, March 3-8,1947, pp. 5-6, NIOD IC No. 006524-006535. The name Beppan was changed to 
Nanseitai in April 1945, when Beppan's role switched from intelligence to "active defense work." Tsuchiya 
and Yoshitake told Ruth McVey that one of the Nami Kikan's tasks was to train American and Australian 
POWs it had "turned" for boryaku and propaganda work. The Nami Kikan, they said, also trained a 
Yugekitai unit composed of locally born Chinese. It recruited candidates by asking bupatis (regents) to 
recommend the sons of leading Chinese families "who wanted to be given training to become more 
effective merchants," with a promise or hint that good relations with the Japanese would result. Nothing 
was said about this being an intelligence body, but those trained were to be sent back to their home areas 
to work as merchants while providing the Japanese with information on the Chinese community, 
economic affairs, and shipping news. Ruth McVey interview with Tsuchiya Kiso and Yoshitake Chikao,
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organization used to getting its own way and not well disposed to those it saw as 
rivals. According to a seasoned Kenpeitai junior officer, Beppan was a powerful and 
influential body, "the only organization among the Japanese forces which could 
override [the] all-feared Kenpeitai."132 Beppan, he added, had powers of arrest and 
authority to search and confiscate property. That claim is disputed by former Beppan 
officers. Unlike the Kenpeitai, they say, Beppan did not have any official powers of 
arrest nor did it have the authority to conduct searches and confiscate property. In 
Japanese-occupied Java, however, those constraints meant little. Beppan officers felt 
free to act as and how they saw fit. "No one complained," said a former Beppan chief, 
somewhat disingenuously, "when Beppan used those powers if necessary," adding the 
qualification that the agency probably resorted to these practices no more than ten 
times during the three-and-a-half year occupation.133
General Kokubu was too busy, of course, to direct Beppan's activities on a day-to- 
day basis. Nor did Major Kuriya Jisuke, the staff officer in charge of intelligence for the 
Sixteenth Army, have time to provide more than general oversight of Beppan.134 That 
meant, in practice, that Beppan was run by Captain Maruzaki Yoshio, an officer with 
some very fixed views about the revolutionary potential of Indonesian youth. After 
graduating as a member of the Nakano School's first class in mid-1939, Maruzaki had 
been posted to a section of the Second Bureau (Intelligence) of the Army General 
Staff.135 Maruzaki was seen by his Japanese colleagues as a broadminded and tolerant 
officer, but he was also tough, with a streak of zealotry in his makeup. In early 1941, as 
war loomed in the Pacific, he had been planted in the Japanese consulate in Surabaya, 
East Java, to study Indonesian society.136 While there, he came to the view that if Japan
Osaka, October 1980. Tsuchiya told Allied interrogators that Yoshitake had helped train a Special 
Overseas Chinese Defense Unit (Tokubetsu Kakyo Keibotai). This was an organization of young, locally 
born ethnic Chinese civilians set up in late 1944 within the Civil Defense Corps (Keibodan); Yoshitake's 
training course was very short (one week), and this body does not seem to have amounted to much. See 
Tsuchiya Kiso "Statement," pp. 3-4. See also "Explanations Regarding All Kinds of Armed Bodies," a 
document drawn up by the headquarters of the Sixteenth Army, p. 7, NIOD IC No: 059394 (11 pages). It is 
not clear if there were any relationship or overlap between the Kakyo Keibotai and the Nami Kikan. The 
Nami Kikan was headed at one time by First Lieutenant Yonemura Masao. See Lebra, Japanese-Trained 
Armies in Southeast Asia, p. 93.
132 Interrogation of Lieutenant Onishi Kyutaro, Glodok Jail, Batavia, May 18,1946, ARA ASDGA, No. 5280. 
Onishi, who was stationed in Java throughout the Japanese occupation, joined the Imperial Army as a 
private in 1919, transferring to the Kenpeitai two years later. In 1933, he was attached to the feared 
Kwantung Army Kenpeitai in Manchuria and reached the rank of warrant officer four years later. Between 
1943 and 1945, he was attached to the Tokko (Special Higher Police) division of the Java Kenpeitai 
Headquarters in Jakarta. In the words of Captain Yoshitake, a Beppan officer, "Sometimes the Kempeitai 
[sic] misunderstood Special Section as if it was an organization to keep a check on Kempeitai [sic]. At times 
there was very bad feeling between the two organizations." See "Written Statement of Kempeitai [sic]
Capt. Yoshitake," pp. 12-13.
133 Written communication, Tsuchiya Kiso, August 20, 2002. Tsuchiya was the head of Beppan during the 
final stages of the war.
134 Kokubu may have been the "big boss" of Beppan, but Major Kuriya actually directed it. Although he is 
sometimes referred to as Kuriya Tsugunori, Tsuchiya says that he and his colleagues in Beppan called him 
Jisuke. Written communication, Tsuchiya Kiso, May 29, 2002. Kuriya had served in Jakarta as a military 
attache. Ruth McVey interview with Tsuchiya Kiso, Osaka, October 1980. See also Stephen C. Mercado,
The Shadow Warriors of Nakano: A History of the Imperial Japanese Army's Elite Intelligence School (Washington, 
DC: Brassey's, 2002), p. 36.
135 Mercado, The Shadow Warriors of Nakano, p. 35.
136 Supported by a government-run company set up to finance intelligence operations, Maruzaki took 
lessons in Indonesian and Dutch and, as one writer put it, "generally had quite a good time," at least until
Soeharto and the Japanese Occupation 33
wanted the assistance of the Indonesians "in the coming struggle against the 
Westerners, the Indonesians should first be endowed with a fighting spirit, a spirit 
based on self-confidence as Asians who are not inferior in any way to Westerners."137 It 
would be difficult, he felt, to raise the spirit of older Indonesians, but he was confident 
that younger people could easily be imbued with the necessary fighting spirit.138 As the 
head of Beppan, Maruzald was given the opportunity to imbue young men with 
precisely that spirit.
At this time, Beppan was still monitoring political, social, and economic conditions 
on the island in an attempt to provide headquarters with "a good grasp of the 
sentiment among the Javanese."139 But Beppan was no mere sponge, passively 
absorbing non-military information that might be of interest to army headquarters. 
Beppan officers were graduates of the Nakano Gakko. They had come through a 
rigorous intelligence course of study, where the curriculum included not only 
intelligence, strategy, and propaganda but also languages, philosophy, history, current 
affairs, martial arts, counter intelligence, and the various facets of covert action.140 They 
had been instructed in the art of winning over "native people" to the Japanese side 
(senbu) and had been taught how to train local recruits (minzoku shido). They had 
mastered techniques relating to the development of spiritual strength (seishin-ryoku). 
They had been shown how to achieve their various tasks in occupied territories.141
December 1941, when he and other Japanese officials were interned by the Dutch following the attack on 
Pearl Harbor. See Nugroho Notosusanto, Tentara Peta Pada Jaman Pendudukan Jepang di Indonesia [The Peta 
Army during the Japanese Occupation of Indonesia] (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1979), p. 59.
137 Ibid.
138 Ibid.
139 Tsuchiya Kiso, written communication, May 29, 2002. Beppan's task, another officer observed, was to 
"collect and properly arrange ... information on the movements of each race and the voice of the general 
population in the island." See Yoshitake "Statement," p. 4. To this end, Beppan's offices in Jakarta, 
Bandung, Yogyakarta, and Surabaya each filed monthly reports with the Sixteenth Army headquarters.
140 Tsuchiya Kiso, written responses to questions, May 29, 2002. See also "Nakano agents and the Japanese 
forces in New Guinea, 1942-1945," www.thefreelibrary.com/Nakano+agents+and+the+Japanese+ 
forces+in+New+Guinea,+1942-1945-012316110 (accessed September 21, 2007); and www.thefreelibrary. 
com / Nakano+agents+and+the+Japanese+forces+in+New+Guinea%2c+l 942-1945.-a0123162110 (accessed 
August 4, 2009).
141 Written communication, Tsuchiya Kiso, May 29, 2002. In one of its early special assignments, Beppan 
recruited between twenty and forty volunteers from the small ethnic Indian community on Java and sent 
them to Singapore for training in the Indian National Army. See also George S. Kanahele, "The Japanese 
Occupation of Indonesia: Prelude to Independence" (PhD dissertation, Cornell University, 1967), p. 118. 
Kanahele states, incorrectly, that some three hundred ethnic Indian volunteers were sent from Java to 
Singapore. Later, in mid-1943, Beppan was ordered to make a propaganda film, "Call to Australia," which 
sought to convey the impression, totally false, that Australian prisoners of war were being treated 
humanely on Java, thereby seeking in some ill-defined way "to create an anti-war spirit in Australia." 
Yanagawa "Statement," Part I, p. 4. Yanagawa was the "chief producer" of the film. Later still, there were 
to be more special projects. In 1944, Beppan drew up plans to land intelligence agents in northern 
Australia, using two Chinese-crewed junks that had been sent from Shanghai to a special training base in 
the Bay of Jakarta. Some junks were sent, but the mission was a failure. The program was under the 
command of Captain Yonemura Masao, who had been the Beppan man in Yogyakarta when Soeharto 
began working in the local police force. Written communication, Tsuchiya Kiso, May 29, 2002. In what 
seems to have been a related exercise, Beppan sought to "get hold of a complete set of Australian army, 
navy, and air force uniforms," eventually assembling about fifteen or twenty such outfits, including 
underclothes, boots, and socks. See "Written Statement" of Captain Yoshitake, SEATIC Intelligence Bulletin 
225, January 4,1946,12-13, TNA/PRO WO 203/6303. At about the same time, Beppan took in and 
sheltered a man it thought to be Tan Malaka, an Indonesian revolutionary whose Marxist views were
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In November 1942, Major Kuriya gave Beppan a new and important assignment, 
one that would eventually eclipse its intelligence-gathering functions. As Yanagawa 
Motoshige, a Beppan officer who was to have a profound impact on the lives of many 
future Indonesian army officers, and indeed on the Indonesian National Army, later 
put it, "we began to study the education of Indonesian youth."142 This statement, 
translated into English in a post-war interrogation document, is bland, even opaque, 
but the import is dramatically clear. Some Japanese officers had begun to toy with the 
idea that Indonesians could be trained to serve in separate military units, not just as 
auxiliary soldiers (heiho) in Japanese army units. The idea, as a senior Indonesian 
general later put it, was to do a test on some "laboratory mice," to see whether 
"Indonesian pemudas [youth] were physically and mentally strong enough to undergo 
military training."143 Initially, the Japanese had it in mind to produce a squad of strong 
and determined army intelligence operatives. These men might, as Kuriya saw it, be 
infiltrated into Australia ahead of a possible Japanese invasion.144 But it did not take 
long for Beppan to broaden the focus of the program. After discussions with his 
colleagues, Maruzaki decided to take this opportunity to test the "overall military 
capabilities" of young Indonesians, without forgetting the intelligence-gathering aspect 
of his assignment.145
The officer chosen to run the trial program was First Lieutenant Yanagawa, a 
graduate of Takushoku University in Tokyo, who, like First Lieutenant Tsuchiya, had 
done his basic training in the Imperial Japanese Army Air Force before being tapped 
for the second intake at Nakano.146 Yanagawa was about five feet four inches tall; he 
was, as the Japanese say, chuniku chuzei, a person of medium height and build. Some of 
his army colleagues thought him quite ordinary to look at. However, he appears in a 
post-war photograph with a shock of thick black hair, exceptionally bushy eyebrows, a 
slightly quizzical expression, and wearing a bow-tie. A man of high intelligence, 
exacting standards, and exceptional will power, Yanagawa made a powerful 
impression on everyone he met, both Japanese and Indonesian. "He was a very strong- 
willed, confident man," said Tsuchiya, one of his Beppan contemporaries. "We could 
plainly say stubborn, someone who didn't listen to others. But, at the same time, he 
couldn't accept things he considered wrong, like bribery and injustice. He believed in 
righteousness. He was very sharp."147 In the opinion of Kaneko Tomokazu, a civilian 
journalist who had befriended Yanagawa before the war and who sailed with him to 
Java on the troopship Sakura Maru, Yanagawa's character could be summed up in the
anathema to the Japanese in general and the Kenpeitai in particular. Beppan officers concluded after the 
war that the "Tan Malaka" who lived at a Beppan house in Gang Scott, in central Jakarta, might have been 
an imposter.
142 Yanagawa "Statement," Part I, p. 3.
143 Interview, Lieutenant General Purbo Suwondo, September 15,1998.
144 See Nugroho Notosusanto, "The Peta Army During the Japanese Occupation of Indonesia" (PhD 
dissertation, Universitas Indonesia, 1977), p. 97. Kuriya "thought that Indonesians would be less 
conspicuous than Japanese in Australia," especially as many Indonesians were in Australia with the 
Dutch. The aim was to assess the possibility of training Indonesians as "excellent suppliers of infm," to 
create "good observers along Jap[anese] army lines." Yanagawa "Statement," Part I, p. 3.
145 Nugroho, "The Peta Army During the Japanese Occupation," pp. 97-98.
146 For details of Yanagawa's background, see Ruth McVey interview with Yanagawa Motoshige, Jakarta, 
November 13,1980.
147 Interview, Tsuchiya Kiso, Mishima, February 2,1999.
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Japanese expression take o watta yona; this phrase, rich in connotations of admiration 
and respect, is commonly used to describe a strong and manly individual. Yanagawa 
was, said Kaneko, straightforward, open-hearted, frank in disposition, someone who 
did not pay attention to trifling matters.148 Taniguchi Taketsugu, who headed the 
thirty-five-man Kenpeitai detachment in Bogor and thus had the responsibility to 
"watch quietly" all Japanese army personnel within his area, including Beppan 
officers, remembers Yanagawa as a man of bravery and fortitude, someone who 
invariably made quick and correct decisions.149 Nor was Yanagawa lacking in 
flamboyance. In Bogor, said Taniguchi, he took to riding about on a "wonderfully big 
thoroughbred horse, pure white. I often saw him on that horse. It was unheard of."
Yanagawa is spoken of with equal awe by some of Indonesia's most senior first- 
generation military leaders. "He was a very tough man," said Lieutenant General 
Kemal Idris, who trained under Yanagawa for five months. "He was very rough. But I 
liked him. He was not only rough towards Indonesians but towards Japanese 
themselves."150 According to Lieutenant General Purbo Suwondo, Yanagawa was not 
really flamboyant at all, the splendid horse notwithstanding. "He was a typical 
Prussian-style Japanese officer. He was an intelligence officer, not the flamboyant 
type."151 No one, said Purbo, ever forgot Yanagawa.
Everyone remembers him. If he inspects us, he will inspect our eyes, to see if you 
are sleepy, have no energy, are not vital. Because, according to their philosophy, 
the eyes are the mirror of the soul, whereas in Javanese culture you must not look 
into the eyes of an older person. In the old days, we were brought up that way. 
Here we learned to look directly into someone's eyes, with vigor! Not with "fish 
eyes." Fish never sleep. "Mata ikan," [Fish eyes] Yanagawa would say, "You are a 
damned fish eyes!"... The eyes were very important. One by one he would look 
into your eyes.152
According to another officer, Major General Moersjid, Yanagawa was not only a 
man of immense presence, with clear leadership qualities; he had almost mystical 
powers as well. When Yanagawa was the commander of the officer cadet school in 
Bogor, he made it his practice to inspect the morning parade from the back of his horse. 
Although there might be several hundred men lined up before him, Yanagawa claimed 
that he could tell if even one man blinked. To Moersjid, it was uncanny. "We started 
thinking, 'How could it be possible that one man, at a distance of, let's say, one 
hundred metres, could observe one man blinking? That must be supernatural!' But it 
did happen! He could see that!"153
148 Interview, Kaneko Tomokazu, Tokyo, February 3, 1999. Kaneko was a civilian who had worked before 
the war as a writer for the Japanese Army magazine Rikugun Gaho (Army Illustrated). He served in the 
Sixteenth Army's well-staffed Propaganda Corps (Senden-han) as an assistant to Lieutenant Colonel 
Machida, who headed that department until November 1942. Not long after that, Senden-han was 
incorporated into the Military Administration (Gunseikanbu) and changed its name to Senden-bu.
149 Interview, Taniguchi Taketsugu, Tokyo, February 1,1999.
150 Interview, Lieutenant General Kemal Idris, Jakarta, September 1,1998.
151 Interview, Lieutenant General Purbo Suwondo, Jakarta, February 13, 2000.
152 Interview, Purbo Suwondo, Jakarta, September 1,1998.
153 Interview, Major General Moersjid, Jakarta, April 29,1999. Ruth McVey, who interviewed Yanagawa in 
1980, found him "an impressive old man, probably was a very impressive character for pemudas in the
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Yanagawa considered himself a man with something that amounted almost to a 
sacred mission, or so he liked to claim after the war. One of his army intelligence 
colleagues, Major Fujiwara Iwaichi, had played a key role in setting up the Indian 
National Army. Another, Colonel Suzuki Keiji, had been instrumental in establishing 
the Burma Independence Army. Yanagawa believed that it was his destiny to build a 
similar institution on Java. Each of these three men, it has been claimed, "was imbued 
with a romantic and idealistic self-image of his own and Japan's role in fostering 
Indian, Burmese, or Javanese independence."154 Each, it has been further claimed, was 
struck by the parallel between his own mission and that of Lawrence of Arabia, the 
British archaeologist and intelligence officer who, while assigned to the Arab Bureau 
during World War I, led often bickering Arab guerrilla forces against the Ottoman 
Empire and later pushed for an independent Arab state. It is possible that Yanagawa 
did indeed see himself in this light. At Nakano, he had been trained to work in the 
Arab world. He was to go to the Middle East as a merchant, as a cover for his military 
activities. He had learned about Lawrence, he told Ruth McVey, while at Nakano.155 
Tsuchiya, however, has cast doubt on the notion that Lawrence's example influenced 
Yanagawa in his dealings on Java. Yanagawa, he says, did not draw any parallel 
between himself and Lawrence until well after the war.156 Whatever the truth of the 
matter, 'Through the imaginative negotiations and promptings of these men, three 
revolutionary armies were spawned."157
Yanagawa, Tsuchiya, and another Beppan officer spent December 1942 searching 
for a suitable training center and suitable Indonesian recruits.158 By January 10, 1943, 
they had both. Working in great secrecy, they set up a Youth Training Center (Seinen 
Dojo) at Tangerang, just west of Jakarta, and brought together about fifty young 
Indonesians, most of them in their late teens, for a five-month training program.159 The
war." Information from McVey's notes of an interview with Yanagawa Motoshige, Jakarta, November 13, 
1980.
154 Lebra, japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia, pp. 7-8.
155 Ruth McVey interview with Yanagawa, November 13,1980. For more details, see Yanagawa Motoshige, 
Rikugun chohoin Yanagawa Chui [Army Intelligence Officer First Lieutenant Yanagawa] (Tokyo: Sankei 
Shimbun, 1967). Yanagawa lived in Indonesia after the war.
156 "I never heard him say a word about Lawrence of Arabia," said Tsuchiya, who was one of Yanagawa's 
key army associates during the Japanese occupation of Java. "Nor can one find any such references in his 
book Rikugun chohoin Yanagawa Chui. Flowever, when I met him in Jakarta in about 1970,1 gained the 
impression that he was isolated from the Japanese community in Indonesia, which may have led him to a 
state of mind much like that of Lawrence of Arabia." Written communication, Tsuchiya Kiso, May 29,
2002. There are, in fact, two references to Lawrence of Arabia in Yanagawa's book. In one instance, he 
refers to Colonel Suzuki as the "Lawrence of Burma." In the other, he says, in effect, that the people of 
Indonesia should all become like Lawrence in order to win independence. This hardly proves that 
Yanagawa saw himself playing such a role in the early 1940s, but the possibility should not be discounted.
157 Lebra, japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia, p. 8.
158 Yanagawa is generally given the credit for establishing the asrama. Tsuchiya and Yoshitake believe this 
was not Yanagawa's achievement, but Maruzaki's; Yanagawa, they feel, claims too much credit.
Yanagawa was, however, the head of the asrama. Ruth McVey interview with Tsuchiya and Yoshitake, 
Osaka, October 1980.
159 Among those who attended the course were Zulkifli Lubis, Daan Mogot, Kemal Idris, Umar 
Wirahadikusumah, R. M. Sroehardojo, Mohamad Jasin, and Suprijadi, who was to lead a revolt against the 
Japanese in 1945. Sroehardojo was to serve later as a battalion commander under Soeharto. According to 
Yanagawa, the recruits were mostly from Jakarta; about ten were from Surabaya, half a dozen from 
Central Java, and several from Bandung. See Yanagawa "Statement," Part I, p. 4. According to Togashi 
Tomoshige, a former Beppan officer who was in charge of spiritual training (latihan jiwa) at Tangerang,
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Beppan officers had high hopes for the course and devised a program that placed 
extraordinary emphasis on spiritual values and physical fitness, themes that had been 
so central to their own training in Japan. Cadets were worked hard, with an exhausting 
round of study and physical activity. They studied Japanese, the history of the 
Netherlands East Indies, world affairs, tactics, communications, espionage, counter­
intelligence, propaganda, conspiracy, shooting, reconnaissance, liaison, and 
camouflage. They were subjected to constant drill and devoted many hours to 
gymnastics, swimming, sumo, and kendo, a martial art which had its origins in samurai 
sword-fighting. They were taught Japanese martial songs.160 Nothing was said about 
independence. "As the question of Indonesian independence was not yet settled," 
Yanagawa noted, "we tried only to inspire cooperation, coexistence, and co-prosperity 
among the peoples of East Asia."161 The pace was relentless, the pressure intense. The 
students began to falter. For a time, even Yanagawa wondered whether it had been 
such a good idea after all. "At the beginning it seemed rather impossible to get any 
results without keeping a constant watch," he said.162 "But later the men began to 
understand our spirit of enthusiasm and worked with a will."
One of those who observed the changes in the Indonesian cadets was the journalist 
Kaneko Tomokazu, who was a member of the Sixteenth Army Propaganda Corps. "I 
had many trips to the Tangerang Seinen Dojo," he said.
Because I was in charge of newspapers, Mr. Yanagawa wanted me to go there to 
see how young Indonesian people were trained and became strong. Whenever I 
went there, Yanagawa took part in the sumo himself with the young Indonesian 
trainees to show how strong they had become. And I could clearly see the 
difference after two or three months' training.163
According to one of the Indonesians who trained at Tangerang, Yanagawa was not 
only strict and tough, but also keen to insure that the cadets developed a sense of 
pride. When, eventually, he let them leave the camp, he encouraged them to travel 
(without paying) first-class on the train, "saying they shouldn't think it was for 
foreigners or the rich; it was their country, and they were its hope so deserved the 
best."164 Yanagawa "defended his boys strongly if they were hassled by the Japanese, 
and looked after their interests, so they got great confidence in him." He was perceived
Beppan asked each kabupaten (regency) on Java to send three or four people, who should be devout 
Muslims (tegas Islam). Togashi interview with Ruth McVey, October 1980.
160 Nugroho, "The Peta Army During the Japanese Occupation," p. 98.
161 Yanagawa "Statement," Part I, p. 3. In his book, Yanagawa writes that he took a warning from the case 
of Colonel Suzuki Keiji, in Burma, who, "when he tried to redeem his promise to the BIA of independence, 
lost his position as head of the Minami Kikan." See Yanagawa, Rikugun chohoin Yanagawa Chui, p. 112, 
cited in Lebra, japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia, p. 100. Yanagawa told Ruth McVey that when 
Suzuki had pushed for Burmese independence, he had been "sent to Siberia," so he decided he would 
keep his mouth shut and concentrate on training Indonesians to be ready for independence. Yanagawa 
Motoshige interview with Ruth McVey, Jakarta, November 13,1980.
162 Yanagawa "Statement," Parti, p. 4.
163 Interview, Kaneko Tomokazu, Tokyo, February 3,1999.
164 Kusnowibowo, in an interview with Ruth McVey, Jakarta, November 20,1980. Kusnowibowo served 
later as a senior officer in Bakin, the State Intelligence Coordinating Board. See also Ruth McVey interview 
with Yanagawa Motoshige, Jakarta, November 13,1980.
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as sincere. Those who were trained by him "had a particular pride; indeed, one could 
say they were sombong [arrogant] about it."165
By May 1943, when the members of the first intake completed their course, the 
Japanese were well pleased. The test, said Tsuchiya, was a "great success."166 
According to Yoshitake Chikao, another Nakano graduate, 'This training, due to the 
fervor of the instructors and the native youths, gradually produced successful results, 
which ... developed incidentally to become the very foundation of the organization of 
the militia force, born from the fervent desire of the natives."167 The Indonesian recruits 
were also pleased. A second intake of Indonesians entered the training center in June, 
graduating in October. On June 10, General Kokubu, the officer with close links to 
Prime Minister Tojo, took up his appointment as chief of staff of the Sixteenth Army 
and "big boss" of Beppan.
As the new recruits began their training, Lieutenant General Inada Masazumi, the 
recently arrived deputy chief of staff of the Southern Army, made an inspection tour of 
Java, Sumatra, and Borneo.168 Concerned about inadequate Japanese troop numbers 
and knowing that no reinforcements would be forthcoming, he recommended that 
both Lieutenant General Harada Kumakichi, who had taken over as the Japanese 
commander on Java in November 1942, and his opposite number in Sumatra train a 
core of local troops to supplement Japanese forces. Harada, who had been a senior staff 
officer during the 1937 Japanese conquest of Shanghai, was already strongly in favor of 
such a course.169 Tojo, who happened to be travelling in Southeast Asia, was also in 
favor. Tokyo shared Inada's concern about Japanese troop numbers (although even 
some of Inada's own officers are said to have worried that it might be dangerous to 
arm indigenous forces).170 Tokyo also felt it needed to mollify Indonesian nationalist 
leaders. The Indonesians had been bitterly disappointed when, in January 1943, Tojo 
announced that Burma and the Philippines would be granted "independence" within
165 Ibid.
166 "Statement" of Captain Tsuchiya Kiso, March 3-8,1947, p. 3.
167 See Yoshitake, "The Beppan of the General Staff," p. 3.
168 Lebra, japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia, p. 11, based on an interview with Inada.
169 Harada was the military attache at the Japanese Embassy in China when, on December 12,1937, during 
the six-week Rape of Nanking, Japanese naval aircraft attacked and sank the US Navy gunboat Panay as 
she lay at anchor in the Yangtze River, upstream from Nanking (Nanjing). Colonel Hashimoto Kingoro, an 
aggressive and insubordinate ultranationalist who had masterminded two coup attempts in Japan, had 
ordered his artillery and a squadron of Japanese Navy bombers temporarily under his command to attack 
the Panay and other neutral foreign vessels, threatening to summarily execute the reluctant navy squadron 
commander unless he complied. At a press conference in Shanghai eight days later, Harada, a friend and 
associate of Hashimoto, sought to put all the blame on the Japanese navy. Harada told the press he had 
been to Nanking and had made a personal investigation of the Panay incident. He cleared Japanese army 
units of any fault. Tokyo later took full responsibility for the attack, but claimed it had been unintentional. 
In Shanghai, according to Hallett Abend, a correspondent for the New York Times, Harada was known as a 
drunken, disreputable, and mendacious officer who had connections with Shanghai's vice and drug rings 
"from which the Japanese army profited hugely." Time and again, Abend wrote, Harada called upon the 
American Consul-General in Shanghai "so drunk that he could scarcely articulate, and actually swayed on 
his heels when he tried to stand erect." For a good account of these events, see Hallett Abend, My Life in 
China 1926-1941 (New York, NY: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1943), pp. 268-75. According to one of his 
senior staff officers in Java, Harada "had a long military career in China and was known as a China 
specialist [Shina-ya], He had a firm belief that native people's cooperation was indispensable in fighting 
war." See "Miyamoto Shizuo no hanashi," pp. 195-217.
170 Kanahele, "The Japanese Occupation of Indonesia," p. 119.
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the year, with no such pledge for Indonesia. In August 1943, the Southern Army issued 
an order to the armies in Sumatra and Java "approving the establishment of native 
armies."171 Implementation of the decision was left to the local army commanders.
Harada, who had been impressed by the success of the Tangerang experiment, 
wasted no time in complying with this instruction. He and his staff sought, however, 
to create the impression that they were responding to local demands. On September 7, 
in a "spontaneous" gesture timed and stage-managed by Beppan, Gatot 
Mangkupradja, who had been a close associate of Sukarno in the pre-war Indonesian 
National Party, wrote a petition, in his own blood, urging Harada to establish a 
volunteer force for the defense of the fatherland.172 The letter was given extensive 
coverage in the newspapers, and people came to believe that this force was an 
Indonesian patriotic initiative. (Beppan had sought to persuade the young Sultan of 
Yogyakarta to play this role, but without success.173) Yanagawa, who had been working 
on the propaganda film "Call to Australia," was ordered in mid-September to "put out 
propaganda aiming to rouse enthusiasm for the defense of Java by a Volunteer Defense 
Force."174 During this time, he and his Beppan colleagues wrestled with three main 
questions. What motto should be adopted? What attitude was to be taken on the 
question of independence? What was the best way to harness Islamic sentiments?175 As 
the Japanese policy on independence had not been settled, Yanagawa decided that 
recruits should be drawn from a religious, rather than a nationalist, background.
On October 3, 1943, Harada announced the formation of a volunteer defense force 
on Java "based on the spirit of the common defense of ... Greater East Asia and in 
response to the intense desire of the fifty million Indonesians for homeland defense."176 
The force would be subject to the direction of the supreme commander, with units 
assigned for local defense against America, Britain, and the Netherlands. Candidate 
officers would not have to have any particular educational qualifications, but they 
would need to be of "firm ideology and of vigorous will" and be of strong physique. 
Training would be based on the spirit of sharing a common fate with the Japanese 
forces. Those who joined were "to devote their souls, flesh, and blood to the ideology 
of Japan and the Greater East Asia" region.177 At the same time, the Japanese pushed 
ahead with a program, started in May, to train a large number of heiho, Indonesian
171 Miyamoto, "Jawa shusen shori-ki," p. 221.
172 Interview, Tsuchiya Kiso, February 2,1999. See also Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution, pp. 32, 420; 
Lebra, Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia, pp. 99-100; and Gatot Mangkupradja, "The Peta and My 
Relations with the Japanese," trans. Harumi Wanasita Evans and Ruth McVey, Indonesia 5 (April 1968): 
105-34. Tsuchiya said that although Gatot's petition was a Beppan initiative, it gave expression to a widely 
held aspiration. Afterwards, "the whole of Indonesia flared up with hope that Japan would do something, 
and many petitions came in from many islands, some written in blood." These were spontaneous, and 
"even when we said, 'We don't need any more petitions!' they kept pouring in." This pattern of behavior, 
in which seemingly spontaneous public demands were orchestrated by those in authority to create a 
spurious sense of responsiveness, was to become a feature of Indonesian society under the Soeharto 
government.
173 Tsuchiya revealed this in a 1972 interview with Joyce Lebra. See Lebra, Japanese-Trained Armies in 
Southeast Asia, p. 99, n. 65.
174 Yanagawa "Statement," Parti, p. 1.
175 Ibid., p. 5.
176 Kishi Koichi et a l, eds., Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia (JPRS), p. 194.
177 Ibid., pp. 195-96.
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auxiliary soldiers who were attached to Japanese units on Java. These men, who 
tended to come from a fairly modest social and educational background, were issued 
Japanese army rifles and bayonets and "treated on the same level as Japanese 
soldiers."178
The Japanese were to create a number of mass organizations during their three- 
and-a-half-year occupation of Java, many of them significant. But none was to have as 
great an impact as the Java Volunteer Defense Force, which the Japanese called the 
Jawa Boei Giyugun—or Giyugun, for short—but which became known to Indonesians 
as Peta. Conjured out of nothing, virtually overnight, and manned entirely by 
Indonesians, it burst into life as a force of no fewer than thirty-three battalions, each 
consisting of about 522 officers and men.179 It was to grow in less than two years into 
an organization of sixty-nine battalions, or about 37,500 men, on Java and Bali, with 
another 20,000 on Sumatra.180
The Japanese did not envisage, at least initially, that the Peta would be in any way 
an independent force, although they were to move, late in the war, to put it on the path 
to greater autonomy. Unlike the Indian National Army and the Burma Independence 
Army in Japanese-occupied Burma, Peta was structured for decentralized activities.181
Peta would have no higher command, no general staff, and no unit larger than a 
battalion. Instead, it would come under the direct control of the Sixteenth Army, which 
would deal with the battalions on an individual basis through local Japanese garrisons. 
Contact between the various Peta battalions, even those in the same residency, would 
be discouraged. Nor, indeed, was Peta intended as a front-line force. In the words of an 
undated Sixteenth Army headquarters document, 'The duties of the ... PETA were ... 
mainly ... those of air-watch along the coast, guarding of important objects and 
cooperation in the building of fortifications." Peta units, it said, were "not to 
participate in the actions of war." During "actual warfare," they were to remain at the
178 See "Explanations Regarding All Kinds of Armed Bodies," p. 4. By the end of the war, there would be 
nearly 14,900 heiho on Java and another 2,500 who had been sent from there to Timor, trained to fight, but 
used mainly as guards and drivers.
179 A Japanese battalion normally comprised one thousand men, but the Sixteenth Army thought it would 
be hard to control thousand-man Peta battalions and made them half that size instead. Interview, Colonel 
Miyamoto Shizuo, Tokyo, February 4,1999.
180 There were sixty-six battalions on Java, with a total of 35,853 men; and three battalions on Bali, with 
1,626 men. See "Explanations Regarding All Kinds of Armed Bodies," pp. 2-3. Nugroho says each 
battalion had about 535 members. Nugroho, "The Peta Army During the Japanese Occupation," p. 147. On 
Sumatra, the Twenty-fifth Army set up its own 20,000-strong volunteer force, but with 150-man companies 
as the largest fighting units. Although Bali was administered by the Imperial Navy, the navy had 
insufficient men to defend the island against Allied attack. In view of this, Tokyo ordered the Sixteenth 
Army to take charge of Bali's defense. Tsuchiya set up a training unit there in 1944.
181 Colonel Miyamoto Shizuo has written that, after the war, he asked General Kokubu whether he or other 
senior officers had had any concerns at all about Peta. Kokubu replied that he had had no such worries in 
the beginning because when Peta was first established the tide of war was going in Japan's favor. "But," 
wrote Miyamoto, "considering a case of the worst coming to the worst, they didn't put Peta under 
Sukarno's control but kept it in the hands of the Japanese staff officer in charge of strategy [sakusen sanbo]." 
See, "Miyamoto Shizuo no hanashi," pp. 195-217. Needless to say, this didn't stop Sukarno claiming later 
that, "The [Japanese] High Command requested Sukarno's help in attracting the proper candidates for 
officers ... I looked for young men whom I could control... I singlehandedly proposed the future colonels 
and generals of our Republican Army back in the fall of 1943." See Sukarno: An Autobiography, As Told to 
Cindy Adams (Hong Kong: Gunung Agung, 1966), pp. 186-87.
Soeharto and the Japanese Occupation 41
rear, where they would be engaged in guard duty.182 In short, this was, at best, an 
embryo army. It was to be, nevertheless, a wholly Indonesian force, save for two or 
three Japanese officers and four or five Japanese NCOs who would be attached to each 
battalion, mainly for administrative, liaison, and training purposes.183 The battalion 
commanders (daidancho), company commanders (chudancho), and platoon commanders 
(shodancho) would all be Indonesians, mostly Javanese or Sundanese, as would the 
soldiers.
By early October, Maruzaki had taken over the dormitory of the former KNIL 
Nineteenth Battalion in Bogor and set it up as the Java Volunteer Defense Force Officer 
Cadet Training Center (Jawa Boei Giyugun Kanbu Renseitai).184 He had also assembled 
his core staff. What he needed now was 856 young, and not so young, Indonesians 
who could serve as the backbone of the Peta—33 battalion commanders, 127 company 
commanders, and 696 platoon commanders.185 These men were to be drawn from 
various parts of West, Central, and East Java and sent back to recruit others to serve in 
a local force in their home regions, and nowhere else. The assumption was that the 
trainees had good local knowledge and social ties and would be well placed to fight in
182 "Explanations Regarding All Kinds of Armed Bodies," p. 3. Miyamoto says the aim was to "defend the 
fatherland and Islam" against reoccupation by the Dutch and to train support troops for the Japanese. But 
he also stresses another consideration. Harada, "whose administration was influenced by his experience in 
China," felt that "order among the natives should be maintained by the native military so that the 
Japanese army could be held in reserve as a core force." See Miyamoto Shizuo, "Jawa shusen shori-ki," p. 
221.
183 Yanagawa "Statement," Part I, p. 7. According to Miyamoto, about five Japanese were attached to each 
battalion "as trainers." See Miyamoto Shizuo, "Jawa shusen shori-ki," p. 222. According to Nugroho 
Notosusanto, each daidancho had a shidokan (supervisor), usually a captain or first lieutenant, who advised 
him how to run his battalion. The shidokan was assisted by several subordinate officers, who advised the 
chudanchos and the shodanchos. There were also noncommissioned Japanese officers (NCOs) who helped 
supervise the sections. See Nugroho Notosusanto, "The Peta Army in Indonesia 1943-1945," in Japan in 
Asia, ed. William H. Newell (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1981), p. 40.
184 The name had been chosen with great care. According to one account, it was the strong wish of Major 
General Kokubu that the center be a renseitai (training corps) rather than a kyoikutai (education corps). He 
wanted the army to train (kitaeru) Indonesians rather than just educate (kyoiku sura) them. He particularly 
liked the radical (left-hand side) of the kanji character for ren, because it means "metal." He wanted to turn 
young Indonesians into hardened soldiers by giving them rigorous training, "just as steel manufacturers 
subject iron to intense heat and beat it to produce refined iron." (To make steel, of course, one must also 
add alloys.) The training corps changed its name to kyoikutai at about the time of the second intake of 
cadets in early 1944. According to Tsuchiya, there were two reasons for this. First, Kokubu had by that 
time left Java. Second, Yanagawa, who had strong ideas of his own, had taken command of the center. 
Interviews, Tsuchiya Kiso, February 2,1999, and August 27, 2001, and written communication, May 29, 
2002. The first part of Tsuchiya's explanation is curious. As noted above, Kokubu did not leave Java until 
November 1944. According to Morimoto Takeshi, a member of the teaching staff at Bogor and author of 
the semi-official Japanese history of the Peta, the person who suggested that the radical of renseitai's ren be 
"metal" rather than other possible kanji characters, such as "fire" or "tree," was not Kokubu, but Captain 
Maruzaki. Kokubu, Morimoto writes, recommended the kanji character for "fire." He wanted the Japanese 
Army and the Peta cadets to become like "a ball of fire," but eventually accepted Maruzaki's idea. See 
Morimoto Takeshi, Jawa boei giyugun-shi.
185 See Yanagawa "Statement," Part I, p. 6. The figures vary somewhat. Morimoto says there were 33 
daidanchos, about 140 chudanchos, and approximately 600 shodanchos, two hundred each from East, West, 
and Central Java. See Morimoto Takeshi, Jawa boei giyugun-shi, pp. 86-87. Yanagawa gave a figure of 34 
daidanchos. An Indonesian daidancho was the equivalent, on paper, of a Japanese Army daitaicho, who 
carried the rank of major. A chudancho was the equivalent of a chutaicho, who was a captain. A shodancho 
was the equivalent of a shotaicho, who was usually a second lieutenant. However, the ranks of major, 
captain, and second lieutenant were not awarded in the Peta.
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that region if the Allies landed. It was envisaged that each daidancho would recruit 
some five hundred men to serve as NCOs and soldiers in his locally raised battalion.
Because Beppan was such a small organization, quite unable to scour Java on its 
own, Maruzaki asked officials in the Japanese military administration to recommend 
officer cadet recruits. He consulted Japanese and Indonesians in the provincial 
bureaucracy. He consulted Kenpeitai officers and regional Japanese police chiefs. He 
sought advice from Beppan's resident experts on Indonesian Islam, one of whom was a 
Japanese interpreter named Ono Nobuharu, who had lived for many years in the East 
Indies, embracing Islam and changing his name to Abdul Hamid Ono. He consulted 
the Beppan chiefs in Bandung, Yogyakarta, and Surabaya. He consulted the Tangerang 
graduates. At the end of this process, Maruzaki had a long list of names of potential 
recruits. He now arranged for three of his subordinates to conduct the interviews by 
which the future Indonesian officers would be chosen. In Central Java, that task fell to 
Lieutenant Tsuchiya, the director (shibucho) of Beppan's Yogyakarta office.186 Until this 
time, Tsuchiya had spent his days gathering intelligence, not least about developments 
within the Kraton, and supervising the Beppan offices in Semarang, Solo, and Madiun. 
Now, on Friday, October 8,1943, he began a recruiting drive that was to bring in a crop 
of young officer cadets, a number of whom were to rise to high office in the future 
Indonesian National Army. One of them was Soeharto.187
Recruits for a Volunteer Force
For ten days in mid-October 1943, Tsuchiya conducted a whistle-stop tour of 
Central Java and parts of East Java, interviewing applicants for the volunteer self- 
defense force. Traveling by car and accompanied by an Indies-born Japanese civilian 
interpreter and a Japanese army medical officer, he visited as many as ten cities, setting
186 Tsuchiya, who combined intelligence and drive with a good sense of humor, was to have an impact on 
the future Indonesian officer corps perhaps second only to that of Yanagawa. A graduate of a technical 
school in Shizuoka, Tsuchiya worked for twelve to eighteen months in a Japanese factory that made 
military binoculars before joining the Army Air Force. He spent a year as a cadet at an Army Air Force 
school, and stayed on for six months as an instructor. In 1938, he was sent to join the first main entering 
class at the recently opened Nakano Gakko, where he met Yanagawa and Yonemura Masao, who was also 
to play an important role in Java. Following his graduation in 1939, he was commissioned as a second 
lieutenant and assigned to intelligence duties at the War Office in Tokyo. In December that year, he was 
transferred to military headquarters in Taiwan, where he made a study of the Dutch East Indies and 
French Indochina and began to teach himself Malay. Recalled to Tokyo in October 1941, Tsuchiya was 
assigned to Sixteenth Army headquarters, where he conducted further research on the Dutch Indies. 
Landing in Java in March 1942 with a branch force of the invading army, he moved to Bandung, where he 
spent about three months in the special intelligence office (bunshitsu) of the Second Division. From there 
he went to Jakarta, where he joined Beppan. In June 1943, he took over as the director of Beppan's Yogya 
branch from First Lieutenant Yonemura, who had also been transferred from Taiwan to Java. The Yogya 
branch had one officer, one sergeant-major, and three interpreters. Interviews, Tsuchiya Kiso, Mishima, 
February 2,1999, and March 2001; Tsuchiya Kiso, written communication, May 29, 2002; "Interrogation of 
Captain Tsuchiya Kiso at Glodok Jail," Southeast Asia Translation and Interrogation Center Intelligence 
Bulletin No. 228, January 25,1946, p. 26, TNA/ PRO WO 203/ 6306; and "Statement of Capt. TSUCHIYA 
Kiso, member of the 'Beppan' (NANSEITAI) Staff," p. 1.
187 Among the others recruited in Central Java, either in this or in the two subsequent Peta intakes, were 
Sudirman, the future panglima besar (commander-in-chief); four future army chiefs of staff (G. P. H. 
Djatikusumo, Bambang Sugeng, Achmad Yani, and Surono); Gatot Soebroto, a future deputy army chief of 
staff; Sarwo Edhie, a future commander of the elite red beret unit; and Sarbini, a future minister for 
veterans affairs.
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up his mobile recruitment office in schools and community centers. In each of these 
towns, Japanese and Indonesian officials had publicized the recruitment program and 
attended to the necessary paperwork, but it was Tsuchiya who conducted the 
interviews and made the selections, sitting at a small table, with the interpreter on his 
left and the doctor on his right. Although it had not been planned that way, the 
selection of potential Indonesian officer cadets was rushed and rudimentary, even 
slapdash at times.188 But the decisions made by Tsuchiya and by his two Beppan 
colleagues in East and West Java were to have a profound impact on the shape of the 
future Indonesian National Army.189
In Central Java there were many hopeful applicants, perhaps two thousand in all, 
and no time for niceties. Tsuchiya did not invite applicants to sit down because it took 
up too much time. "It was quite rushed," he said. "When I lookback, it was a rush."190 
In Yogyakarta, Tsuchiya got through all four hundred applicants in one day. A large 
number went away disappointed. "There were some to whom I said, 'Leave!' and the 
guys were so reluctant to leave and said, 'Please recruit me!' There were many of those. 
But there was a limit to the number we could recruit. It was a hard job to screen out 
those applicants." Working from early morning until dusk, Tsuchiya was quick to 
establish a routine. "I did not give ranking to applicants," he said. "They were simply 
placed in two categories—either pass or fail. There was no written test. They were 
asked only two or three oral questions and, if accepted, proceeded to the physical 
examination. I selected those who were cheerful, pleasant, and seemingly smart."191 
When it came to choosing potential company commanders, Tsuchiya tended to favor 
young men who looked physically strong and who had worked as schoolteachers or 
served with the police force, the civil defense organization, or one of the many youth
188 "Selection was to be made after strict screening of a large number of volunteers," a Japanese officer 
noted immediately after the war. "But as a matter of fact, urgency led to indiscriminate selection." See 
"Document taken from 16 Army HQ," NEFIS Document 2618, November 14,1946, NIOD IC No. 006501-
006506, p. 3.
189 Before he set out on his recruitment drive, Tsuchiya asked several organizations in Yogyakarta to 
recommend suitable candidates for the Peta. He contacted the provincial government office, which passed 
his request on to the Seinendan (youth group), the Keibodan (civil defense organization), and schools. He 
also contacted the Kenpeitai, the civilian police force, and a number of army defense companies (rikugun- 
boeitai). He sought the views of his colleagues in Beppan as well. This effort yielded a crop of names. In 
Central Java, Tsuchiya was responsible for recruiting daidartchos, chudanchos, and shodanchos. According to 
Tsuchiya: "We used two channels to reach potential daidanchos— provincial governors and Beppan's 
Islamic Guidance Section. We asked provincial governors to recommend people from religious and 
neighborhood groups, as well as people from government offices, whom they thought had strong 
leadership qualities. ... Beppan's Islamic section gave us names, too." Tsuchiya Kiso, written 
communication, May 6, 2003.
Using Yogyakarta as his base, Tsuchiya made day trips to some of the towns on his list, staying 
overnight at one or two of the more distant locations. During his ten-day recruitment drive, he 
interviewed candidates in Yogyakarta, Magelang, Semarang, Solo, Madiun, Pati, Mojokerto, Bojonegoro, 
and, possibly, Banyumas. Morimoto, Jawa boei giyugun-shi, p. 84. Tsuchiya was unable to recall visiting 
Banyumas; he thought that that region, known for producing many soldiers, may have been part of 
Yanagawa's recruitment pool.
190 Interview, Tsuchiya Kiso, February 2,1999.
191 Interview, Tsuchiya Kiso, May 6, 2003, and written communication, September 17, 2003. Candidates of 
interest were asked to give their age, address, and educational background, and to answer one or two 
other questions. They were also required to provide information about family members. Tsuchiya Kiso, 
written communication, September 16, 2003.
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groups.192 "As for platoon commanders [shodancho], I selected vigorous, enthusiastic 
young men whose attitude was firm and who spoke clearly."193 How long, Tsuchiya 
was asked, had each interview lasted; would an applicant have had perhaps ten 
minutes before the board? "Shorter than that," he replied, his face creasing into a broad 
smile. "Some, ten seconds! The minute I saw someone I could tell if he was suitable. 
Usually I spent one or two minutes on those I thought had potential."194
First Lieutenant Yanagawa Motoshige (seated) interviews a potential Feta recruit inBogor, October 10, 
I c)43, while General Harada and others look on. Pradjoerit 3 (1944-45).
One of those deemed to have potential was Soeharto. As Tsuchiya recalled,
We borrowed the site of an elementary school for the examinations, and it is there 
that I first met Soeharto. Since many years have passed, 1 don't have too vivid a 
memory of Soeharto at that time. But we met each recruit face to face—individual 
interviews were conducted—and I can say that his manner was so crisp and clear.
192 The main consideration of the Japanese was that the candidates be reasonably literate; in 1942, illiteracy 
was widespread in Java. Officers had to be able to read and understand instructions, write reports, keep 
records, and so on. Ben Anderson, personal communication, February 26, 2009.
193 Tsuchiya Kiso, written communication, May 6, 2003.
194 Interview, Tsuchiya Kiso, February 2,1 ‘->‘->‘-1
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The words he chose when responding to my questions were very clear-cut and 
easy to understand. There was nothing I could grade as a minus.195
Like so many others over the years, Tsuchiya was struck by Soeharto's composure. "He 
was calm. He looked confident. No appearance of being intimidated." Asked how he 
would rate Soeharto among the 230 men he selected for the platoon commanders 
course, Tsuchiya replied, "He belonged to the top class!" That was due in large part to 
the fact that his education, however incomplete, was infinitely better than that of so 
many of the others who were seeking admission.
You must realize that the educational level of Indonesian youngsters in those days 
was very low. They had very little education. Anybody who had had some years of 
schooling found it easy to be prominent. Even those who had had only a few years 
in elementary school could be conspicuous. There weren't many who had a junior- 
high-school education, and so to have graduated from a high school was something 
you could be really proud of. Those people with even a little education stood out 
among those who had only a smattering of education.196
Yanagawa, who was conducting interviews in West Java, found the same thing. As 
he said later, "Quality, both in physique and education, was rather lower than we had 
expected, and it was very difficult to find suitable people."197
Soeharto had been advised by Superintendent Okamoto to apply for selection in 
the volunteer army. But why was Okamoto willing to dispense with the services of an 
assistant on whom he had come to depend? Did he feel under pressure from the army? 
To some extent, he probably did. "If he was under any pressure at all," Tsuchiya said, 
"I suspect it could have come from Soeharto himself, with his strong wish to enter the 
volunteer army. But it is also possible that he felt pressure from within himself to 
cooperate with the commander's proclamation and with Beppan."198
In giving the green light to the formation of the new self-defense force, the 
Sixteenth Army had ruled that no former members of the KNIL were to be recruited.199 
The loyalties of such men, it was thought, might be suspect. Aware of the ruling, 
Soeharto took care to make no mention of his service in the KNIL, just as he had in the 
police interview nearly a year earlier. He was to remain "watchful" for some time 
thereafter, "hoping the Japanese would never discover this and arrest me."200 As it 
happened, Tsuchiya knew that Soeharto had served in the Dutch colonial army and 
chose to ignore the fact.201
The policy ... was that we should not admit anyone who had worked in the former 
Dutch army, regardless of position. However, those who had worked in the Dutch
195 Ibid.
196 Ibid.
197 Yanagawa "Statement," Part I, p. 5.
198 Tsuchiya Kiso, written communication, May 6, 2003.
199 Morimoto, Jawa bod giyugun-shi, p. 83.
200 Soeharto, My Thoughts, p. 19.
201 In his memoir in the Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Tsuchiya noted, "Soeharto said he hid the fact that he had 
once belonged to the Dutch army in order to be admitted to the PETA. But we knew he had been there." 
Interview, Tsuchiya Kiso, February 2,1999.
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army were from the elite, and they had good brains as well as physical strength. So 
I thought it would be a pity if we didn't admit them. And I happened to see 
Soeharto in Yogyakarta. Soeharto was a former Dutch army noncommissioned 
officer ... It was against the military policy, but I thought it would be a shame not 
to hire a capable person like this so I decided to admit him.202
As Tsuchiya saw it, Soeharto's attributes outweighed any drawbacks that might 
have been associated with his prior service in the KNIL.
It was my belief the internal order from military headquarters was a bad one. 
Because I was aware that all Indonesians had feelings against the Dutch. And the 
fact that a person had once been in the Dutch army wouldn't prove that he would 
cooperate with Holland and fight against the Japanese regime. So I myself thought 
this order very strange.203
Having made his decision, Tsuchiya passed Soeharto over to the doctor. Soeharto was 
asked to strip down to his underpants—he was presumably no longer wearing his 
KNIL-issue underpants—for a brief examination. Soeharto had no skin disease, TB, or 
any other obvious problem and was pronounced medically fit.
In later years, Soeharto was to claim that he was one of only two applicants 
selected in Yogyakarta out of about five hundred who turned up.204 This is 
demonstrably untrue, the distortion of a man who never missed an opportunity to 
polish up his credentials. It was true that only a small number of applicants were 
deemed suitable, but Tsuchiya recruited at least twenty or thirty men in Yogyakarta 
that day.205 And the list of those who joined the same 230-strong training company as 
Soeharto includes the names of at least three men who were to become close associates 
of the future president and serve with him during the war and the Revolution. They 
included Soedjono, Soemyarsono, and Pranoto Reksosamoedra. Soeharto must have 
known that his statement about being one of only two men selected in Yogyakarta was 
false when he made it.
As soon as he had met his recruitment quota, Tsuchiya wound up his Beppan job in 
Yogyakarta and left for Bogor, where he was to accept the successful candidates from 
Central Java. He had only one or two days before the entrance ceremony was held, on 
October 20.206 At Bogor, the recruits were to be divided into five groups: a Special 
Company for the thirty-three men who were to be trained as battalion commanders
202 Interview, Tsuchiya Kiso, February 2,1999. Lieutenant Colonel Miyamoto Shizuo, who arrived in Java 
in April 1944, and who was one of four staff officers responsible to the chief of staff of the Sixteenth Army, 
echoed those sentiments. Although he did not meet Soeharto at that time —"[Soeharto] was way, way 
down" in the hierarchy—he heard from his fellow officers before the end of the war that "Soeharto was so 
capable that he should be recruited even though he had been with the Dutch army." Interview, Colonel 
Miyamoto Shizuo, Tokyo, February 4,1999. According to Taniguchi Taketsugu, the former Kenpeitai chief 
in Bogor, Soeharto's service in the KNIL was not something Soeharto needed to hide. "The Sixteenth 
Army," he said, "didn't take it as a big issue." Interview, Taniguchi Taketsugu, Tokyo, February 1,1999.
Six decades later, Tsuchiya was unaware that another of the men he almost certainly recruited, Achmad 
Yani, had, like Soeharto, been a sergeant in the KNIL.
203 Interview, Tsuchiya Kiso, February 2,1999.
204 Soeharto, "Watashi no Rirekisho."
205 Tsuchiya Kiso, telephone conversation, September 15, 2003.
206 See Morimoto, Jawa boei giyugun-shi, p. 85. Yanagawa says the course opened on October 22. See 
Yanagawa "Statement," Part I, p. 5
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(idaidancho), a First Company for the 127 company commanders (chudancho), and three 
companies for the platoon commanders (shodancho). Tsuchiya took command of the 
Fourth Company, which was to train the 230 platoon commanders from Central Java, 
including Soeharto.207
The 850 Indonesians who joined the first intake at the Bogor officer training 
center—and the 1,300 others who were to follow them in 1944—came from three 
distinct age cohorts and, indeed, layers in society. Those selected for training as 
battalion commanders were prominent local figures who were thought by the Japanese 
to have "influence among and authority over the youth."208 Of these, 30 or 40 percent 
had a strong Islamic background.209 Although their professional skills would never be 
up to standard (the Japanese had decided to give the battalion commanders only six 
weeks' training, which was half the planned time set aside for the instruction of the 
platoon commanders), their social position and charisma were what counted. Their 
task was to ensure that the local Peta unit had the all-out support of the community. 
'The wisdom of this recruitment policy," a retired Indonesian officer observed, 
"became evident during the war against the Dutch: our troops easily got the support of 
the population."210
Battalion commanders were, on average, nearly twenty years older than platoon 
commanders, most of whom were recruited directly from school and still in their teens. 
As such, they were more experienced, more politically astute, and more wary of the 
Japanese, if not openly hostile to them, than were the younger men. The company 
commanders, who formed a middle layer between these two groups, were generally
207 For the details, see Yanagawa "Statement," Part I, p. 7. Morimoto gives slightly different, rounded 
figures. See Morimoto, Jawa boei giyugun-shi, pp. 86-87. Yanagawa was the commander of the Third 
Company, which had 246 cadets from West Java. The Second Company, commanded by Lieutenant 
Yonemura Masao, had 220 cadets from East Java. The three shodancho training companies consisted of four 
sections (kutai), each with about fifty-five to sixty men. On paper, the commanding officer at Bogor was 
Colonel Uchino Uichi. But he was busy with other duties at Sixteenth Army Headquarters, and the man 
who actually ran the center (and who personally trained the daidanchos) was the deputy commander, 
Captain Maruzaki.
208 Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution, pp. 20-21.
209 This estimate was given by Lieutenant General Purbo Suwondo, who has written extensively on the 
Peta. Personal communication, July 8, 2009. Harry Benda, working from incomplete data and admitting 
that his conclusions are tentative, appears to overstate the Islamic dimension. Discussing the Peta, he 
writes that, "Muslims played an outstanding role from the very beginning." The Indonesian officer corps, 
he adds, "contained a great number of kiyai. As far as can be ascertained, the new Indonesian military elite 
in effect drew its main strength from Muslim leaders and from members of the aristocracy." Muslims 
"soon occupied an important, and perhaps even a predominant, place" in the Peta officer corps. See Harry 
J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam Under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945 (KITLV, 
Dordrecht: Foris Publications Holland/USA, 1983 [original: The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1958]), pp. 138-40. 
While it is true that there were a number of devout Muslim daidanchos in the Peta—including such men as 
Kasman Singodimedjo (a lawyer and former head of the Muhammadiyah in Jakarta), Sudirman (a Cilacap 
schoolteacher who would be elected in 1945 as the commander-in-chief of the Indonesian Army), Arudji 
Kartawinata, and Imam Sudjai'i—the Islamic factor should not be exaggerated. An identification with 
Islam does not seem to have been disproportionately strong, at least in Central Java, among the 
chudanchos, and still less so among the shodanchos, who would go on to play such a significant role in the 
future national army.
210 Written communication, Major General Soetarto Sigit, August 5, 2000. As one Japanese document put it, 
the aim was to recruit "local influential persons with an intense racial spirit." See "Document taken from 
16 Army HQ," p. 3. The word "racial" should perhaps have been translated as "nationalistic." The central 
role of the daidancho "was to give moral leadership and exercise political supervision over their 
subordinates."
48 David Jenkins
about ten to fourteen years older than the platoon commanders. Some of the company 
commanders were well-educated men who had been schoolteachers in the Dutch era, 
but there were also religious teachers, civil servants, and prominent local figures.211
The officer cadets who joined the Peta were motivated by a range of 
considerations.212 Almost all of the battalion and company commanders had been 
"persuaded" to enlist in the volunteer force during informal meetings with Japanese 
officials.213 Many of the company commanders seem to have had no interest at all in a 
military career but joined because of the pressure that had been brought to bear or 
because they were convinced that it was necessary for Indonesians to obtain military 
skills. Although the Japanese were careful to make no promises about independence, 
"most Indonesians had a feeling that somehow Indonesian independence would soon 
come, in whatever form."214 When that time arrived, an army would be one of the 
prerequisites. Some of the cadets were driven by careerist considerations. They 
reasoned that their involvement in the volunteer defense force would open up avenues 
for social advancement "where other fields of endeavor had for them reached a dead 
end."
Most of the cadet officers, however, joined up willingly, albeit "with various 
degrees of fervor." Some were convinced that their country's well-being was closely 
linked to the fortunes of Japan in the Pacific War. Others believed that Peta would 
serve as "one large training camp to produce military cadres for independent 
Indonesia."215 In later years, a number of those who went through the officer-cadet 
program said they had been influenced by the eight-hundred-year-old Joyoboyo 
prophesy. According to a version current during the Japanese occupation, "the 
Javanese would be ruled by white men for three centuries and by yellow dwarfs for the 
life time of a maize plant, prior to the achievement of a golden age."216 On balance, one 
Indonesian researcher tactfully concluded, "Most Peta officers were motivated by 
patriotism, although the element of careerism was not altogether absent."217
What of Soeharto? What drove him? In the later stages of the war, when the 
harshness and brutality of Japanese rule was becoming impossible to ignore, Soeharto 
seems to have become increasingly nationalistic, although he was careful to disguise 
any anti-Japanese sentiments he may have felt and was to go on serving until the bitter 
end, a loyal instrument of Japanese Army oppression, trusted by his superiors and 
rewarded with important assignments. In 1943, it was a very different matter. 
Soeharto's careerist instincts, always well developed, would have told him that the
211 Interview, Colonel Soepardio, Bogor, September 10,1998.
212 See Nugroho Notosusanto, "The Peta Army During the Japanese Occupation," pp. 125-29, on which 
this section is based.
213 Ibid., p. 125. It seems unlikely that most of them were persuaded by members of Beppan, as Nugroho 
claims. According to Nugroho, those with a Muslim background were approached by Abdul Hamid Ono, 
the so-called Islamic expert in Beppan. Those with a non-Islamic background were approached by 
Yanagawa and his colleagues.
214 Ibid., p. 126.
215 Ibid., p. 128.
216 Cribb, Historical Dictionary of Indonesia, p. 228.
217 Nugroho Notosusanto, "The Peta Army During the Japanese Occupation," p. 128. Nugroho went on to 
become the head of the Indonesian Army history department. He was later appointed rector of the 
University of Indonesia and then minister of education under Soeharto.
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Peta was a promising avenue, one in which he could put to good use the experience he 
had gained in the KNIL. Besides, he apparently had little say in the matter. It is clear 
that Okamoto encouraged him to join the Peta, and Soeharto would have known that 
the Japanese would not look favorably on a refusal. According to Nugroho 
Notosusanto, an Indonesian historian and honorary brigadier general in the TNI, those 
who were ordered by their superiors to join the Peta
... felt no particular ardor for their new status, but they did not dislike it either. 
Among them we could find people who would do their best to perform any job 
entrusted to them, and some of them were to continue their military career after the 
independence of Indonesia was achieved, reaching top positions in the Indonesian 
Armed Forces.218
Nugroho, who was something of a careerist himself, may not have been thinking of 
Soeharto when he wrote these words, but the cap does seem to fit. Soeharto, of course, 
puts a very different spin on these events, collapsing events and stressing only the 
nationalist aspects. As he told a Japanese journalist,
Without the fighting spirit and patriotism that was hammered into us in the Peta, I 
don't think we would have been able to drive the Dutch away when they came 
back to recolonize us. I am grateful to the Japanese army in that sense. However, 
my gut feeling is that their real purpose in occupying Indonesia was not the 
"Liberation of Asia" but something they did in their own interests. The reason why 
we cooperated with them was to gain our independence.219
"He Was From Another World"
Bogor stands, green and damp, at the foot of Mt. Salak (7,185 feet), forty miles 
south of central Jakarta. Behind the town, which is 860 feet above sea level and 
pleasantly cool, a narrow road begins its tortuous climb up through the tea plantations 
and on across the mountainous backbone of Java towards the upland city of Bandung. 
A Dutch Governor General, Baron van Imhoff, had built a retreat in Bogor, which he 
renamed Buitenzorg ("Without a Care"), in 1745 to escape the unhealthy climate of the 
capital, and he had made sketches for a splendid official residence, modeled on 
Blenheim Palace in England. The building that eventually appeared, remodeled and 
rebuilt many times, painted a dazzling white and looking nothing like Blenheim,
218 Ibid., p. 127.
219 Soeharto, "Watashi no rirekisho." The fact that the Peta cadets were, by the very nature of things, 
overwhelmingly Javanese and Sundanese helps explain why, after 1945, the Indonesian army had so many 
Javanese and Sundanese officers, a sore point among some people, both military and civilian, in the Outer 
Islands. Another part of the explanation for the Java-centric nature of the future Indonesian army is that 
the republic was restricted to the Javanese and Sundanese areas, plus Sumatra, during the revolution. 
Interestingly, the three brightest stars at Tangerang had been non-Javanese—Zulkifli Lubis (Batak), Daan 
Mogot (Menadonese), and Kemal Idris (Minangkabau). Equally interesting is the fact that the three most 
prominent members of the pre-war Royal Dutch Military Academy (KMA) in Bandung were non- 
Javanese. T. B. Simatupang, who became chief of staff of the armed forces, was a Batak. So, too, was A. H. 
Nasution, a future army chief of staff. Another KMA cadet, Alex Kawilarang, perhaps the most widely 
respected field officer in post-war Indonesia, was Menadonese. Simatupang was the "Crown cadet" at the 
KMA, meaning that he was the top student of his year, beating all his classmates, who were 
overwhelmingly Dutch and Eurasian. It is also true that most, if not all, of these six officers had spent at 
least some of their senior high school years on Java. Three of the six were Christians.
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became in time the primary residence of the governors-general. It was set down amid 
ninety-five acres of lushness and greenery, with sweeping lawns supporting a large 
herd of spotted deer, imported from Holland. Alongside it was the world famous 
Botanical Garden, which had been started by Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles.
Soeharto arrived in Bogor on Tuesday, October 19, having traveled from 
Yogyakarta on a Japanese army truck in the company of other prospective platoon 
commanders.220 If he had any misgivings as he entered the former KNIL compound, 
which stood, with its imposing new Japanese gateway, a short distance to the north of 
the palace and the adjacent small town, they are likely to have been fleeting. He and 
his fellow cadets from Central Java were greeted warmly by Tsuchiya, an officer who 
radiated authority, energy, and enthusiasm. Although he was only eight or nine years 
older than most of his charges, Tsuchiya appears to have had a paternal concern for 
their education and well-being. And even allowing for the possibility of some post­
factum rationalization, he seems to have been more of an Indonesian nationalist than 
most of those in his training company, Soeharto included. Tsuchiya says that, during 
this period, he believed in the goal of Indonesian independence, even if he and his 
colleagues were not permitted to talk of such matters for the time being. "We felt we 
Japanese should go there and work for their freedom," he claimed many years later. "It 
was with this wish and this high hope that we departed Japan. Long before Peta was 
founded, there was, very deep in our hearts, the hope that some day soon Japan would 
help Indonesia become free."221 Nor was Soeharto entering an unfamiliar world. He 
already knew a good deal about army life from his time in the KNIL, and he knew a 
good deal about the Japanese from his time in the police force. Moreover, he was to be 
billeted with more than two hundred other young men from Central Java, cocooned in 
a Javanese world, just as he had been when he served as a corporal in an ethnic 
Javanese KNIL infantry company in East Java.
At the same time, Soeharto may have felt that he had little in common with many 
of those undertaking the shodancho course. For one thing, there was the significant age 
difference separating the cohorts. At the broad base of the officer cadet pyramid, the 
accent was on youth. As many as 80 percent of the prospective platoon commanders 
were either schoolboys, recruited directly from junior high school, or young men not 
long out of school.222 The other 20 percent were, for the most part, low-level 
government employees, most of them in their late teens or early twenties. Soeharto, 
who was twenty-two, was five years older than most of those in his intake. He was also 
a great deal more experienced than most of them, having worked for the 
Volkscredietbank, having risen up through the KNIL to the rank of sergeant, and 
having served for nearly a year as a policeman under the Japanese.
Socially and educationally, it was another matter. Among the 2,088 cadets who 
were to be pushed through the three shodancho and chudancho courses at Bogor in 1943- 
44 were eleven young Javanese princes or other members of the nobility, ten of them
220 Morimoto, Jawa bod giyugun-shi, p. 84.
221 Interview, Tsuchiya Kiso, February 2,1999.
222 Interview, Lieutenant General Purbo Suwondo, July 31, 2002.
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from the courts of Solo and one from Yogyakarta.223 Nor were these aristocrats 
swimming alone in a sea of commoners. As many as 70 or 80 percent of the shodancho 
cadets came from the ranks of the priyayi, albeit in many cases the lower tiers of that 
social category.224 "Most of us were from a priyayi background," said Lieutenant 
General Purbo Suwondo, an East Javanese officer whose father had been a school 
inspector in the Dutch education system. "Certain background, certain values, certain 
philosophies, certain standards of living."225 Soeharto was, of course, from a non-
223 Princelings and other young aristocrats of the two royal courts of Solo were well represented in the Peta 
officer corps, with no fewer than ten signing up. The two royal courts of Yogyakarta were represented 
hardly at all, and what representation there was came from the Pakualaman.
Four members of the Sunanate of Surakarta (Solo) joined—or, in one case, nearly joined—the Peta. 
They were G. P. H. Poerbonegoro, a Breda graduate and former KNIL officer who was to have joined a 
daidancho course, only to withdraw; G. P. H. Djatikusumo, a former cadet at the KNIL Reserve Officers 
Training Corps (Corps Opleiding Reserve-Officieren, or CORO) in Bandung who became a chudancho; R. 
M. Subroto Kusmardjo, who became a Yugeki shodancho; and R. M. Sukandar Tjokronegoro, a chudancho 
who became a senior officer at TNI headquarters in Yogya. In 1936, Djatikusumo had been offered a place 
at the Royal Military Academy in Breda. He turned it down because, as an officer in the Dutch army, he 
would have had to swear an oath of loyalty to the Dutch Queen "and that is too difficult." Interview, 
Lieutenant General G. P. H. Djatikusumo, Jakarta, March 9,1981. Sukandar, who was expelled from the 
elite Dutch-language Higher Civil School (Hogere Burger School, HBS) in Malang after a clash with a 
Dutch teacher who is said to have hated pribumis, finished senior high school in Jakarta. He later went to 
Tokyo, where he studied economics. When the war broke out, he joined an army officers' school and 
graduated as a first lieutenant (chui). He landed at Kragen, East Java, with the Japanese invasion force. 
When the Peta was established, he was transferred to that body as a chudancho and was posted to Bogor, 
where he served as a staff officer. He was later assigned to the Yugekitai in Malang, where he played an 
active role in forming the Untung Suropati Division. He became deputy chief of staff of the TNI under 
Lieutenant General Oerip Soemohardjo. He died, as did Oerip, in 1948.
Seven members of the Mangkunegaran joined the Peta. They were: the future Mangkunegoro VIII, K. 
P. H. Hamidjojo Saroso, who became a chudancho; his younger brother, K. P. H. Hamidjojo Santoso, who 
became a shodancho; and five grandsons of Mangkunegoro VI—R. M. Yonosewoyo (shodancho), R. M. 
Yonohatmodjo (shodancho), R. M. Ronokusumo (Yugeki shodancho and later chudancho), R. M. Ronopuspito 
(Yugeki shodancho), and R. M. Ronopradopo (Yugeki shodancho). Written communication, Lieutenant 
General Purbo Suwondo, May 20, 2002.1 am not aware of any members of the Yogya Kraton who became 
Peta officers. As far as I know, only one member of the Pakualaman, K. R. M. T. Soemyarsono, joined the 
Peta. Reflecting on this phenomenon, Djatikusumo said that one group of cadets had come from the 
bangsawan (nobility). "What is bangsawan? The bluebloods! The Tjakraningrats from Madura. 
Mangkunegoro, with his younger brother. And us. Not from Yogya! Very strange!" Asked why this was 
so, he replied, "I don't know!" Interview, Lieutenant General G. P. H. Djatikusumo, Jakarta, March 9,1981.
224 By this time, Benedict Anderson has noted, the word priyayi was being used in such a loose manner that 
even a postal clerk could describe himself as low priyayi, allowing him to bask in the glow of a term still 
tinged with connotations of aristocracy. In the 1940s, there was not much of a nobility left on Java. Many 
of these priyayi were simply children of officials, "quite petty bourgeois but with typical aristocratic 
pretensions." Benedict Anderson, personal communication.
225 Interview, Lieutenant General Purbo Suwondo, Jakarta, September 1,1998. Purbo's suggestion that 70 
to 80 percent of the shodancho cadets were from a priyayi background fits broadly with the findings of a 
1977 study. In a sample of 124 ex-Peta officers, Nugroho Notosusanto found that 70 percent (fifty-nine out 
of eighty-four) of the shodanchos were from a priyayi background. However, thirty-eight of them were from 
the low priyayi, a category that included men whose fathers were train conductors, pawnshop keepers, 
and NCOs; nineteen were from the "middle" priyayi and two from the "grand" priyayi. There was one 
member of the nobility, and twenty-four commoners. See Nugroho, "The Peta Army During the Japanese 
Occupation," p. 122. According to Major General Moersjid, more than half the Peta platoon commanders 
were the sons of government officials. Interview, General Moersjid, Jakarta, May 8, 2000. Moersjid was a 
member of the second shodancho intake in 1944, together with Widodo, who later became Army chief of 
staff; Supardjo Rustam, who became interior minister; and Daryatmo, who became speaker of the People's 
Deliberative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR). Some shodancho cadets were the sons of 
aristocrats and entitled to call themselves Raden Mas. Some others were the grandsons of aristocrats and
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priyayi background, although he had lived for some years with his uncle, a government 
official in Wuryantoro. This made him something of an outsider.
In pre-war Java, elevated social status had tended to go hand-in-hand with better- 
than-average education, which served only to deepen the divide between Soeharto and 
many of his fellow cadets, especially those who had been selected as future company 
and battalion commanders.226 As many as 10 percent of those in Soeharto's intake had 
attended one of the prestigious Dutch-language senior high schools, or the Japanese 
occupation equivalent; they were not only fluent in Dutch, but had acquired the 
European social graces that were essential if one were to rise in pre-war colonial 
society.227 Some had gone on, after completing secondary school, to study at the 
medical faculty, the civil servants' college, the agricultural college, or one of the 
teachers' training colleges. Of those in Soeharto's intake, 80 percent had spent three 
(sometimes four) years in a Dutch-language junior high school or its Japanese 
equivalent. As a result, they had enjoyed an education that nearly matched the training 
acquired by students who had attended Dutch-language senior high schools, save for 
the fact that their Dutch was not quite as fluent and their schooling had ended by the 
time they were sixteen, before they could go on to senior high. The remaining 10 
percent came from a much less exalted educational background. Some, like Soeharto, 
had attended a schakelschool. Others had attended vocational schools. A small 
percentage had come from a pesantren, or rural Islamic boarding school.228 In some of 
the training companies at Bogor, almost everyone was from an urban, middle-class, 
Dutch-speaking background. "In my kutai [section] of thirty East Java cadets," said 
Purbo Suwondo, "there was only one who was from a pesantren. The rest were at least 
junior high students. In my one-hundred-man company, I think there were only one or 
two cadets who came from a pesantren ... Maybe 95 percent had attended a MULO 
junior high school."229
In short, there was a significant educational, as well as a social, cleavage between 
the shodancho cadets at Bogor. Ninety percent of the young men in Soeharto's intake 
were at home in the Dutch language, at ease in the modern world, and had spent at 
least three years in junior high school, which put them in the category of the relatively 
well-educated in 1943. A minority had come from a world in which Javanese families
in a position to call themselves Raden. Most chose not to use these titles as a gesture to the new spirit of 
egalitarianism that came with the revolution.
226 The correlation between social status and education was not automatic, of course. A man such as G. P. 
H. Djatikusumo, a son of Pakubuwono X of Solo, might have received a sound Dutch education, in Java 
and in the Netherlands. But many Kraton princelings had little education.
227 These were the Higher Civil Schools and General Secondary Schools (Algemene Middelbare Scholen, 
AMS). Under the Japanese, the AMS was replaced by Sekolah Menengah Tinggi (Higher Middle School), 
in which the language of instruction was Indonesian. Below that was the Sekolah Menengah Pertama 
(Lower Middle School), which replaced the More Extensive Lower Education (Meer Uitgebreide Lagere 
Onderwijs, or MULO) junior high schools.
228 A non-Western education was by no means an impediment to a successful military career. Major 
General Muchlas Rowi, a pesantren student who trained as a chudancho, became a successful battalion 
commander in the Untung Suropati Division in Malang. In the early 1950s, he took private Dutch- 
language classes in the afternoons and evenings.
229 Interviews, Lieutenant General Purbo Suwondo, July 31, 2002, and July 8, 2009. Almost all of the cadets 
had some knowledge of the Japanese language, the high-school students having studied it for two hours a 
day for the previous eighteen months.
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spoke Dutch at home and read Dutch books, newspapers, and magazines as a matter 
of course. They had attended schools in which most of the students were Dutch or 
Eurasian. The others, while speaking Javanese or Sundanese at home, had had more 
than ten years' education in schools where the language of instruction was Dutch.
In their school days, these young men had behaved in many ways like young 
Dutch or Eurasian boys. They had known, almost by heart, the works of Karl May, the 
best-selling German author who specialized in adventure books about the Wild West, 
populating his stories with characters such as Winnetou, a fictional Apache chief, and 
his faithful sidekick, Old Shatterhand, a German 6migr6 who was an outstanding 
sharpshooter.230 They had read books about Dik Trom, a corpulent Dutch schoolboy. 
They were familiar with Pietje Bell, another fictional Dutch schoolboy. They had pored 
over the Flash Gordon stories in the Dutch magazine D'Orient. They had read about 
Dutch national heroes such as Michiel de Ruyter and Piet Hein, two seventeenth- 
century admirals, and had committed to memory the school songs dedicated to those 
men and designed to inculcate the values of Dutch nationalism and Dutch patriotism 
in students. Those cadets who had reached senior high school by the time the Japanese 
arrived had, of course, been exposed to a richer intellectual diet. They had read more 
widely and more deeply. The more serious among them had some familiarity with 
modern and classical European literature, with philosophy, with international 
relations, European imperialism, the crisis of capitalism, the rise of fascism and 
Nazism, and with Marxist thinking.231 Soeharto was one of about twenty young men, 
in a training company of 230, who did not come from a Dutch-language background. 
He may have had a fleeting acquaintance with that world while attending the 
schakelschool, but it was not his milieu. "He was from another world," said Major 
General Moersjid, with the merest sniff of condescension. "I'm not sure whether he 
had read the books by Karl May about Winnetou. Maybe he knew more than I do 
about wayang [Javanese shadow plays]."232
230 Some of the cadets had identified not with the white men in the books, as their Dutch schoolfriends are 
said to have done, but with the Native American chief, a man "oppressed" by Europeans. As it happens, 
Germans also identified with Winnetou, who was seen by his creator as a "truly noble man." "Winnetou," 
the magazine Der Spiegel noted in 2006, "is the quintessential German national hero, a paragon of virtue, a 
nature freak, a romantic, a pacifist at heart, but in a world at war he is the best warrior, alert, strong, sure." 
See Michael Kimmelman, "In Germany, Wild for Winnetou," New York Times, September 12, 2007, 
w ww.nyhmes.com/2007/09/12/arts/design/ 12karl.html (accessed on July 17, 2009).
231 This sketch of the intellectual horizons of those who had reached senior high school and university is 
drawn from J. D. Legge, Intellectuals and Nationalism in Indonesia: A Study of the Following Recruited by Sutan 
Sjahrir in Occupation Jakarta, Monograph Series, Publication No. 68 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern Indonesia 
Project, 1988), pp. 76-77. Legge is writing about the young intellectuals associated with Sjahrir, a 
privileged, unique, and well-educated group. But his study gives a sense of an intellectual environment 
that would not have been foreign to some Peta cadets, particularly those at the chudancho level.
232 Interview, Major General Moersjid, Jakarta, May 8, 2000. Moersjid, of course, had some reason to dislike 
Soeharto. When Soeharto came to power, Moersjid was arrested and jailed for more than three years, with 
no charges ever filed. At the time, his only "crime" appeared to be his unswerving loyalty to President 
Sukarno. However, Moersjid and Soeharto had clashed on at least two occasions in the early 1960s. In 
1961, when Moersjid was the assistant for operations and Soeharto the commander of the Army General 
Reserve Corps (Caduad), Moersjid blocked Soeharto's attempts to have the battalions that had been 
earmarked for Caduad duties put under his immediate command. In 1962, when Soeharto, who was head 
of the Mandala command for the liberation of West New Guinea, sought to bypass both Moersjid, who 
was by then deputy chief of staff of the Army for operations, and Major General Soeprapto, the deputy for 
administration, he was brought into line by Moersjid.
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It would be wrong, however, to make too much of these social and educational 
differences. During the Japanese occupation and in the early post-war years, the 
distinction between officers who came from a priyayi and Dutch-language stream and 
those such as Soeharto, who came from a more modest background, was of little or no 
consequence. It would only become important in the 1950s, when attempts were made 
to transform a large and unwieldy guerrilla force into a modern professional army. At 
that time, Soeharto would find himself struggling to keep up with his better-educated 
colleagues and rivals, only achieving by dint of hard work and after-hours study some 
of the educational advantages they had so effortlessly acquired. By the late Fifties, 
Soeharto would find himself bumping up against both a glass, and a class, ceiling in 
the TNI. Thanks to a combination of application, aptitude, and great good luck, he was 
to become one of the very few officers of his generation—perhaps the only one—to 
make it to a senior TNI staff position in Jakarta despite having had such a limited 
education. But it was a close call.
If the prospective Indonesian platoon commanders came from a broad cross- 
section of Javanese society, albeit weighted heavily towards the educated urban 
middle-class elite, their Japanese officers and instructors came from a similarly diverse 
social and skills background. Most of the senior officers—and they weren't really very 
senior at all—were Beppan men who had graduated from the Army Intelligence 
School. They had no expertise whatsoever when it came to training recruits in basic 
infantry skills. As Tsuchiya readily acknowledged, "We were absolute amateurs. We 
had not had much military training ourselves before we had to take on the task of 
training a large number of Indonesian army recruits ... It was like laymen training 
laymen."233 They were, however, brimming with enthusiasm and optimism. And they 
had recruited two other categories of men to look after the technical training.
Some members of the Japanese training staff at Bogor were recent graduates of the 
Reserve Officers Academy (Yobishikan Gakko), highly motivated and eager to pass on 
what they themselves had absorbed during their own eight-month training course. 
Others were combat-hardened Imperial Army noncommissioned officers, many of 
whom bore the scars of recent fighting in China and on the Malay Peninsula.234 As a 
former Indonesian cadet remembered, "My company commander, for instance, was a 
China veteran ... He had lost two of his fingers, so if he salutes back, it's only three 
fingers ... I think he [had been] wounded two or three times."235 In Soeharto's 230-man 
training company, there were twenty-eight Japanese apart from Tsuchiya—four 
officers, eight NCOs, sixteen of other ranks—as well as four interpreters and a few 
Indonesian graduates of the Tangerang Youth Training Center. "What we did," 
Tsuchiya explained, "was to let the sergeants and corporals take charge of the actual 
military training while we, the company commanders, concentrated more on 
enhancing moral and emotional strength. We put the emphasis on nurturing 
nationalism and agitating them so that they would want to fight together with the 
Japanese military for the independence of Indonesia."236
233 Interview, Tsuchiya Kiso, August 27, 2001.
234 Ibid.; and Morimoto, Jawa bod giyugun-shi, p. 89.
235 Interview, Purbo Suwondo, April 14, 1998.
236 Interview, Tsuchiya Kiso, August 27, 2001.
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"Training Took Place Even in Heavy Rain"
The Japanese entertained high hopes for the Peta, and General Harada traveled 
down to Bogor to preside over the opening ceremony, which was held on Wednesday, 
October 20, 1943.237 This did not proceed quite as expected. The young men who were 
to be trained to lead an Indonesian volunteer force had been drawn up on the parade 
ground in the early hours of the morning, and as the general took his place on the 
reviewing stand, they looked quite impressive. Their uniforms, which were modeled 
on those of the Japanese army but made from surplus KNIL cloth, consisted of a green 
tunic and jodhpurs and a brown leather belt. The prospective battalion commanders 
had high black boots. The others wore black shoes and black leather leggings.238 Some 
wore a Dutch ceremonial sword. All of this gave the Indonesians a superficial 
resemblance to Japanese officer cadets. It soon proved to be illusory. As Harada began 
his opening remarks, one of the Indonesian officer cadets fainted. He was followed by 
another and then another. Before long, cadets were falling like ninepins, even though it 
was barely 8:00 AM, and the sun was still low in the sky. The Japanese looked on in 
dismay. "Everyone stood there in line," Tsuchiya said, "and the commander-in-chief 
addressed them for about forty minutes. But he was only five minutes into his speech 
when officer cadets began to fall down, one after another. The commander-in-chief was 
so disappointed. Later he said to us, 'Can this really be successful with such weak 
soldiers?' Of course, we were all disappointed."239 The recruits had succumbed to what 
the Japanese called nisshabyo (sunstroke). "It's more than fainting," said Tsuchiya. 
"They were hardly alive. They were barely breathing." Tsuchiya and his fellow officers 
wondered themselves if the Javanese and Sundanese cadets would be able to endure 
the severe training the Japanese had in store for them. "It was astonishing to us. We 
were surprised how weak they were. They weren't expected to do anything except 
stand."240
Despite the unpromising start, the Beppan officers were determined to make a 
success of the training program. They knew they had too little time to give the cadets 
all the necessary technical skills. They knew, too, that there were not enough textbooks 
to go around.241 None of this fazed them. Fired with enthusiasm themselves, they 
sought to instill a similar enthusiasm into their Indonesian charges. At Bogor, there 
was an unrelenting emphasis on the importance of nurturing spiritual strength (seishin-
237 Morimoto, Jawa bod giyugun-shi, p. 85.
238 Nugroho, "The Peta Army During the Japanese Occupation," pp. 171-72.
239 Interview, Tsuchiya Kiso, February 2,1999.
240 Ibid. See also Morimoto, Jawa bod giyugun-shi, p. 88.
241 Captain Yamazaki Hajime, who was later to head the Planning Department for the Guidance of the Java 
Volunteer Defense Force (Giyugun Shidobu), although formally only the number-three man in that 
organization, gives an example of how difficult it was to translate Japanese military texts into Indonesian: 
"It took almost a month before we agreed on the translation of such basic terms as heishi (soldier). We 
didn't want to use soldaat because it was Dutch, the enemy language. Kesatria sounded as archaic as 
mononofu in Japanese. After much discussion, we settled on prajurit. But even that didn't seem just right. 
Prajurit sounded a little outdated, like samurai in Japanese." See Yamazaki Hajime, Kita-ni minami-ni 
[Northward, Southward] (published privately by Yamazaki in Takasaki, Gunma Prefecture, 1977), pp. 80- 
81.
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ryoku) and enhancing self-awareness and enthusiasm.242 Seishin had been greatly 
emphasized in the training of intelligence officers at the Nakano Gakko.243 It was also 
fundamental to Japanese army doctrine, which continued to stress the primacy of 
spiritual factors—loyalty, faith in victory, aggressiveness, and fighting spirit—over 
material ones in warfare.244 The army's successes against superior forces in the Sino- 
Japanese war (1894-95) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) "gave its leaders 
confidence that their unique Japanese fighting spirit would ensure victory even against 
nominally stronger enemies."245 As it happened, this was to prove a costly delusion for 
the Japanese, who, alone among the great powers, had never experienced at firsthand 
the destructive firepower of the modern weapons used on the European fronts in 
World War I.246 However, the belief in voluntarism, the idea that a highly motivated 
force can overcome a better equipped enemy, proved of critical importance in 
Indonesia. It came to underpin and reinforce the Indonesian concept of semangat, or 
revolutionary ardor, which was to be such an important energizing force in the post­
war struggle for independence.
The Japanese knew, of course, that they would be able to get more out of their 
charges if they could tell them they would be fighting for an independent Indonesia. 
But for now, the word "independence" was taboo.247 "The educational goals would 
have been attained more quickly if we could have openly hoisted the slogan of 
Indonesian independence," one Japanese historian has written. "But the policy of 
Imperial Headquarters was that Java was to be secured as a supply base, so any 
agitation in favor of independence was strictly prohibited."248 In these circumstances, 
the Japanese company commanders could only imply that Indonesia deserved to be 
independent, which they did by hammering away in their morning lectures about the 
iniquities of Dutch colonialism.
Yanagawa, who was responsible for training the first intake of West Java platoon 
commanders, the men who would become the all-important battalion commanders of 
the post-war Siliwangi Division, had his own way of instilling in the recruits the 
necessary offensive spirit, which the Japanese called kanto seishin and the Indonesians 
semangat menyerang. A devotee of sumo, he devised a modified form of the sport that 
stressed the importance of boldness and aggression. In normal sumo bouts there is a 
good deal of unhurried circling and maneuvering. A wrestler who forces his opponent 
out of a circular ring, or who makes him touch the ground with anything other than
242 Morimoto, Jawa boei giyugun-shi, p. 91.
243 See, for example, Ruth McVey interview with Tsuchiya Kiso and and Yoshitake Chikao, Osaka, October 
1980.
244 See Spector, Eagle Against the Sun, p. 37.
245 Ibid.
246 Alvin Coox and Saburo Hayashi, Kogun: The Japanese Army in the Pacific War (Quantico, VA: Marine 
Corps Association, 1959), p. 16; and Leonard A. Humphreys, "Crisis and Reaction: The Japanese Army in 
the 'Liberal' Twenties," Armed Forces and Society 5 (Fall 1978), pp. 173-77, cited in Spector, Eagle Against the 
Sun, p. 37.
247 The Japanese flew Sukarno and Hatta to Japan in November 1943, a few weeks after the Peta course 
began, to be decorated by Emperor Hirohito. Sukarno's attempts to get even limited Japanese backing for 
the nationalist cause came to naught. Prime Minister Tojo rejected Sukarno's request to permit the use of 
the anthem "Indonesia Raya" or the red-and-white Indonesian flag.
248 Morimoto, Jawa boei giyugun-shi, p. 91.
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the soles of his feet, is declared the winner, even if his opponent has managed to enter 
the winner's side of the ring. In the Yanagawa version, which left a deep imprint on the 
memory of many men who were to rise to prominence in the post-war Indonesian 
army, a circle was drawn in the sand with a line running across the middle. Wrestlers 
were taught to fly at one another as soon as they heard the command, "Start! [Kakare!]" 
The man who entered his opponent's territory was declared the winner. "If possible," 
said one former cadet, "you should meet your enemy on his ground, in his half of the 
circle ... You had to be faster than your enemy. Even if you ... succeed in throwing him 
down, that's not important. It's being faster. Semangat was emphasized, the warrior 
spirit."249 This emphasis on fighting spirit and aggressiveness was entirely in keeping 
with Japanese army doctrine, which stressed the importance of taking the offense at all 
times.
As one of the Japanese company commanders put it, "Yanagawa had liked having 
his trainees doing sumo back in Tangerang. He loved sumo. It was his firm belief that 
sumo was the best sport to nurture the fighting spirit."250 Those who emerged from the 
ring with badly grazed skin were taught to rub wet salt into the wound, a painful 
procedure, but one that aided the healing process. Soeharto and his fellow officer 
cadets from Central Java were not taught sumo in their company, but many of them 
took part in the sumo bouts organized by Yanagawa for the West Java cadets, some of 
whom found the traditional white mawashi (waist cloth) embarrassingly brief and wore 
shorts underneath. Soeharto seems to have thrown himself into these contests, 
although he may not have enjoyed them as much as others did. "We also did sumo," he 
said. "A contestant was not permitted to stop until he won five bouts. I had a hard time 
since I was thin."251 As well as the sumo wrestling, there was juken jitsu, or bayonet 
drills, the cadets wearing Japanese face masks and using wooden rifles, and kendo.
At Bogor, as had been the case at Tangerang, the Indonesian officer cadets were 
quick to pick up the importance of spiritual training. Indonesia, two former Beppan 
officers said, was "like a white paper; you could write anything on it."252 The basic 
principle of the Japanese training was makoto (sincerity). "This was expressed 
especially in the personal relationship between the training officer and the cadre. They 
emphasized the importance of personal commitment, relations which cannot be 
betrayed ... Japanese intelligence officers were expected to die for their country, and 
they emphasized that Indonesian pemudas must be ready to do the same for theirs."
The Japanese had planned to give Soeharto and the other platoon commanders 
three months' intensive training at Bogor, but this was cut back to two months "due to 
the worsening situation of the war."253 It was impossible, they knew, to turn out well- 
rounded junior officers in that time, so they concentrated on instilling fighting spirit, 
on teaching basic infantry skills, and on building up the physical strength of the cadets.
249 Interview, Purbo Suwondo, September 1,1998.
250 Interview, Tsuchiya Kiso, February 2,1999.
251 Soeharto, "Watashi no rirekisho." It is possible Soeharto did not begin sumo training until he returned to 
Bogor nearly a year later, when Yanagawa was the commanding officer.
252 Ruth McVey interview with Tsuchiya Kiso and Yoshitake Chikao, October 1980, from which this 
paraphrased paragraph is taken.
253 Morimoto, Jawa boei giyugun-shi, p. 89.
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The emphasis was placed on infantry training, night fighting, and static defense.254 
Training was kept simple. Although 90 percent of the cadets had attended junior high 
school, and some had gone a good deal further than that, there were others who had 
had very little education. 'There were so many tiers," said Tsuchiya. "That is why we 
set the level of the training to the level of the lowest peasants."255
For Soeharto, the day began at 7:30 AM (6:00 AM in the "old" timekeeping system), 
when a Japanese bugler sounded reveille. On this signal, the cadets, bare from the 
waist up, made their way at the double to the training field for roll call. While waiting 
for other members of the company to assemble, they engaged in the Japanese practice 
of kanpu-masatsu, or body-rubbing, using a small dry towel and bellowing the words 
“yoisho, yoisho!" under the direction of the cadet class leader. Roll call was followed by 
the flag-raising ceremony, an event invested with immense solemnity. As the Japanese 
flag inched its way up the flagpole, Soeharto and the others turned and bowed deeply 
from the waist in the direction of the Imperial Palace in Tokyo.256 After that came 
gymnastics, which was followed, on most days, by a four-kilometer jog through the 
streets of Bogor, with squads of young men doing a lap of the palace and the botanical 
gardens. The run ended with the cadets swarming up a steep hill from the river in a 
simulated bayonet charge (totsugeki), the air echoing with shouts of “waaa...a!f" a cry 
designed to instill fear into the heart of any enemy. The slowest ten members of each 
group would be penalized with an additional 200-meter charge. All of this made a 
lasting impression on Soeharto. “'Kakero! Kakero! [Run! Run!]' I can still clearly 
remember our instructors' shout in the morning running session," he told a Japanese 
journalist more than fifty years later. "Even today, the language I use when I talk about 
those days is Japanese."257
After breakfast, the members of the Fourth Company broke up into four sections 
for a ninety-minute classroom lesson, either on spiritual strength or military science. 
Along with his fellow cadets, Soeharto was instructed in the code of conduct that had 
been set down in the 1882 Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors. This code 
identified five cardinal virtues—loyalty, propriety, valor, righteousness, and 
simplicity—that should guide the behavior of servicemen, and it made the observation 
of these virtues a sacred obligation to the emperor as supreme commander. "Keep well 
in mind," the Rescript said, "that your duty outweighs death itself as much as a 
mountain outweighs a feather." In Japan, these ideas had been reinforced in the 1930s 
when militarists and ultra-nationalists began laying stress on the Yamato-damashii, the 
spiritual qualities supposedly unique to the Japanese people. By the start of the Pacific 
War, Yamato-damashii was equated with unquestioning loyalty to emperor and nation. 
For all that, the Japanese appear to have drawn a clear distinction between their own 
servicemen and the Indonesian candidate officers.
254 According to Tsuchiya, the Japanese did not give the cadets any lessons on guerrilla warfare because, at 
the time, they still thought they could fight an "authentic war." The idea of guerrilla training came later, 
when the Japanese army began to realize it was losing the war. Interview, Tsuchiya Kiso, February 2,1999.
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Although the Bogor cadets were required to bow towards the Imperial Palace each 
morning, there seems to have been no requirement that they take an oath of loyalty to 
the emperor. According to Tsuchiya,
They didn't take a pledge of loyalty to the emperor nor to Japan on arrival at the 
Peta course. The emperor's retainers ought to be Japanese military men, whereas 
the Peta recruits were Indonesian. They joined for the sake of Java's defense. So if I 
remember correctly, we didn't make them recite an oath of loyalty to the emperor 
in our daily routine activities. We did a lot of recitation of the Imperial Rescript, it 
is true. But those five items were something, I believed, essential not only to a 
soldier but to any human being.258
Oath of loyalty or not, Soeharto was to feel a surge of pride and satisfaction when, on a 
wintry Tokyo day in 1968, he met the emperor, on an equal footing, as one head of 
state to another. "I wore Javanese clothing and I met the emperor of Japan!" he told a 
colleague on his return.259 "Oh yes, I met him! That is the emperor that we had to bow 
to ... And it was so cold. I forgot to wear socks. I had only sandals." "Oh," recalled the 
colleague, "he was very happy."
The morning lecture was followed by instruction in one or more of the standard 
field exercises set out in the Japanese army infantry textbook (Hohei soten).260 The 
afternoon was given over to further exercises in the field, the focus being on small-unit 
tactics, especially those involving offensive action against an enemy. During these 
sessions, Soeharto learned how to attack and overrun a defensive position. He learned 
how to face an enemy with his bare hands. He mastered Japanese army bayonet 
techniques. "After lunch," one former cadet remembered, "we had to run to the 
exercise area, which is now the Bogor golf course. It was hot, and we were soaked with 
sweat. When we came back in the afternoon, our shirts were often white from the salt 
of dried up perspiration."261 It was, this officer thought, "very, very tough training."262 
From time to time, the acting commander of the Bogor center, Captain Maruzaki, 
inspected the training grounds, mounted on a large white horse and receiving oral 
reports from the company commanders.263 With his unyielding manner, Maruzaki was 
seen as a man to be propitiated. No one took him lightly. When he rode into view, the 
Japanese instructors and Indonesian cadets threw themselves into the training with 
renewed vigor.
On most occasions, the cadets were required to run back to the barracks through 
the streets of Bogor, carrying their KNIL-issue rifles. Many found this so exhausting, a 
Japanese observer noted, "they were almost ready to cry."264 But the Japanese granted 
no respite. If an Indonesian cadet failed to run fast enough or fell out, he would find 
himself mocked by his instructors. "Hey you!" a Japanese corporal would shout. "You 
said you want to have independence and you can't even do this! How can you become
258 Written communication, Tsuchiya Kiso, February 15,1999.
259 Confidential communication, November 15, 2004.
260 Morimoto, jawa bod giyugun-shi, p. 90.
261 Interview, Purbo Suwondo, September 1,1998.
262 Interview, Purbo Suwondo, September 10,1998.
263 Morimoto, Jawa bod giyugun-shi, p. 90.
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independent if you can't even run five miles?"265 On other occasions, cadets would 
march back to camp, singing Japanese and Indonesian songs. One of the favorites was 
the Japanese military song "Hohei no honryo," with its famous first line "Banda no 
sakura" (Cherry blossoms in full bloom). Other favorites were "Bengawan Solo" and 
"Hallo Hallo Bandung." Back at the barracks, there were still more songs, including 
"Shina no Yoru" (China Nights)—a romantic ballad, popular at the time but now 
seldom sung because it is considered deeply offensive in China, and "Umi Yukaba," a 
melancholy lament about the inevitable death that awaits a soldier or sailor.266 After 
dinner, cadets were taught how to shout commands in the field, a procedure known as 
gorei chosei. Members of a platoon would gather at one end of a soccer ground. The 
cadet chosen to command them would stand at the other end, bellowing out orders 
like a company sergeant major and suffering punishment and humiliation if those 
orders could not be clearly understood. Afterwards, there might be compulsory 
practice of Japanese army songs. The two hours to 9:00 PM were set aside for study. A 
bugler sounded lights-out shortly afterwards.
From time to time, the Japanese would organize night training sessions, which 
began after dinner on Saturday night and continued until sunrise the following day. As 
Tsuchiya, the commander of Soeharto's training company, noted, "Everybody looked 
forward to Sunday."267 During the course, the cadets were taken three or four times to 
the firing range, where they would each fire about ten rounds. "There," said one Peta 
officer, laconically, "we learned that every bullet should kill one person. Japanese 
efficiency!"268 As in any army, great emphasis was placed on the care and maintenance 
of weapons. Here, Soeharto had an advantage over his fellow cadets. The Peta officer 
cadets were issued with captured KNIL rifles and machine guns, all of which were 
familiar to Soeharto, who could strip and reassemble them even when blindfolded.
The training at Bogor was not only intense but relentless, just as it had been at 
Tangerang. Bogor is one of the wettest places on earth, with an annual rainfall of 160 
inches. It has been known to have as many as three hundred thunderstorms in a single 
year. But the arrival of the late-year monsoon had no impact on the Japanese training 
program. As Tsuchiya put it:
265 Interview, Purbo Suwondo, April 14,1998.
266 More than half a century later, many older Indonesians could recall the words of "Umi Yukaba," which 
had been taught at school during the Japanese occupation:
Umi yukaba, mizuku kabane 
Yama yukaba, kusa musu kabane 
Okimi no he ni koso shiname 
Kaerimi wa seji.
If I go away to sea,
I shall become a corpse floating in the water;
If I go away to the mountains,
I shall become a corpse from which grass grows;
If it is for the emperor,
I will not regret my death.
267 Written communication, Tsuchiya Kiso, January 21,1999.
268 Interview, Purbo Suwondo, September 1,1998.
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Training took place even in heavy rain. Weapons and clothes got soaked. Our lips
turned purple. We could not stop trembling. My army sword got rusted through.
Trainees had trouble taking care of their wet clothes and weapons on rainy days.269
The acting commander of the First Company, who was responsible for training the 
127 Indonesian company commanders, was known to his charges as a "madman" 
(orang gila) after he forced them out on midnight maneuvers in clothes still soaking wet 
from an afternoon thunderstorm. As the semi-official Japanese history of the Peta 
notes, "He wanted to teach the company commander cadets that war went on 
regardless of weather. Since everyone was in high spirits, no one came down with a 
cold."270 In short, the Japanese squeezed every available minute from the day. "Because 
our time was limited," Tsuchiya said, "we couldn't afford to see even a day pass 
without physical training outdoors. Even if spears fell, we were determined to do this 
outdoor training."271 The Indonesians found it difficult to meet the exacting standards 
of the Japanese NCOs who supervised their field training. "As in every military 
establishment," one Indonesian officer said, "they were never satisfied with your first 
effort. You had to do it all four or five times. 'You did not shout loud enough!' 'You 
did not advance fast enough!"'272
Punishments were imposed for the slightest infraction. Perhaps the severest form 
of corporal punishment (taibatsu) inflicted on cadets was seiza, which involves kneeling 
on the floor, folding one's legs under one's thighs, while resting the buttocks on the 
heels.273 Most Japanese find it difficult to maintain the seiza position for more than 
thirty minutes, even with a cushion under the knees. Cadets at Bogor were forced to do 
so for an hour or more, sometimes all night. During that time they were expected to 
remain still and reflect on themselves. Cadets referred to this mockingly as zazen, 
which is a form of religious meditation in Japan, and among them the term zazen 
became virtually synonymous with corporal punishment. At other times, a cadet might 
be forced to stand at attention for an hour in the midday sun, his rifle held out in front 
of his body. To make matters worse, some Japanese officers and NCOs were in the 
habit of slapping cadets on the face, a common practice in the Japanese army, but one 
which the Indonesians found deeply humiliating. Nor was it only individuals who 
were punished in these ways. If one man in a company erred, the entire unit might be 
made to sit in the seiza position, sometimes for an entire night, watched by three 
Japanese NCOs, each carrying a two-meter-long bamboo cane. Very few cadets could 
do this for long, and when, inevitably, someone fell to the ground, an instructor would 
move in and strike him viciously across the back. The victim would sit up again, only 
to fall down yet again and be struck yet again. A unit that spent an entire night in this 
way was expected to be on the parade ground at 7:30 AM the next day, ready for 
another full day of training. Recalling this kind of treatment, Major General Moersjid
269 Written communication, Tsuchiya Kiso, January 21,1999.
270 Morimoto, Jawa boei giyugun-shi, p. 91.
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said, "Sometimes I didn't get the point. What kind of training is this? We were treated 
like that! But afterwards we felt it couldn't be different, it had to be done like that."274
General Purbo Suwondo was another who was to conclude that there might have 
been some method in the Japanese madness, even in their penchant for collective 
punishment. "That happened very often," he said. "That makes for a kind of esprit de 
corps. That fosters a concern for others. If you do something wrong, the whole platoon 
will be punished."275 According to General Widodo, a contemporary of Soeharto's who 
became chief of staff in the Indonesian Army, "it was very hard training," with a heavy 
emphasis on physical training, the use of weapons and basic platoon tactics. "And 
almost every day we received a slap—pukul! Almost every day!"276 Others, looking 
back, thought the punishment was more mental than physical.277 Whatever the truth of 
the matter, the experience left a mark on some of Indonesia's future army officers. 
Bashed by the Japanese, a number of them went on to become bashers themselves. 
Some recruits, finding the training and the punishments impossibly hard, applied for a 
discharge. But they were "talked into staying by strong persuasion."278 The Japanese 
reminded them of "the situation of their motherland" and of the heavy future 
responsibility of the younger generation.
Soeharto and the other shodancho cadets from Central Java were fortunate to have 
Tsuchiya as their company commander. Not only was he sympathetic to the 
Indonesian nationalist cause, but he also kept a tight rein on his Japanese army 
subordinates, especially the NCOs, who had lived for years in an institution in which 
brutal punishment was accepted as normal. At Bogor, Tsuchiya chose to live in the 
barracks with the Indonesian trainees, forgoing the house that had been set aside 
outside the camp for the commanders of the training companies. And he had given 
strict instructions that no cadet was to be slapped on the face. What is more, he went 
out of his way to empathize with his Indonesian officer cadets. As he said later, "When 
a seito [pupil] was ordered by a kutaicho [section commander] to stand through an 
hour-long recess due to a mistake he made, while others lay in the shade of the trees, I 
would stand next to him until the recess was over. I didn't want the recruits to think 
Japanese were merciless and cruel."279
Soeharto seems to have had a high regard for Tsuchiya and met him twice while on 
official visits to Japan as president.280 The Japanese instructors, Soeharto said, were 
"strict-minded military officers, but we felt their sympathy for us."281 Even so, the
274 Interview, Major General Moersjid, Jakarta, April 29,1999.
275 Interview, Purbo Suwondo, Jakarta, September 1,1998. Purbo made the point, however, that his 
company commander, First Lieutenant Shindo Kazuma, a veteran of the war in China, did not slap his 
charges. Written communication, March 1, 2009.
276 Interview, General Widodo, Jakarta, November 17,1981. Widodo was in the second intake at Bogor.
277 Interview, Moersjid, May 8, 2000.
278 Morimoto, Jawa boei giyugun-shi, p. 89.
279 Written communication, Tsuchiya Kiso, January 21,1999.
280 When Soeharto went to Japan for the first time, he asked to see Tsuchiya as his old trainer. After that, 
people say, Tsuchiya was "bombarded" with offers from Japanese company representatives "thinking he 
had an in and wanting to get him to act as their agent; but he refused." Ruth McVey interview with 
Tsuchiya Kiso and Yostiitake Chikao, October 1980. At the time of Soeharto's visit, Tsuchiya was working 
for the Nissan Motor Company.
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Soeharto and the Japanese Occupation 63
treatment was harsh enough for Soeharto to remember it clearly forty-five years later. 
As he wrote in his memoirs, "Once during an exercise we were forced to drink filthy 
water from a river behind a Goodyear rubber factory. At another time, we were made 
to kneel for hours because one of the recruits had thrown his hancho's [squad leader's] 
cap away."282 In an account given to a Japanese newspaper, Soeharto said, "Peta 
training was beyond imagination. We had military drill, theory, and spiritual training 
from 5:30 in the morning until midnight. The training given to the platoon 
commanders who would command troops at the front line was especially rigorous. 
When they found one trainee slacking off, they made all of us kneel with our backs 
straight [seiza] until midnight."283
Photo from an article "Jawa Sumatra Kinkyo" (What's Happening in Java and Sumatra) showing Peta 
cadet officers from Central Java returning from a day's field training led by First Lieutenant Tsuchiya (left) 
and Second Lieutenant Sasaki. The photograph appeared in the magazine Bungei-Shunju.
~‘'i Soeharto, My Thoughts, p. 20.
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Throughout the course, the Japanese stressed the importance of showing respect 
towards superiors and attending to the welfare of subordinates. "We had water bottles 
made from coconuts," one officer remembered. "When you took a break you would 
first offer your water bottle to the instructor. We also learned the techniques of 
leadership. You have to think of your subordinates, your anak buah. Your concern is for 
your subordinates. It's called buka no shoaku."284 Soeharto, who had of course been 
made aware of such considerations in the KNIL, took all this very much to heart. In 
later years, he was to be known for the exceptional attention he paid to the welfare of 
his men. Indeed, the efforts he made to advance those interests were to lead him into 
dubious fund-raising and business deals, which were to be a hallmark of his years both 
as a senior officer and as president, and which, when taken to excess, would do so 
much to undermine his legitimacy as president.
The Japanese went to some pains to feed their officer cadets well. Breakfast might 
include Japanese miso soup, made from bean paste, accompanied by white rice, 
sometimes mixed with corn, sometimes with soy beans.285 A typical dinner consisted of 
beef or fish, rice, tomatoes, green vegetables, peanuts, and other items. Still, there 
never seemed to be enough food, and some cadets risked beatings by slipping out 
through the barbed wire at night to hunt for food. Once, during a night exercise 
involving both chudancho and shodancho cadets, G. P. H. Djatikusumo, a prince of the 
royal court of Solo, son of the popular and corpulent Pakubuwono X, and K. R. M. T. 
Soemyarsono, a member of the Pakualaman, the minor court in Yogyakarta, stopped to 
collect sweet potatoes from a village garden—two well-educated young Javanese 
aristocrats scrabbling about at night in a West Java potato patch, a metaphor for a 
world in transition.
As time passed, the Indonesians gained in strength. Even those who had fainted 
during the entrance ceremony "learned to endure the severe training and to give a 
fierce look back at their instructors when in the beginning they failed in focusing their 
loosely opened eyes."286 "After a week or ten days," said Tsuchiya, "we noticed a 
change in their eyes. They had a sharper look in their eyes. That was obvious."287 The 
Japanese noted, too, that the Indonesian cadets were growing darker after long hours 
out in the sun.
Most of the cadets were Muslims, and the Japanese had, of course, gone out of their 
way to recruit a number of prominent Islamic figures as future battalion and company 
commanders. Beppan was anxious not to offend any religious sensibilities, if at all 
possible. Care was taken to ensure that all food was halal (permitted). But there were 
limits to the concessions that it felt it could make. This was wartime, and the Peta was 
a special force being trained for defense purposes.288 "I'm sorry," said Tsuchiya. "We 
had to ignore Islam. In Islam there is a provision that says that, in a time of emergency, 
followers do not have to abide by the regulations ... So we made use of that. So Friday
284 Interview, Purbo Suwondo, September 1,1998. Buka means subordinate. Shoaku means "to be in control 
of."
285 Interview, Tsuchiya Kiso, June 12, 2003.
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wasn't a day off, and we didn't let them do their prayers every day. There could be 
some people who made regular daily prayers behind our backs, but we didn't set up a 
regular time for prayers."289 According to Tsuchiya, the Japanese did not encounter any 
difficulties on this front. On the contrary, those daidanchos who were from a strongly 
Islamic background "persuaded the lower ones not to demand their religious 
observances." According to Morimoto Takeshi, Japanese officers had come to an 
agreement with Indonesian religious leaders, who conceded that they did not have to 
pay special consideration to religious practices. Although no time was set aside for 
mosque attendance on Friday, Morimoto said, cadets were free to pray before reveille 
and after lights-out if they chose.290
On Friday afternoons, the cadets were expected to rest in the camp. Family 
members could visit if they lived nearby, but cadets were not permitted to leave the 
training center at any time, except when they were under instruction or on the closely 
supervised morning run. For Soeharto, one of the treats at Bogor was the daifuku-mochi, 
a Japanese confection made of sweet bean paste and available in the canteen. For 
others, an even greater treat was the cigarette ration. The Japanese provided each cadet 
with two or three packs of Western-style cigarettes each week, a rare treat in wartime 
Java. These could be either be smoked or exchanged with visitors for fruit and snacks.
Soeharto made several important friends among the shodancho cadets at Bogor, all 
of them within his sixty-man training section, one third of which consisted of recruits 
from the Princely Territory of Yogyakarta. His closest friend was Soedjono, the son of a 
pegawai negeri (official) of the Pakualaman.291 A solidly built young man, bespectacled 
and always neatly turned out, Soedjono was seen by colleagues as "a good fellow" and 
was later to display considerable gifts as a military commander. In the years after 1945, 
when Indonesia was fighting for its independence against the returning Dutch, 
Soedjono was not only Soeharto's closest friend but one of his two most competent and 
dependable battalion commanders.
Soedjono is of interest for two reasons. First, he had not completed elementary 
school. That meant that he had even less formal education than Soeharto. Of the 
sixteen men who were to serve as battalion commanders under Soeharto between 
1945-50, all but Soedjono were better educated than their commanding officer, 
sometimes by a long chalk.292 Second, Soedjono was a Roman Catholic. During his 
early years as an army officer, and later as president, Soeharto was to depend, to a 
marked degree, on officers from a Christian background. Of his sixteen battalion 
commanders in the late 1940s, no fewer than five were Catholics.293 There was, 
however, no political or religious significance in this fact, as there would be in later 
years, when Soeharto seemed to go out of his way to appoint Christian officers to
289 Interview, Tsuchiya Kiso, February 2,1999.
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291 Interview, Brigadier General K. R. M. T. Soemyarsono, Jakarta, April 24, 2000. This Soedjono is not to be 
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Catholic battalion commanders were from the court of the Pakualaman.
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senior positions, conscious, no doubt, that they could pose no threat to his position. 
Rather, the disproportionate number of Christians was a reflection of both the high 
educational standards in Christian schools and the broad social, political, and religious 
backing for the revolutionary movement.
Another cadet whom Soeharto befriended at Bogor was Pranoto Reksosamoedra. 
Pranoto was from Purworejo, an area in which the Communist Party was to gain many 
supporters; indeed, his uncle was to emerge as a prominent local Communist.294 In 
Yogyakarta, Pranoto had attended Muhammadiyah junior and senior high schools 
established on the Dutch pattern and with a "Western" orientation. He had gone on to 
a Teacher's Training College (Hollandsch-Inlandsche Kweekschool, HIK), where he 
studied to be a teacher in the Dutch-language Muhammadiyah system.295 Pranoto was 
intelligent, reserved, and seen by his colleagues as unswervingly honest. Yet another 
colleague from this time was Soemyarsono, the quietly spoken aristocrat from the 
Pakualaman. He had attended the same Muhammadiyah junior high school as 
Pranoto, and, though two years younger than Pranoto, was as close to him as Soeharto 
was to Soedjono. In 1945, Soemyarsono was to set up his own battalion in Yogyakarta, 
alongside Soeharto. A year later, after Soeharto was promoted to regimental 
commander, Soemyarsono served under him as a battalion commander. Later, in 
December 1947, he was one of a small group of people invited to Soeharto's wedding.
Each of these friendships, it is worth noting, was to come under strain in the years 
ahead. In 1948, Soeharto would relieve Soemyarsono of his battalion on the grounds 
that he was insufficiently decisive. Nor, according to Soemyarsono, did Soeharto's high 
regard for Soedjono prevent him from treating him harshly on one occasion. In a 
moment of anger in 1950, Soemyarsono claims, Soeharto struck Soedjono, apparently 
on the head, for smuggling a stolen blue Studebaker when the Garuda Mataram 
Brigade was returning to Java after a deployment in Makassar.296 In 1959, Soeharto and 
Pranoto were to fall out irrevocably when the latter reported Soeharto, who was by 
then military commander in Central Java, to army headquarters over freewheeling 
business and trading deals, which Pranoto, who personified the puritanical ethos of 
most Central Javanese officers, found deeply offensive; Soeharto never forgave this 
"betrayal." He refused to accept President Sukarno's appointment of Pranoto as acting 
army commander in October 1965, and when he came to power, he lost no time in 
finding reasons to jail his former friend.
Curiously, Soeharto makes no mention of these men in his autobiography, referring 
only to other "friends" from his time at Bogor. One is a man named Supio. "We were 
assigned to the same barracks and became close friends," the future president wrote of 
Supio, while nevertheless relegating him to a subservient position in the Soeharto 
narrative. "After an exercise, he would wash both his and my clothes while I cleaned 
our guns. He would also wait in line in the canteen to buy us mochi ... There was never
294 Interview, Dayino, Jakarta, February 3, 2000.
295 Before World War Two, the Muhammadiyah worked hard to modernize Indonesian education with 
Dutch as the model of what was modern; hence the use of Dutch titles when one might expect Indonesian.
I am indebted to Ruth McVey for making this point. Personal communication, August 24, 2009.
296 Interview, Brigadier General Soemyarsono, Jakarta, February 2, 2000. Other sources, including the late 
Colonel Alex Kawilarang, have insisted that Soeharto himself was behind the theft.
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enough, so you had to line up fast to get any."297 The other friend is a man whom 
Soeharto refers to as "Pranoto Wijono." This is odd. There was no one of that name 
involved in the shodancho course at Bogor. The only Pranoto at Bogor was Pranoto 
Reksosamoedra.298 This suggests either that Soeharto's exceptionally good memory and 
almost obsessive attention to detail failed him when he came to write his memoirs, or 
that he was, once more, rewriting the historical record, unable, perhaps, to 
acknowledge that he had once been friends with Pranoto Reksosamoedra, a man he 
had come to detest. Among the others in his platoon were Bardosono, a young man of 
a mystic bent who was to hold key positions in Soeharto's New Order government, 
and Maryono, who went on to serve as a company commander in Soeharto's Battalion 
X in Yogyakarta in 1945.299 In 1965, while serving as Assistant III (Personnel) in the 
Diponegoro (Central Java) military region, Colonel Maryono sided fatally with the 
September Thirtieth Movement; he and his fellow Central Java plotters were hunted 
down and killed by troops operating on Soeharto's orders.
Another shodancho cadet from Central Java was Amad Jani (later Achmad Yani), 
who would be killed in the failed 1965 coup. The son of an Indonesian chauffeur, Yani 
had been brought up by a Dutch family, as a result of which he was able to attend the 
Christelijke AMS senior high school on fashionable Oranje Boulevarde (now Jl. 
Diponegoro) in Jakarta. He joined the KNIL, where he served in the cartographic 
section and rose to sergeant. Yet another cadet from Central Java was Sarwo Edhie 
Wibowo, who became a close friend of Yani's at Bogor. In 1965, Sarwo Edhie was 
commander of the Army Para-commando Regiment (Resimen Para Komando 
Angkatan Darat, RPKAD), which would lead a brutal crackdown on alleged 
Communists in Central and East Java, as well as Bali, and track down Maryono and his 
colleagues. Others on the course were Surono Reksodimedjo, a future Army chief of 
staff, and Munadi, whom Soeharto would later appoint as governor of Central Java.
The list of shodancho cadets from West Java included Amir Machmud, a blunt and 
unsophisticated officer who would later do Soeharto's bidding for thirteen years (1969— 
82) as Indonesia's all-important interior minister. Umar Wirahadikusumah, who was to 
serve as vice president under Soeharto (1983-88), was also attached to the West Java 
company, presumably as a trainer, given that he had graduated from the Tangerang 
course. The East Java Training Company included Mohammad Jasin, who, in the
297 Soeharto, My Thoughts, p. 19.
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1970s, after a time as deputy army chief of staff, would risk everything by daring to 
accuse Soeharto of greed and hypocrisy. In subsequent years, some of these men were 
to rise to high office by dint of their own ability. Others were to win preferment 
because Soeharto made it a practice to intervene in the promotions system. Throughout 
his career, Soeharto was to value personal connections more highly than competence, 
and he would reach back across the decades to bring forward men whom he knew and 
trusted and who could be counted on to implement his wishes.
As well as those in his immediate circle, Soeharto was thrown together with a 
number of instructors and officer cadets who were to play key roles in the post-war 
Indonesian National Army. One of them was Zulkifli Lubis, a subdued, disciplined, 
and intense young Batak whom Beppan officers considered the brightest Indonesian 
they ever recruited.300 One of ten children of a Batak schoolteacher, Lubis was born in 
Aceh but moved to Yogya, where he enrolled in 1940 in the AMS-B high school. He 
was fluent in Dutch, which he spoke with a distinctive lisp. Selected as a member of 
the first intake at the Tangerang training center, he learned Japanese very quickly and 
displayed a natural flair for intelligence work, propaganda, and clandestine operations. 
At Tangerang, he never said anything if he was angry but would quietly obey the 
command he had been given.301 But if Lubis did not make trouble, he was much 
stronger in his criticisms of the Japanese than his fellow students. "He was," said 
Tsuchiya, who came to know him well, "a fanatic Muslim, very strong in spirit."302 
Lubis was never slapped by the Japanese, although everyone else was, at one time or 
another, as a result of which some of his less gifted fellow cadets labeled him a 
Japanese lackey (antek jepang).303 Rated number one at Tangerang, both in class work 
and outdoor military training, Lubis was sent to the Peta training school at Bogor as an 
assistant instructor (shido-gakusei) in Soeharto's training company, which means that 
Soeharto would have been in contact with him on a daily basis. Lubis was nineteen 
when the Bogor course began, two and a half years younger than Soeharto.
At the beginning of 1944, the Japanese sent Lubis to Singapore for further 
intelligence training, a rare distinction, conferred on no other Indonesian. Not long 
after the proclamation of independence, Lubis set up the first of what was to become a 
series of government and army intelligence bodies, infiltrating not only the political 
parties and mass organizations but also the army, as well as liaising with underground 
groups and carrying out propaganda work. A contemporary Dutch intelligence report 
gives the following quick sketch of Lubis: "about 1.7 metres tall, slim, with a broad 
face, sound white teeth, pimpled nose, heavy eyebrows, straight hair combed 
backwards with a parting in the middle, big ears, speaks Dutch."304 In the 1950s, Lubis 
was the stormy petrel of Indonesian military politics, enveloped in an air of mystery 
and intrigue, serving for a time as acting army chief of staff and allegedly staging an
300 Interview Tsuchiya Kiso, February 2,1999. Tsuchiya and Yoshitake made the same point in an 
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unsuccessful coup. Another assistant instructor in Soeharto's company was Daan 
Mogot, who had been the runner-up at Tangerang, behind Lubis.
To his fellow cadets at Bogor, Soeharto seemed uncommonly taciturn. Asked to 
recall his first impressions of Soeharto, Soemyarsono could do no better than anyone 
else. "He was polite," he said. "But he did not speak too much."305 He was "low- 
profile." The Japanese also found Soeharto quiet, but were much impressed by his 
abilities. Tsuchiya, who had recruited Soeharto and who watched him closely for two 
months as his company commander, felt that he was one of the best and brightest of 
the officer cadets at Bogor. He was not as gifted as Zulkifli Lubis, who was "plain and 
simple, quiet, sober, restrained, modest, low-keyed" and, as Tsuchiya saw it, quite the 
most impressive of all the Indonesians who underwent officer training during the 
occupation. Nor was he as good as Daan Mogot, who was "more Japanese than an 
ordinary Japanese officer" and "willing to do anything."306 But Soeharto was one of the 
stars of the Fourth Company. As Tsuchiya put it, Soeharto "did an outstanding job in 
both classroom work and in military training outdoors. He was always able to do a 
model demonstration when we asked him to do so. Let's suppose there's an 'enemy' 
out there with a gun. In training, he was able to give a good example and run to the 
enemy and kill him."307
For one or two of the cadets, the relentless combat training was tiresome, and they 
undertook it reluctantly. Soeharto treated it with the utmost seriousness, charging 
headlong at imaginary enemies with rifle and bayonet, shouting in the approved 
manner, abandoning all normal reserve. The Japanese instructors watched all this 
admiringly. "You have to be really serious in showing a good example," Tsuchiya 
explained. "If the example is done poorly, the others can't learn." In these exercises, 
Soeharto would show exactly how an attack was to be carried out, crawling forward 
toward the enemy for about 150 yards, then charging the last fifty yards, screaming as 
he went, disposing of the enemy in hand-to-hand fighting with the bayonet. At the end 
of the course, Tsuchiya ranked his Indonesian cadets in order of ability, from one 
down to 230, although no cadet was told where he had finished. "I can't remember 
where Soeharto was," Tsuchiya said. "Maybe he was within the top ten. But he was 
never number one. Lubis was easily number one. And number two was Daan Mogot 
... They rose to the top through ability ... They became almost like Japanese military 
officers."308 A retired Indonesian army historian who graduated from the Bogor course 
was a little less generous in his assessment. "Pak Harto," he said, somewhat 
dismissively, "was not that outstanding."309
On Thursday, December 2,1943, when Soeharto's intake had less than three weeks 
of training to complete, the sixty-five-year-old commander-in-chief of the Japanese 
Southern Army, Field Marshal Terauchi Hisaichi, visited the Bogor center, resplendent 
in full dress uniform and spurred riding boots. He was accompanied by an aide-de- 
camp to Emperor Hirohito, by General Harada, and by the commanders of all the
305 Interview, Soemyarsono, February 2, 2000.
306 Interview, Tsuchiya Kiso, February 2,1999.
307 Ibid.
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Japanese battalions deployed on Java. Before the visit, Yanagawa had told the 246 
future platoon commanders in his company, "Pretend the general is a Dutchman, your 
enemy! Glare at him!," an instruction that was obeyed to the letter, as the future 
officers of the West Java Siliwangi Division fixed the visitor with an "angry stare." 
When Terauchi had finished his inspection, he turned to Harada and said, only half 
jokingly, "Don't make them too strong! The Japanese may have to suffer later."310 It 
was a concern that would in time prove real enough. Interestingly, the officers of the 
Japanese high command took no chances during Terauchi's visit to Bogor. No 
Indonesian officer cadet was allowed near the high-ranking visitors, who were 
guarded by the Kenpeitai and other Japanese soldiers.
December 8 was the second anniversary of the beginning of what the Japanese 
called the "Greater East Asia War," which had begun with the surprise attack on Pearl 
Harbor. The Indonesian battalion commanders had by now completed their course and 
were commissioned during a ceremony in Gambir Square (now Merdeka Square), in 
the heart of Jakarta, during which each man was presented with a Japanese-style 
ceremonial sword. General Harada took the salute as around eight-hundred members 
of the first Peta intake marched past the reviewing stand and out into the streets of 
Jakarta, led by the band of the Japanese Sixteenth Army. "It was," one Japanese wrote, 
"a good opportunity to show the newly established Java Volunteer Defense Force to 
the Indonesian public."311 Two days later, the new battalion commanders left for their 
home regions, where they were to recruit and train five-hundred-man battalions.
The appointment ceremony for the company and platoon commanders was held on 
the lawns of the Bogor Palace on December 20, with Harada once more taking the 
salute. Zulkifli Lubis made a "pledge of acceptance" on behalf of the Indonesian 
company and platoon commanders.312 When the ceremonies were over, Harada held 
two separate parties, one for the Japanese officers inside the palace, another for the 
Indonesian officers, who gathered on the lawns at the front of the palace.313 For 
Soeharto and his fellow trainees, it was a day of triumph and pride. The next day, 
Soeharto left to join his battalion. As a shodancho, he wore on each collar three gold 
stripes on a field of blue, the Peta badges of rank having been modeled on the Japanese 
ones.314 After a course that had lasted barely two months—Soeharto was to claim in his 
memoirs that his shodancho training had taken four months, a more intensive course 
that had been given only to recuits in the second intake—Soeharto was an officer in the 
first Indonesian defense force.
The Japanese had been ambitious in the extreme to imagine that they could create 
an Indonesian self-defense force from scratch in just a few months, not least when the 
raw material seemed at first to be so unpromising. But they succeeded. The men who 
were to dominate the Indonesian army for the first thirty years of independence came
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away from Bogor with three key attributes—fitness, fighting spirit, and a familiarity 
with small-unit infantry tactics. All this, of course, was of obvious benefit to the 
Japanese. More importantly, it was to stand the Peta officers in good stead during the 
post-war clashes with the Dutch colonial authorities. The intensity of this training, the 
emphasis on fighting spirit and physical toughness, had had a profound impact on the 
cadets, especially those who had gone straight from school to the platoon commanders 
course. As one Indonesian officer observed, "We were at the age of being like wax, you 
know. You can make whatever you want from that material. Because you are receptive 
to anything."315 But that did not mean, this officer added, that the Indonesian officer 
cadets were simply stooges of the Japanese. "Some people [have said], 'You were 
cooperating with the Japanese.' You can say that. We can also say something else. No, 
we were not cooperating, we were just seeing what we could do for our own nation."
Alwin Nurdin, who later became a major in West Java's renowned Siliwangi 
Division, was one of those whose life was totally changed by his experience in the Peta. 
Born into a privileged middle-class family in West Sumatra, Nurdin had grown up 
feeling no animosity towards the Dutch. "But still," he said, "the Japanese time came, 
and it was an inspiration for us."316 While the arrival of the Japanese may have been the 
downfall of the Dutch, "for us it was a chance in a million. We had to grab [our] 
independence. When the Japanese came, we were just Dutch [sic] schoolboys. [When 
they left we were highly motivated army officers]." The Peta, Lieutenant General G. P. 
H. Djatikusumo liked to point out, was the nucleus of the TNI. "So I say to everybody 
who would care to listen, if you would like to understand this power structure now, 
you cannot afford not to study the anatomy of the Peta."317
Despite the hardships and humiliations of the Bogor course, not one man had 
dropped out. On the contrary, the young Indonesian officers had developed an intense 
pride in their training and their capabilities. They felt they were members of a highly 
favored elite. They were fired with enthusiasm. As one Japanese officer noted, they 
were "very ardent, except for a few, and their abilities could not be neglected."318 
Soeharto was no less enthusiastic than his colleagues. Soon, he knew, he would take 
command of a forty-four-man infantry platoon, one that would have to be established 
from the ground up. It was going to be an enormous challenge, but it was a challenge 
he was confident he could meet.
For their part, senior Japanese staff officers were "especially enthusiastic" about the 
volunteer force, no one more so than General Harada, who was to remain a supporter 
of Peta throughout his time on Java.319 As one senior Sixteenth Army staff officer put it, 
"General Harada loved Peta, and I could see he couldn't help smiling when he talked 
about it. He was always willing to review the Peta ... He was very keen on Peta, and 
trusted it, too."320 According to a Japanese staff assessment written immediately after
315 Interview, Major General Moersjid, Jakarta, May 8, 2000.
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the war, "the Japanese army had great expectations [for] these troops. The Japanese C- 
in-C and all ranks, mindful of the Army's intention, favored them heartily."321 That was 
not entirely true. Some Japanese officers were to become, in time, deeply skeptical 
about the Peta. Although the Peta was a highly decentralized set of units, with no 
higher command structure, these officers saw potential danger to themselves in an 
armed Indonesian defense force; their reservations echoed the sort of concerns that had 
been expressed in earlier years by senior KNIL officers. Colonel Miyamoto, who was 
posted to Java in April 1944, was not at all sure it was wise to put "total trust" in the 
Indonesian force,322 fearing it might one day turn on its mentor, as, indeed, some units 
did at the end of the war.
Part Three: "W hy Did They Choose Soeharto?"
Defending the Beaches
On his return to Central Java, Soeharto was assigned to the Peta battalion being 
established at Wates, seventeen miles southwest of Yogyakarta. Fearing an Allied 
attack from Australia, the Japanese had drawn up operational plans to fight a 
defensive battle on the south coast of Java, concentrating the bulk of their forces on 
East Java but with other units guarding the southern coast of Central and West Java.323 
Under these plans, Indonesian battalions would defend the beaches most susceptible to 
amphibious assault while Japanese troops were held in reserve, ready to launch an 
immediate counterattack.
It was, of course, a strategy of desperation. No one doubted for a moment that the 
Japanese excelled in the art of beach defense. Imperial Army engineers were skilled in 
the construction of bunkers, dugouts, and blockhouses, all of them mutually 
supporting and extremely well camouflaged. It is also true that the south coast of Java 
is notoriously forbidding, with dangerous seas and very few beaches. But the Japanese 
could not hope to defend every beach on the south coast. Nor could one or two five- 
hundred-man Peta battalions stem a full-scale Allied landing, which, the Japanese 
estimated, would consist of as many as ten divisions.324 At best, a defending battalion
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could cover a beach frontage of 900 to 2,000 yards. That meant that Peta units would be 
very thinly distributed. It also meant that frontline Peta battalions would be subjected 
to a devasting naval bombardment before any Allied landing. Japanese reserve units, 
as hopelessly outnumbered as the Dutch had been when they faced the Japanese in 
1942, would be pounded from the air and sea as they sought to join the battle. To make 
matters worse, this strategy created political problems. It did not take long for 
Indonesian leaders to conclude, erroneously, that the Japanese had decided to let local 
troops do the fighting and dying while the Japanese remained safely out of sight. 
"Sukarno," said Morimoto Takeshi, "hated the idea of using Indonesians as a shield for 
the Japanese."325
Fissures Begin to Open Up
As these plans were put into operation, Soeharto was posted on to Glagah, a 
hamlet on the Indian Ocean, nine miles west of Wates. Glagah stands on a narrow strip 
of low-lying ground between the Menoreh Hills and the ocean, a few miles south of the 
east-west highway. It is a forlorn and decrepit little town, set deep among coconut 
palms and banana trees. To the north are rice fields, to the south, uncultivated land 
that gives way to grass-covered dunes. These extend for several hundred yards, to the 
uninviting coastline of the Indian Ocean, the domain of Ratu Loro Kidul, the Goddess 
of the South Seas, a spirit much feared in Javanese mythology. As he approached the 
town, Soeharto would have smelled the salt in the air and heard the muffled roar of the 
surf. Beyond the dunes, the waves roll in relentlessly, dark and powerful, crashing 
onto the beach and tossing plumes of spray into the air, creating an almost permanent 
curtain of haze over the beach.
The Japanese had chosen their defensive position here well, as might be expected, 
and it is likely that work was already underway on the construction of the beach 
defenses. These would have been designed with great care. In most places, Japanese 
strong points were earth emplacements, reinforced with timber, particularly palm logs 
or teak, and sometimes with corrugated iron.326 The roofs of these structures were 
made of several layers of logs, covered with dirt and rocks and planted with fast­
growing vegetation for camouflage. From narrow firing slits, anti-tank guns and 
medium machine guns were sited to fire on landing craft as they beached, ready to cut 
down assault troops as they struggled through rows of barbed-wire obstacles, some of 
them below water level. Field guns deployed well behind the coastal strip were 
positioned to bring fire to bear on the beaches, supported by light and heavy mortars, 
which often proved to be even more deadly.
If the Glagah defenses were already under construction, Soeharto may have seen 
for the first time the way the Japanese treated their Javanese romusha (laborers), men 
and women, most of them Javanese peasants, who had been mobilized into a vast and 
terrible slave army, working under appalling conditions on defense and infrastructure 
projects. The Sixteenth Army had begun drafting forced laborers in October 1943, the 
month Soeharto joined the first Peta intake at Bogor, and in the twenty-two months
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that were to follow, hundreds of thousands (by one account, "many millions") of 
Javanese were pressed into service.327 Some were put to work on a hopelessly 
ambitious scheme to double rice production in three years. Others were sent to build 
fortifications and airfields and other defense projects. Still others were packed off to 
West Sumatra, where they were sent down into the mines. Tens of thousands more 
were sent as far away as Thailand and Burma to work on the notorious Death Railway.
Wherever they served, the romusha were treated brutally by their Japanese or 
Indonesian overseers, who fed them meagerly, beat them savagely, and worked them 
to the point of exhaustion. Tens of thousands died, from pneumonia, tuberculosis, 
malaria, dysentery, and yaws. Many thousands more seem simply to have been 
worked to death. In time, the ill-treatment of the romusha would do more than 
anything else to generate anti-Japanese resentment among the young men of the 
Peta.328 It also left many Javanese with feelings of contempt for the lower-level Javanese 
officials charged with bringing in the required number of romusha, and it sullied the 
image of political leaders such as Sukarno, who reluctantly endorsed the scheme.
The last weeks of 1943 and the early months of 1944 were a time of intense activity 
for Soeharto. An Indonesian volunteer defense force was being created from scratch. It 
had to be manned and trained and supplied. The commander of the First Battalion 
(Wates), Martodjoemeno, had gone on ahead to recruit the five hundred young men 
who were to serve as soldiers in his new battalion, drawing on his contacts in the local 
community.329 He and his fellow battalion commanders seem to have had no difficulty 
in finding volunteers. As one historian has noted, "the lure of a uniform, a steady diet, 
pay, or adventure attracted many young aspirants."330 Nor were entry standards 
especially high. There was no minimum standard of education, no requirement that a 
recruit have any knowledge of Japanese or even that he be able to produce a letter of 
recommendation from someone in the bureaucracy. All that he needed was a strong 
physique and the necessary fighting spirit. Many recruits were peasant boys, 
"apolitical, with little or no schooling."331 Others came from humble backgrounds in 
the cities and towns of Java. In the years ahead, these recruits were to be the 
dependable foot soldiers not only of Peta but also of the post-war Indonesian army. 
And they were to prove remarkably sturdy and steadfast, even in times of great
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training depot in Bogor.
329 According to Morimoto, the commander of the First Battalion, stationed in Wates, was Anjaya 
Purbokusumo. See Morimoto Takeshi, Jawa boei giyugun-shi, p. 397.
330 Kanahele, "The Japanese Occupation of Indonesia," p. 125.
331 Ibid.
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adversity, when some of their better-educated superiors were to fall into despair at the 
apparent hopelessness of the anti-Dutch struggle.332
For Soeharto, as for the other Indonesian officers, the establishment of Peta would 
have brought an exhilarating sense of purpose. It was an honor to be part of a self- 
defense force of 16,500 armed men. It was a challenge to be asked to train a forty-four- 
man infantry platoon (shodan), to pass on the skills learned in the KNIL and at Bogor, 
to instill in the recruits something of the fighting spirit that had formed such a central 
part of the Japanese indoctrination. For the recruits, too, this was a deeply satisfying 
time. These men were equally proud to be part of an all-Indonesian armed force, kitted 
out in the distinctive dark green Peta uniform, which set them apart as members of a 
new and important institution in local society, issued with rifles taken from KNIL 
armories, and trained to handle heavy machine guns and mortars. As the rainy season 
dragged on, turning the ground to oozing red mud, these men were drilled and trained 
intensively by their platoon commanders and company commanders, just as the latter 
had been by the Japanese. Enormous emphasis was placed on the development of 
physical stamina and semangat, just as it had been at Bogor. In the Peta, semangat "came 
to mean an almost reckless kind of physical courage, defiant of bodily injury and even 
death."333
In Wates and Glagah, Soeharto was given command of one of the three platoons 
(First Platoon) of the First Company of the First Battalion. He now found himself 
working alongside several Peta officers whose lives were to be closely interwoven with 
his in the years ahead. One of them was his company commander, Sunarwibowo. A 
well-educated a man in his early thirties, Sunarwibowo had been a high-school teacher 
under the Dutch, when teacher standards had been high. Identified by the Japanese as 
a potential leader, he had been recruited by Tsuchiya and sent to the chudancho course 
at Bogor, as had a number of other high-school teachers. Sunarwibowo was to be 
Soeharto's regimental commander when, in Yogyakarta in October 1945, Soeharto set 
up his first battalion. Another man Soeharto served with on the Indian Ocean beach at 
Glagah was Bardosono, a platoon commander who had been a student at the AMS-B at 
the time of the Dutch surrender. The third platoon commander was Hadjid Soedibjo, 
who was to serve in 1945 as one of Soeharto's fellow battalion commanders under 
Sunarwibowo. Two of Soeharto's friends from Bogor—Pranoto Reksosamoedra and 
Soedjono—were serving nearby, having been given command of platoons in the 
Second Company.334
Each Peta battalion came under the wing of a Japanese battalion—in places, one 
Japanese battalion might have responsibility for seven or eight Peta battalions—and in 
each Peta battalion there were six or seven Japanese officers and NCOs, responsible for 
such matters as logistics and training. But the Peta battalion commanders were proud 
of their "independence" and sensitive to slights, be they real or imagined, which meant 
that the Japanese officers attached to these units needed to act with considerable tact.
332 Personal communication, Major General Sukotjo Tjokroafenodjo, Jakarta.
333 Kanahele, "The Japanese Occupation of Indonesia," p. 125.
334 Raden Sutomo, who was in charge of the battalion's financial affairs, was made chief of supply at the 
Defense Ministry in May 1946, with the rank of major general. Selo Adji, the commander of the Third 
Company, later became a regimental commander in Yogyakarta.
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As the months wore on, strains were to develop between some Japanese battalions and 
their Indonesian "brother" units.
"Modest but Very Sharp"
Soeharto spent an exceptionally short time in a Peta fighting unit. On May 10,1944, 
less than five months after he had graduated as a platoon commander, he found 
himself back at the Officer Cadet Training Center in Bogor. With the war going from 
bad to worse, the Japanese had decided to create another twenty-two Peta battalions, 
in addition to the thirty-three already in place, to bolster their defenses along the south 
coast. That meant they needed another twenty-two battalion commanders, another 
eighty-one company commanders, and another eight hundred platoon commanders.335 
Soeharto, having made a good impression as a platoon commander, had been chosen 
for training as a company commander, which would put him in charge of three 
platoons, or 132 men.
Bogor in mid-1944 was a changed place, a noisy military town with many bars and 
brothels, all of them well patronized by Japanese soldiers and civilians. At the training 
center, which was now under the command of Yanagawa, there was the same high- 
minded emphasis on Japan's wartime goals, the same commitment to the idea of 
building an Indonesian defense force that would fight alongside the Japanese army. 
But the Indonesian officer cadets were all too aware of the ugly realities of Japanese 
occupation, and fissures were opening up between the Japanese and the Indonesians. 
To some extent, too, fissures were opening up in the Japanese ranks. When Soeharto 
was first in Bogor to undergo the platoon commanders' course, the training center had 
been run by Beppan. Now, with Peta growing by leaps and bounds, the Japanese had 
established in Jakarta a Planning Department for the Guidance of the Java Volunteer 
Defense Force (Giyugun Shidobu). This body, which took its orders from the Sixteenth 
Army Headquarters and which was intended "as a sort of proto-general staff' for Peta, 
carried out much of the work formerly done by Beppan.336 It was the Planning 
Department, not Beppan, which now ran the training center.337
These changes coincided with a gradual deterioration in the ideals that had 
attended the creation of the Peta. Members of the instruction staff that had been 
assembled for the new Peta levy came mostly from Japan. They had no knowledge of 
the local languages or customs.338 (Compounding this problem, about one hundred
335 Yanagawa gives a figure of 20 battalion commander cadets, 81 company-commander cadets, and 780 
platoon commander cadets. See Yanagawa "Statement," Part n, pp. 3—4. Once again, Morimoto gives 
slightly different figures. See Morimoto, Jawa boei giyugun-shi, p. 98. According to Yanagawa, the new 
intake of shodancho cadets began their training on April 10, with the chudancho cadets starting on May 10, 
and the daidancho cadets on June 10. All three training courses finished on August 10. See Yanagawa 
"Statement," Part II, p. 4. Morimoto says the course began on April 1 and ended on August 10. See 
Morimoto, Jawa boei giyugun-shi, pp. 98 and 124. If Morimoto is correct, and if the chudancho course began 
on April 1, Soeharto spent more than four months on this course, not two months. This would be in 
keeping with Soeharto's claim that the course lasted four months.
336 Tsuchiya Kiso and Yoshitake Chikao interview with Ruth McVey, Osaka, October 1980.
337 As part of the overhaul, the Training Centre (Renseitai) had been renamed the Education Corps 
(Kyoiku-tai).
338 Yanagawa "Statement," Part II, p. 2.
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Japanese officer cadets had arrived directly from Japan and been assigned to Peta 
battalions across Java without proper orientation.)339 A number of the new arrivals 
were overbearing and brutal. In theory, corporal punishment was prohibited in the 
Peta. But, notes Morimoto Takeshi, some Japanese resorted to slapping Indonesians on 
the face almost daily.340 As it happens, Morimoto appears to have been well-qualified 
to make that observation. According to a former Peta cadet who rose to a high rank in 
the post-war TNI, Second Lieutenant Morimoto's company was notorious for its "daily 
slapping practices."341
The restructuring notwithstanding, Beppan officers continued to play an important 
role in Peta training. Yanagawa, recently back from a two-month visit to Japan, threw 
himself into his role as commanding officer at the training center, which included a 
four-man Carrier Pigeon Research Unit.342 He was still as demanding and determined 
as ever, but his new responsibilities, some of his Beppan colleagues felt, had given him 
an inflated sense of his own importance, and he had taken to riding around Bogor on a 
large white horse, as his predecessor, Captain Maruzaki, had done.343 In the months 
ahead, he was to have a running battle with Lieutenant Colonel Masugi Kazuo, the 
new Sixteenth Army intelligence chief.344 He was also to become caught up in an 
increasingly bitter dispute between young Japanese officers at the training center and 
Japanese working in the local Japanese civilian administration.345
339 Morimoto, Jawa bod giyugun-shi, pp. 102-3.
340 Ibid.
341 Written communication, Lieutenant General Purbo Suwondo, March 9, 2009. According to Purbo, 
Morimoto was a kutaicho and mortar instructor.
342 According to one account, Yanagawa had taken back "photographic negatives plus research materials 
and reports." While in Japan, he made a vain attempt to find thirty Japanese "for secret-service work in 
Beppan in connection with Chinese affairs." Yanagawa "Statement," Part II, p. 1. What Yanagawa actually 
took back, it seems clear, was his propaganda film "Call to Australia." Tsuchiya Kiso, written 
communication, May 29, 2002.
343 Interview, Tsuchiya Kiso, February 2,1999. Yanagawa was promoted to captain on December 1,1944. 
See Yanagawa "Statement," Part II, p. 1. This promotion, said Tsuchiya, "led him to mistakenly believe 
that he was also number-one among the Japanese living in Bogor. He became arrogant." Tsuchiya seems 
to have erred on the timing of Yanagawa's promotion, however. It came through the day after he 
completed his stint as the commanding officer at the Bogor center—so any perceived arrogance can't be 
attributed to that promotion.
344 See Yanagawa "Statement," Part II, pp. 8-9. These differences centered mainly on the army's treatment 
of the ethnic Chinese community.
345 By the time Soeharto attended the company commanders' course, there was a palpable antagonism 
between the Japanese members of Yanagawa's training company and members of the military 
administration, which was headed by the Japanese governor. Young Japanese officers at the Peta training 
center were complaining among themselves about what they saw as the comfortable lifestyle of those 
working in the administration. These officers, they said, routinely took afternoon naps and "played 
around with Eurasian women." For their part, those in the administration objected to the behavior of off- 
duty officers and NCOs from the Peta training company. These men, according to the administrators, 
filled the Bogor restaurants and the local Japan Club every night, drinking to excess and hiring prostitutes. 
Administrators were angered, in particular, by Probationary Officer Takagi Nobuhiro, a notorious 
drunkard and troublemaker who was always getting into fights. He often drew his sword and threatened 
Japanese civilians and administrators. Even when he was sober, Takagi was inclined to commandeer the 
main street to give his recruits combat training, and he became enraged if a car sought to pass. In a post­
war memoir that was seen by some as boastful and perhaps not entirely accurate, Yanagawa said that, one 
day in June 1944, when he himself was absent, the chief of staff, General Kokubu, having heard the 
complaints of the administration staff, descended on the Peta training center. He rebuked the center's 
Japanese staff severely and ordered that no one was to leave camp. Infuriated that Kokubu had apparently
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Soeharto spent three months on the company commanders' course, from May 10 to 
August 10. This was a month longer than the term of the first such course in 1943, and 
it gave him a solid grounding in the subjects he studied.346 Parallel courses were run for 
the new batch of shodancho cadets, who were given four months' training, and the new 
daidanchos, who were given two months. One of those in the battalion commanders' 
course while Soeharto was at Bogor for the second time was Sudirman, a twenty-eight- 
year-old Islamic schoolteacher who, eighteen months later, would be elected 
commander-in-chief of the Indonesian army. There is no reason to believe the two men 
met at this time, and indeed it is highly unlikely that they did. Men in the three 
training tiers were largely kept apart from one another.
Once again, Soeharto made an indelible impression on his Japanese army 
instructors. More than five decades later, they could recall with ease his coolness, his 
composure, his competence. According to former Second Lieutenant Nakamoto 
Yoshiyuki, who was the head of his training section, "Soeharto was a cautious man 
and never showed off his talent. He was a steady man who never lost his temper."347 
According to Morimoto, Soeharto "was remembered by all his instructors as a very 
capable man." Soeharto, he said, was "modest but very sharp" and, although capable, 
never took advantage of other people to make himself look good.348
On Thursday, August 10, 1944, at the end of the course, a formal graduation 
ceremony was held in Jakarta. A photograph taken at the governor general's palace 
shows the inauguration ceremony for new Peta battalions. Indonesian officers stand in 
neat rows, rigidly at attention, feet slightly splayed. The ban on the red-and-white 
national flag remained in force, but each man carries a Peta flag, which, with its green 
field, its distinctive red sun, and red beams radiating in all directions, and its white 
crescent moon and star, was an overripe and overdesigned amalgam of Imperial 
Japanese Army and Islamic symbols.349 A Japanese flag, with its blood-red circle on a
accepted at face value the administrators' one-sided story, Yanagawa expressed the view privately to 
some of his colleagues that the chief of staff should be killed. Fearing the worst, Captain Maruzaki, the 
head of Beppan, made a violent and somewhat theatrical attempt to defuse the situation. Unsheathing his 
military sword, he sliced off the little finger of his left hand in the presence of Yanagawa, Tsuchiya, and 
Yoshitake. "You may want Kokubu's head," he told his subordinate, "but I will give you my finger 
instead. Give up such an idea." For details, see Rikugun chohoin Yanagawa Chui [Japanese Army 
Intelligence Officer, First Lieutenant Yanagawa], pp. 146-156. In November 1944, it was decided that 
Maruzaki should return to Japan "owing to his illness." With his departure, Tsuchiya took over as the 
head of Beppan. (The trouble-making Takagi was shunted off to the Peta battalion in Bojonegoro, East 
Java.) See Yanagawa "Statement," Part II, pp. 3, 8. Maruzaki's illness cannot have been too serious. Back in 
Japan, he was promoted to major and went to work in the Izumi (Spring) Unit, which was "to wage 
campaigns of assassination and terror against the Allied troops and Japanese collaborators." He was later 
transferred to Korea. Mercado, The Shadow Warriors ofNakano, pp. 127 and 160.
346 See Yanagawa "Statement," Part I, p. 5, and Part II, p. 4.
347 Morimoto, Jawa boei giyugun-shi, p. 127.
348 Interview, Morimoto Takeshi, Tokorozawa, Saitama Prefecture, February 1,1999. In his book, Morimoto 
says "it is assumed" that Soeharto attended the third company commanders' course, in September 1944. 
The assumption is incorrect. Indonesian colleagues insist he was a member of the second intake.
349 The Peta flag was designed on the basis that it should not resemble the Indonesian flag, should look 
similar to the Japanese military flag, and should incorporate the Islamic crescent and star. Tsuchiya Kiso, 
personal communication. Benda has suggested that the aim was to express "the desired identification of 
Japan's war with a Holy War for the defense of Indonesian Islam against the Christian, imperialist West." 
See Harry Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945, 
p. 141.
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field of white, hangs at the front of the hall. As Soeharto and his fellow company 
commanders were sworn in, each was presented with a Japanese-style ceremonial 
sword. "It was not a genuine Japanese sword, and the length was less than [that of] the 
swords worn by Japanese officers," an Indonesian historian was to remark dryly. "Yet 
it was received with a certain measure of pride."350
By the time he left Bogor for the second time, Soeharto had spent a total of thirty- 
one months in military service: twenty-one of them with the Dutch, ten with the 
Japanese. Remarkably, he had spent twenty-two (and, by one count, almost twenty- 
four) of those thirty-one months in training centers, receiving instruction from 
experienced Dutch and Japanese army instructors, to say nothing of his three-month 
police training course.351 This training, when combined with his determination, his 
initiative, his natural aptitude, his capacity to organize, and his willingness to take 
charge, was to give him a distinct advantage, not only during the Japanese occupation, 
when he was to be singled out for preferment and given at least two important and 
sensitive assignments, but during the post-war struggle against the returning Dutch. In 
1945, when the revolutionary struggle began, Soeharto had more than five times as 
much military training as the average shodancho or chudancho, and eleven times as 
much as those officers who had attended only the first Japanese-run platoon 
commanders' course or who had been on the parallel company commanders' course. 
This was a striking difference.352 He had between ten and fourteen times as much 
formal military training as the battalion commanders, including Sudirman, whose 
subsequent importance to the independence movement stemmed not from his 
professional military qualifications, which were slight, but from his spiritual qualities, 
which led him to be seen as the almost mystical embodiment of revolutionary struggle. 
As well as all that training, Soeharto had gained practical experience during his 
attachment to a KNIL infantry battalion. If he lagged a long way behind most Peta 
officers when it came to secondary education and social position, he was streets ahead 
of all but a handful of them when it came to professional military training.
There were limits, of course, to what Soeharto and the other Peta officers were 
taught. As we have seen, the Japanese gave the cadets a brief but excellent introduction 
to small-unit tactics, especially at the platoon and company level. This was to prove 
invaluable during the 1945-49 struggle for independence against the Dutch, which was 
all that mattered in the short run. But it meant that the officers who were to form the 
backbone of the TNI for the best part of three decades had, for the time being, at least, 
no higher military education and were capable of mounting nothing more than 
battalion-size operations, if that. That limitation was to play into the hands of officers 
such as A. H. Nasution, T. B. Simatupang, Alex Kawilarang, Hidajat Martaatmadja, 
and Didi Kartasasmita, who had attended either the pre-war Royal Military Academy
350 Nugroho, "The Peta Army During the Japanese Occupation," p. 134.
351 He had spent seventeen of his twenty-one months in the KNIL in training establishments and only four 
months on attachment to a battalion. He had spent five of his ten months in the Peta in training 
establishments.
352 The disparities were somewhat less, of course, in the case of those platoon commanders who, like 
Soeharto, had also been selected for a company commanders' course, and in the case of those men who 
had begun their military training in 1944, when the courses were longer. But even here, Soeharto was a 
long way ahead; he still had more than four times as much training as the platoon or company 
commanders who had attended either a longer course or two separate courses.
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in Breda in the Netherlands or the substitute academy established in Bandung after the 
German invasion of Holland in 1940.353 Not surprisingly, these officers were 
considered more suitable for senior staff and command positions in the early years of 
the TNI.
Concessions from the Japanese
In July 1944, while Soeharto was on the chudancho course, the Americans captured 
Saipan, an island in the Marianas only 1,200 miles from Tokyo. In September, US forces 
seized Morotai, an island in the Moluccas, which General MacArthur saw as a 
jumping-off point for the Philippines, three hundred miles to the north. Observing this 
remorseless American advance, Sixteenth Army planning officers concluded, 
erroneously, that MacArthur would now move on Java from the north, rather than 
from the south. Increasingly alarmed at the inadequacies of their defenses on Java, the 
Japanese pushed ahead with yet another expansion of Peta, which, they had decided, 
needed a further eleven battalions to strengthen defenses on the north coast of Java. 
The third and final intake of Peta officers was in no way special. Like the Dutch on the 
eve of the Pacific War, the Japanese were desperate for Indonesian officers and NCOs 
and could not afford to be too choosy about whom they took. "As this was the third 
batch of trainees," Yanagawa noted, "the quality was very inferior to the previous 
ones."354 Moreover, the Japanese had cut their training courses to the bone, just as the 
Dutch had done. The third Bogor course ran for barely a month; the cadets were 
rushed through at a pace that left the Japanese training staff "a bit bewildered."355
By late 1944, Peta had sixty-six battalions on Java, with more than 37,000 armed 
men. This made the Java defenses look a little more respectable, at least on paper, but it 
also created a new problem. As Colonel Miyamoto Shizuo, soon to become the 
Sixteenth Army staff officer in charge of strategy, wrote in his memoirs, "This was 
twice as large as the entire Sixteenth Army, and four times the actual combat strength 
of the army."356 The Japanese had equipped Peta with 18,700 rifles, nearly 700 heavy 
machine guns, nearly 200 light machine guns, nearly 100 trench mortars, and 20 
artillery pieces. Although Indonesian officers were not aware of the fact, they now had 
in their control two-fifths of the arms on Java, while the Japanese held three-fifths.357 
Beppan, which had set up and trained the Indonesian volunteer force, was still as 
enthusiastic as ever about Peta. So, too, was the commander-in-chief, General Harada. 
But Miyamoto, a latecomer to Java, had misgivings. As he wrote many years later,
353 Lieutenant General Oerip Soemohardjo's military education at Meester Cornelis, now Jatinegara, in 
Batavia (Jakarta), was less good, but better than that of the Peta officers. Oerip was the first chief of the 
general staff in the Indonesian Army.
354 Yanagawa "Statement," Part II, p. 6.
355 Morimoto, jmva Boie Giyungun-shi, p. 126. The course began on August 21 and wound up on September 
20. Yanagawa suggests it ran for about six weeks. See Yanagawa "Statement," Part II, p. 5.
356 Miyamoto, "Jawa shusen shori-ki," p. 223. Colonel Miyamoto arrived in Java in April 1944 as staff 
officer in charge of supply, with responsibility for distributing arms and munitions to the Peta battalions. 
By 1945 he had been promoted to Sakusensanbo, the number-two staff officer, in charge of strategy, under 
Colonel Obana Yoshimasa. As Obana was often ill, Miyamoto served, in effect, as the key planning officer 
of the Sixteenth Army. Miyamoto Shizuo, reply given in response to written questions from the author, 
May 25,1999.
357 Miyamoto, "Jawa shusen shori-ki," p. 224.
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"when I first saw the Peta, I thought I couldn't place total trust in it ... to me it seemed 
dangerous to allow Indonesians to carry weapons when more than ten thousand 
Japanese nationals were living in various parts of the island. I thought the Indonesians 
in Peta would soon learn of our wartime reverses and that we should be ready to 
change our policy in regard to the force."358 Despite these reservations, Miyamoto 
decided not to push for changes "since no other staff officers seemed to share my 
concerns."
With their military fortunes in dramatic decline, the Japanese changed their tune on 
the question of Indonesian independence. On September 7,1944, Prime Minister Koiso 
Kuniaki promised that independence would be granted to the East Indies "in the 
future" or "someday" (Indonesia shorai dokuritsu), which was translated into Indonesian 
as di kemudian hari. The Koiso statement was hedged with caveats. The timing of 
independence was not to be discussed, nor were there to be any "formal activities" for 
independence. But Tokyo was now signaling that it was willing to promote political 
participation in the Indies, that it was prepared to encourage "enthusiasm for 
independence" and ready to conduct propaganda in favor of independence. It also was 
willing to allow Indonesians to fly the national flag and to play "Indonesia Raya," the 
future national anthem.359 Although stopping well short of Indonesian demands, this 
statement was seen in Java as further evidence that Indonesia would soon be free. As it 
happened, the nuances of the Koiso statement were lost on many of the Indonesians 
being trained at Bogor. "In response to this announcement," Yanagawa told Allied 
interrogators, "we began, in training the Giyugun, to inculcate the idea that the 
Giyugun was the army for Indonesian independence. As a result of these lessons, 
however, those cadets who were not well-educated misunderstood and supposed that 
independence had already been granted, which caused us considerable difficulties in 
the training."360
In the wake of the Koiso announcement, the Sixteenth Army believed it had "clear 
authority to make the Giyugun and Heiho the foundation of a future national army of 
Indonesia."361 As a result, those responsible for Peta were ordered to begin "a gradual 
conversion of infantry to other arms."362 According to a document captured at the end 
of the war, Japanese officers now began to organize Peta MT (motor transport) 
battalions, Peta "tank battalions," and Peta engineering battalions.363 According to a 
Sixteenth Army study, the Japanese had "a plan under consideration" to organize an 
"Indonesian National Army" after the granting of independence.364
358 See Miyamoto Shizuo, "Miyamoto Shizuo no hanashi," pp. 195-217.
359 See Nishijima Shigetada, "The Independence Proclamation in Jakarta" [Indoneshia Dokuritsu 
Kakumei], in The Japanese Experience in Indonesia, ed. Reid and Akira, pp. 303-04. See also Major General 
Nishimura, April 10,1947, reply to questionnaire of Mr. A. P. M. Audretsch, Office of the Attorney 
General, Netherlands East Indies, NIOD IC No. 006793-006807, p. 9.
360 Yanagawa "Statement," Part II, p. 6.
361 Miyamoto, "Jawa shusen shori-ki," p. 225.
362 "Supplementary explanation of armed parties in Java under Japanese mil. adm.," from "Document 
taken from 16 Army HQ," p. 4. There is nothing to indicate who wrote this study. However, the 
sentiments expressed, not least the skepticism about the wisdom of relying on the Peta, suggest that the 
author could well have been Colonel Miyamoto.
363 "Document taken from 16 Army HQ," p. 4.
364 See "Explanations Regarding all Kinds of Armed Bodies," p. 5.
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On the face of it, the Japanese were preparing to make Peta more like a 
conventional army. But references to new Peta tank and artillery units need to be 
treated with circumspection. Although the Japanese are said to have eventually turned 
over 20 armored cars, 20 artillery pieces, and 330 trucks to the Peta, a former head of 
Beppan has claimed that he never heard the expression "Peta MT."365 Nor is there any 
reference to such a unit in the detailed and semi-official Japanese history of the Peta. 
There is certainly no reason to believe that the Japanese gave serious thought to 
handing over any tanks. Indeed, as Beppan officers saw it, some senior officers at 
Sixteenth Army headquarters were using the talk of "a gradual conversion of infantry 
to other arms" as a device to reduce the number of Peta fighting battalions, which they 
viewed as a potential threat.
As fears of an Allied landing grew, the Japanese set up yet another armed body, 
one that was to play little or no role in the war, given the lateness of the hour, but 
which was much better trained than Peta and which was to be a progenitor of the 
Indonesian post-war intelligence service and, in some ways, the Military Police. In 
November 1944, Sixteenth Army headquarters ordered Yanagawa to create a Special 
Guerrilla Force (Yugekitai) to gather intelligence and conduct guerrilla operations 
behind the lines in the event of an Allied attack.366 Based at a new headquarters in 
Bandung, Yanagawa established the force using about forty Japanese and about 160 of 
the best second-intake Indonesian platoon commanders, who, in addition to their four- 
month shodancho training, were given four months' instruction in intelligence­
gathering and guerrilla warfare.367 The Indonesians were to be sent back to their home 
areas in East, West, and Central Java, where each was expected to recruit and train an
365 Written communication, Tsuchiya Kiso, May 29, 2002. In a similar vein, Purbo Suwondo said he and his 
fellow Peta officers in Malang did not hear anything about future motor transport, artillery, or armored 
units. Written communication, Purbo Suwondo, March 9, 2009.
366 The full name of the organization, which, Yanagawa later said, "doesn't make sense deliberately," was 
Jawa Boei Giyugun Tokusetsu Yugekitai I Go Kinmutai (Special Guerrilla Force No. I Task Force). 
Interview, Morimoto Takeshi, February 1,1999. The Yugekitai had no organic relation to the Peta but was 
established by and controlled by Beppan officers. Until the Allies landed, it was to concentrate on 
intelligence work. Personal communication, Purbo Suwondo, March 5, 2009. For further details about the 
Yugekitai, see "The Organization of the 'I GO' Task Force," Yanagawa "Statement," Part III, pp. 1—4. See 
also Ruth McVey interview with Hasuda Tatsuo, Tokyo, October 23,1980.
367 Yanagawa "Statement," Part II, p. 2, and interview, Purbo Suwondo, September 1, 1998. Yugekitai 
training was totally different from Peta training and in many ways more difficult. Yugeki were given 
automatic rifles and other arms and were trained especially for night action. They were taught not only 
how to use but also how to repair all kinds of weapons, and how to live on their own and make decisions 
individually rather than as a unit. They were trained in boryaku (clandestine operations) and in collecting 
information from kampung residents. Members of the force wore dark blue civilian clothing (the clothing 
was supposed to be black, but there was no black dye) and were allowed to grow their hair long, which 
helped them blend in with the population. (Yanagawa had a major fight about that with more senior 
officers before he got permission, "pointing out that it was unrealistic to require people who were going to 
melt into the countryside to crop their hair in the Japanese military fashion.") Because it was crucial to 
keep the Yugekitai a secret so that the Allies would not roll it up right away, its existence was not known 
to other units. See Ruth McVey interviews with Tsuchiya Kiso and Yoshitake Chikao, Osaka, October 
1980, and Yanagawa Motoshige, Jakarta, November 13,1980. See also Yanagawa "Statement," Part III, p. 3. 
Yanagawa, who took the most talented Peta officers he had trained in Tangerang and Bogor to act as 
instructors, ranked the Yugekitai as the best of the Japanese-trained Indonesian units. The West Java 
headquarters was in Lembang. The headquarters for Central Java was in Salatiga and the one for East Java 
in Malang. Some graduates of the third shodancho course were also recruited into the Yugekitai. According 
to Yanagawa, the Yugeki officers "were generally people of the education and status of schoolteachers."
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additional five guerrilla fighters.365 *68 "Our plan," Tsuchiya said, "was to hold out as long 
as possible, fighting a guerrilla war together with the Nihongun [Japanese military] 
once it moved back into the mountains."369 Those plans came to naught. The first 
course finished in July 1945, only weeks before the Japanese surrender.
Former Yugeki officers went on to hold some of the most senior positions in the 
Indonesian army and state intelligence services. When Zulkifli Lubis was running the 
Special Military Investigator (Penyelidik Militer Chusus, PMC), an early post­
independence intelligence body in Yogyakarta, he put trusted ex-Yugeki officers in the 
most sensitive positions; as a determining factor in the selection process, his trust in a 
man trumped any expertise that officer may or may not have had in intelligence 
matters.370 Among the appointees were R. M. Subroto Kusmardjo and Kusnowibowo.371 
Other former Yugeki officers who went on to play prominent roles in intelligence were 
Lieutenant General Tjokropranolo (chief of Hankam Intelligence), Major General 
Nicklany Soedardjo (Bakin), Major General R. M. Yonohatmodjo (Bakin), Brigadier 
General Sugeng Djarot (Bakin), Major General Mansjoer, Brigadier General Agus 
Pramono, and Major Rusman. Some of the officers who rose to prominence in the 
intelligence service, it is true, had no connection with the Yugekitai. They include 
Lieutenant General Sutopo Juwono, a former student; General Yoga Sugama, a 
wartime graduate of the Imperial Military Academy (Rikugun Shikan Gakko), in 
Japan; Lieutenant General Charis Suhud, a former korektor (proofreader) on Asia Raya; 
and Major General Parman, a former Kenpeiho.
The Military Police Corps, known initially as the Polisi Tentara (PT), was another 
institution with strong Yugekitai connections. After the proclamation of independence, 
almost all of the former Yugeki officers in East Java, together with most of their men, 
joined the Polisi Tentara RI, Resimen III, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel 
Bambang Supeno. This became the core of the Polisi Tentara in East Java. The one 
notable exception was Major Sobirin Mochtar, who formed an infantry battalion with 
Yugeki company commanders and noncommissioned officers. This unit, known as 
Battalion 507 ("Sikatan"), was one of the best fighting battalions in the Brawijaya 
Division. In Central Java, the PT/CPM was led by men from several distinct streams: 
former Yugekitai officers; a small but relatively well-educated group of former 
Kenpeiho; and former students. Among the Yugeki officers who joined the Military 
Police were Major General Sudirgo, who had helped develop his intelligence skills
365 There were 49 shodanchos from West Java, and they later recruited about 200 other young men from
their home region. The figures for Central Java were about 52 and 180 and for East Java about 57 and 200. 
Yanagawa "Statement," Part III, pp. 1-2. The Yugekitai officers were graduates of the Tangerang asrama or
the Peta training courses in Bogor. Those who were not did not become more than NCO's. Ruth McVey
interview with Tsuchiya Kiso, Osaka, October 1980.
369 Interview, Tsuchiya Kiso, June 19,1999.
370 While not himself a Yugeki officer, Lubis had been close to Yanagawa, the commanding officer of the 
Yugekitai, since the days of the Tangerang training camp. Lubis had spent the latter part of the war 
working with Japanese intelligence in Singapore and Malaya.
371 Interview, Purbo Suwondo, Jakarta, March 5, 2009. In late 1945, many former Yugeki officers in Salatiga 
drifted down to Yogya and joined Lubis. For further details, see Ruth McVey interview with 
Kusnowibowo, November 20,1980; and Ruth McVey interview with Zulkifli Lubis, November 11,1980. 
See also Muchsin Lubis, "Zulkifli Lubis, Komandan Intelijen Pertama di Indonesia," Tempo, July 29,1989, 
reproduced in M.E.M.O.A.R: senarai kiprah sejarah, Diangkat dari Majalah TEMPO (Jakarta: Grafiti, 1993), p. 
53.
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while serving in the PMC in Yogyakarta in late 1945, Major General Soenarso, and 
Lieutenant General Tjokropranolo. If most former Yugeki officers in East Java and 
some in Central Java were drawn towards the Military Police, in West Java former 
Yugeki were more inclined to join infantry battalions. However, the first pribumi 
commander of the Para-Commando Regiment, Major R. E. Djaelani, was a former 
Yugeki.372 Personal relations were usually good between Military Police and 
intelligence officers who had served together in the Yugekitai. Several senior CPM 
officers, including Sudirgo and Soenarso, moved across to Bakin, the ostensibly civilian 
State Intelligence Coordinating Board, during the New Order.
Although many senior officers of the Military Police Corps came from a Yugekitai 
background and were to have an important impact on that body, the CPM was also 
influenced in significant ways by the practices and procedures of the Kenpeitai, at least 
insofar as its police—as distinct from its combat—responsibilities were concerned. For 
example, until 1958, a CPM officer was legally entitled to arrest any army officer up to 
two ranks his senior. This rule was taken directly from the Kenpeitai; Kenpei officers 
could arrest army officers up to three ranks their senior. It has been observed that the 
CPM was regarded in the 1960s as an elite force, with its officers better educated than 
most military men, and seen as more honest and serious than those in other specialized 
units of the Indonesian National Army.373 While that is true, this "arrest" provision had 
made the CPM unpopular in some military circles, especially during the Revolution.374 
In the period after independence, CPM criminal investigation work, that is the 
investigation of crimes committed by army men, was a speciality of former Kenpeiho. 
Some men who had served in the Kenpeitai were also involved in the Military Police's 
political investigation work.375 However, the military judicial system, retired military 
police officers say, was based on the Dutch, not the Japanese, system. Former civilian 
police officers also played a role in shaping PT/CPM procedures.
Restructuring the Volunteer Army
As Japan's fortunes fell, those of Soeharto rose. For the second time in three years, 
he was reaping the benefits that came from joining the armed forces of an alien 
monarch in the northern hemisphere. What is more, important new appointments 
were about to come his way, giving him some early experience as a staff officer. In late 
1944, Peta was still seen by the Japanese as a potentially valuable reserve force, but it 
was an administrative burden for the Sixteenth Army, which was preoccupied with its 
efforts to meet an expected Allied invasion. The Japanese had their Planning
372 The RPKAD, set up under a different name in 1952 by the West Java commander, Colonel Alex 
Kawilarang, was trained and led initially by a former Dutch commando named Rokus Bernardus Visser; 
he had taken out Indonesian citizenship, converted to Islam, and changed his name to Muhammad Idjon 
Djambi.
373 Ben Anderson, personal communication, February 26, 2009.
374 Major General Sukotjo Tjokroatmodjo, personal communication, February 5, 2001.
375 Purbo Suwondo, interview, Jakarta, March 5, 2009, and Sukotjo Tjokroatmodjo interview, August 18, 
2009. See also Corps Polisi Militer, 50 Tahun Corps Polisi Militer: 22 Juni 1946 s/d 22 Juni 1996 (Jakarta: 
Gunung Agung, 1996), p. 283. In the early stages of the revolution, "political investigation" work could 
mean almost anything a local commander decided it meant; there were no rules. Purbo, the Regiment III 
staff officer responsible for training and education, was frequently with Bambang Supeno when the latter 
was in command of troops on the Sidoarjo front.
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Department for the Guidance of the Java Volunteer Defense Force (Giyugun Shidobu) 
in Jakarta. They also had two regional offices (Giyugun Shitsu) to take care of matters 
concerning the volunteer army, one attached to the Japanese forces in the eastern half 
of Java (Tobu boeitai), the other attached to the forces in the western part of the island 
(Seibu boeitai). But the growing size of the Peta was creating difficulties for the staff at 
the regional offices. It was also creating difficulties for the sections (Giyugun Gakari) in 
charge of the Peta in each of the various Japanese battalions.376
In an attempt to address this problem, the Sixteenth Army decided to overhaul the 
organization of the volunteer army. On December 20, 1944, it set up three separate 
"regional headquarters" (Chikutai Shireibu) for the Peta, in East, Central, and West 
Java.377 These offices, which were to receive their orders from the Planning Department 
or directly from Sixteenth Army Headquarters, were not really headquarters (shireibu) 
in the accepted sense of the term. They were to have no command responsibility. 
Rather, they would take care of the administrative, logistical, training, financial, and 
medical needs of the Peta battalions.378 Nevertheless, they were important. Each would 
be headed by a Japanese colonel or lieutenant colonel, and each would have a staff of 
about fifty officers and men, about forty of them Japanese who had worked either in 
the Peta regional offices or in the Peta sections of the various Japanese battalions; the 
rest were trusted Indonesian "apprentices" from the Peta.379 Each "headquarters" 
would take care of the eighteen to twenty-five Peta battalions stationed in its region.380
The Japanese saw this as another step towards the creation of a more independent 
Indonesian defense force. In the words of Miyamoto, the intention was that the 
Indonesians "would soon run all three Chikutai Shireibu by themselves."381 Nor was 
that all. Despite his misgivings about the volunteer army, Miyamoto planned to bring 
Peta battalions together in regiments and brigades, so that the Indonesian force "would 
be able to grow to be their national military," which meant, presumably, that 
Indonesian officers were to be trained for higher staff and command positions.382
For the Japanese, there were two things to be said for the new regional 
headquarters. First, they could be presented to the Indonesians as evidence that Japan 
envisaged that a separate Peta Headquarters (Giyugun Shireibu) would be set up at 
some stage, taking Indonesia another step closer to an independent defense force. 
Second, these regional headquarters would allow the Sixteenth Army to "slim down"
376 The fact that there were sixty-six Peta battalions and only eight Japanese ones suggests that a typical 
Japanese battalion may have been responsible for about eight Peta battalions.
377 Morimoto, Jawa boei giyugun-shi, p. 232. Duties that had been covered by the Giyugun Shitsu and by the 
battalions' Giyugun Gakari were expanded, solidified, and transferred to the Chikutai Shireibu.
378 Each Chikutai Shireibu consisted of six departments—general affairs, education, intelligence, weapons, 
finance, and medical. Ibid., p. 231. As such, they were responsible for the bookkeeping, distribution of 
food and weapons, training program, and relationship between the Japanese instructors attached to each 
battalion and the senior Indonesian officers in those battalions. Interview, Morimoto Takeshi, February 1, 
1999.
379 Interview, Miyamoto Shizuo, Tokyo, February 20,1999. For further details, see "Document taken from 
16 Army HQ," p. 3.
380 On May 17,1945, a fourth Chikutai Shireibu was created. With this, the number of Daidan each 
Shireibu was responsible for was reduced to between eleven and twenty-two.
381 Miyamoto interview, February 20,1999.
382 Miyamoto, "Miyamoto Shizuo no hanashi," p. 206.
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to fighting strength ahead of what was expected to be a climactic battle for Java, 
leaving the Peta free to proceed in its own way.383 That strategy, which may seem 
remarkable in view of all the expectations invested in Peta, reflected the thinking of 
Miyamoto. A China veteran who had arrived in Java in April 1944, more than two 
years after the key Beppan officers, Miyamoto had no familiarity with the Peta and no 
sympathy with the Indonesian youth movement. On the contrary, he distrusted the 
armed Indonesian units that the Japanese had created and was ill-at-ease with the 
rising anti-Japanese sentiment on Java. In the words of Tsuchiya, who had done so 
much to build the Peta, both on Java and Bali, "He believed that Indonesians had no 
war potential ... He always tried to make a strategy using mainly the Japanese army 
and excluding the Peta. He was an executive [kanbu] who was anti-Peta."384 Miyamoto, 
according to Tsuchiya, did not trust Peta and wanted it to fight separately. As we shall 
see, Miyamoto did not take issue with that assessment. He came to believe, he said, 
that Peta members "should choose their own way [jibun no michi]" when the war went 
into a decisive phase.
With much riding on this new administrative structure, the Japanese went to some 
lengths to select capable Indonesian staff officers, calling on some of Peta's best 
battalion and company commanders. One of those officers was Soeharto, who had 
continued to make a positive impression on his Japanese superiors. After completing 
the company commanders' course at Bogor, which gave him a rank equivalent to 
captain, Soeharto was sent to the office of the Central Java Chikutai Shireibu, in Solo, 
where he was placed in charge of training.385 There were, of course, Japanese officers 
above Soeharto in the Solo office. But the appointment was a clear sign of the regard in 
which he was held by his Sixteenth Army superiors. "Looking at this," said the author 
of the definitive Japanese history of the Peta, "you can be sure Soeharto was trusted by 
the Japanese."386 Tsuchiya, who had recruited and trained Soeharto, but who had lost 
track of him after that, felt the same way. 'The Chikutai Shireibu was an organization 
that oversaw all the battalions in that region," he noted. "So if Soeharto was assigned 
to the Chikutai Shireibu, it must have been a really important position."387 According 
to Colonel Soepardio, a former Peta shodancho and former deputy head of the 
Indonesian Armed Forces' Military History Division, "the most important Indonesian 
Peta officer was Soeharto."388 Soeharto, he claimed, "was supposed [in time] to be the 
regional commander for Central Java."
As the senior Javanese training officer at regional headquarters in Solo, Soeharto 
would, in theory, have been in regular communication with about twenty Peta 
battalions. He would have had contact with a wide range of Peta officers and had a 
good sense of conditions in Java at a time of mounting hardship and privation, when 
most Peta officers were confined to their own districts, with little or no opportunity for 
travel and little or no contact with other Peta battalions. Soeharto, however, seems to
383 Morimoto, Jawa boei giyugun-shi, p. 231.
384 Written communication, Tsuchiya Kiso, May 29, 2002.
385 Interview, Morimoto Takeshi, February 1,1999. See also Soeharto, My Thoughts, p. 20.
386 Ibid.
387 Interview, Tsuchiya Kiso, Mishima, February 2,1999.
388 Interview, Colonel Soepardio, Jakarta, September 10,1998.
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have held this position for no more than seven or eight weeks, hardly enough time for 
him to have made many new contacts with Peta battalions.
For the most part, Japanese officers and NCOs formed a favorable impression of 
Soeharto, but this was not always the case. Some were skeptical. One such man was 
Sergeant Teramoto Masashi, who was attached to the Kenpeitai office in Solo, where it 
was his job was to keep a close eye both on Peta units and on Mangkunegoro VIII and 
other members of the minor court in that city. As he recalled:
I saw Shodancho Soeharto a few times when he was in the Chikutai Shireibu office 
in Solo when I visited a Peta unit where my old friend Sergeant Goto Tetsuo was 
an instructor. I wasn't particularly impressed with him. He was rather 
inconspicuous. He seemed restless and inconsequential and didn't look brilliant. 
That is why I was astounded in later years to learn that he became president.389
At the same time, Teramoto acknowledged that his colleagues had found 
something to admire in Soeharto. Asked if he thought the Kenpeitai had "cleared" 
Soeharto before his admission to the Peta, he replied, "I don't think so. Few of us paid 
particular attention to him; he seemed reliable."
After a short stay in Solo, Soeharto was transferred to the Jaga Monyet camp in 
Jakarta to train students from technical schools "for the Engineering Corps." It was the 
first time he lived in the future capital. One of those he trained was platoon 
commander Singgih, whom he had earlier encountered at Bogor and who, in August 
1945, was one of the young men who were to kidnap Sukarno and Hatta in an attempt 
to force the pace of the proclamation of independence. When the Jakarta assignment 
was over, Soeharto returned to the Chikutai Shireibu, which had in the meantime 
moved from Solo to Madiun. Here, for the first time in his military career, he lived not 
in the barracks but in a house provided by the Japanese, another sign of the growing 
regard in which he was held by them.
Throughout this time, the Japanese continued to beat the propaganda drum, with 
strident denunciations of the emperor's enemies. Late in 1944, the army commander 
had issued instructions concerning the ideals of the volunteer forces. The Peta, he said, 
should "aim at the independence and preservation of the people and religion" and 
"march forward toward the annihilation of the enemies, Americans, British, and 
Dutch."390 Increasingly, however, statements of that kind fell on deaf ears. By now, 
many Peta officers combined a deepening hostility towards the Japanese with an 
increasingly virulent nationalism. At one level, there was resentment over small 
personal humiliations. Peta officers had been led to believe that they were members of 
an elite corps that would play a vital role in the achievement of Indonesian 
independence, but they found themselves treated in many cases like second-class 
citizens, obliged to salute Japanese NCOs and to accept without complaint the 
"arrogant and humiliating" attitude of Japanese NCOs and soldiers.391 To make
389 Interview, Teramoto Masashi, Inba-mura, Chiba Prefecture, February 12,1999. See also Morimoto, Jawa 
boei giyugun-shi, p. 234.
390 Jawa Shimbun, October 9,1944, quoted in Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia (JPRS), p. 196.
391 Lebra, Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia, p. 148, and Nugroho, "The Peta Army During the 
Japanese Occupation," p. 174. Junior officers were answerable only to their battalion commanders, and
88 David Jenkins
matters worse, the food allowance of the Peta "conspicuously declined" from the 
middle of 1944, aggravating the dissatisfaction of some Peta members.392
At a more serious level, Peta officers were embittered over the suffering that had 
been visited on Java during the Japanese occupation. For the Japanese, Java was a 
major supply center for the armies in the "Southern areas," which were now all but cut 
off from the Japanese home islands as a result of the relentless US Navy submarine 
campaign. For the Indonesians, Java had become an island of immense hardship. In 
1944, the rice crop failed in many parts of Java, and Japanese rice requisitions hit 
especially hard. On top of that, the economy suffered from huge inflation as the 
Japanese printed money as fast as they could. As was to happen again in the 1960s, 
inflation eroded the buying power of official salaries, spawning racketeering and 
corruption. Java was chronically short of food, medicine, textiles, bicycle tires, and 
kerosene. In many places, Indonesian families were reduced to one meal a day. As the 
textile shortages worsened, some people had nothing to wear. In June 1944, according 
to a Japanese report, the clothing shortage was so acute that children could not go to 
school, women could not leave their homes, and men could not visit the mosque. In 
Madura, "government employees were seen working in their offices wearing shorts 
made of old gunny sacks and nothing else." Later in the same year, farmers were seen 
"working stark naked in the fields,"393 although presumably this was only in the very 
early morning and at dusk, given that a naked man in the midday sun would quickly 
succumb to heat stroke. In some places, people went about wearing sarongs made from 
odiferous rubber sheeting. In Puworejo, they wove a kind of "cloth" from the fibre of 
the warn tree or went about in clothing made from jute bags. One senior official in 
Yogya had a single shirt and a single pair of trousers, both made from jute sacks. When 
he sent his houseboy out, he lent him his clothes and stayed inside, naked.
Throughout this time, the Japanese were recruiting more and more romusha, 
topping up their army of civilian slave laborers as men and women succumbed to 
disease, malnutrition, overwork, and ill-treatment. Many romusha continued to toil on 
defense projects alongside Peta units, their suffering plainly visible. Recalling the 
hardships of those times, Selo Soemardjan said, "rice was taken away, cattle were 
taken away, young people were taken away. So the whole economic life was 
disrupted."394 Families thought only of survival. "People hated the Japanese," said 
Kemal Idris, who had been one of Beppan's more promising trainees at Tangerang. 
"They were not the people we thought they were. They were worse than the Dutch. 
They were very harsh. They took all the food—rice and all these things—for their own 
purposes."395 As conditions deteriorated, there was open peasant resistance to Japanese 
rice levies. The largest rebellion took place in Indramayu, one of the major rice-
those battalion commanders, jealous of their rights and privileges, were sometimes unwilling to take much 
direction from Japanese liaison officers.
392 Nugroho Notosusanto, The Peta Army During the Japanese Occupation of Indonesia (Tokyo: Waseda 
University Press, 1979), p. 151, cited in Sato, War, Nationalism, and Peasants, p. 262. It might be more 
accurate to say that in many areas the food allowance declined. There seem to have been no food-related 
problems, for example, for those serving in the Yugekitai in Malang, which was considered a prosperous 
area.
393 See Sato, War, Nationalism, and Peasants, p. 76.
394 Interview, Selo Soemardjan, Jakarta, September 2,1997.
395 Interview, Lieutenant General Kemal Idris, Jakarta, September 8,1997.
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producing areas on the north coast of West Java, between April and August 1944. The 
Japanese dealt harshly with the protests. Hundreds were killed, and many more died 
of malnutrition.396
If Soeharto is to be believed, he was as much affected by this suffering as anyone 
else.
My feelings towards the Japanese army were gradually changing. Most of us had 
welcomed them as our Asian big brothers, who, we thought, would help us attain 
independence. But we were beginning to find the conduct of many Japanese 
soldiers unbearable. Food was taken by force from the villagers, and hundreds of 
thousands of people who were transferred to the battlefields in Burma as romusha 
never returned to their homeland.397
Rebellion in East Java
At Sixteenth Army headquarters, Colonel Miyamoto felt a growing sense of 
disquiet about the size and firepower of the volunteer army. What would happen, he 
continued to wonder, if Peta units were to rebel or desert in response to the worsening 
Japanese military position? Had the Japanese, in seeking to boost their defenses against 
an external enemy, created a potentially serious internal threat to their position on 
Java? Could the Indonesians be trusted? Miyamoto, it seems, was not the only officer 
with such reservations. Summing up his feelings immediately after the war, one 
Japanese officer wrote, "With regard to their fidelity towards the Japanese army, we 
could not help entertaining a slight feeling of apprehension arising from our superficial 
study of them, but we regarded them as a grateful race appreciative of our endeavors 
to promote their welfare."398
On February 14, 1945, the worst Japanese fears materialized when the Peta 
battalion in Blitar, a town in the backblocks of East Java, revolted, killing four Japanese 
and seven ethnic Chinese who were thought to be pro-Japanese.399 The leader of the 
revolt was a militant twenty-one-year-old platoon commander named Suprijadi. The 
son of a government official who went on to become a post-war bupati (regent) of 
Blitar, Suprijadi was seen by his friends as a solitary and slightly eccentric young
396 Sato, War, Nationalism, and Peasants, pp. 144—48.
397 Soeharto, "Watashi no rirekisho."
398 "Supplementary explanation of armed parties in Java under Japanese mil. adm. (Condensed 
translation)," from "Document taken from 16 Army HQ," p. 2.
399 For a good account of the revolt and its aftermath, see Lebra, Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia, 
pp. 147-53. See also Nugroho Notosusanto, The Revolt Against the Japanese of a Peta Battalion in Blitar; and 
Shiraishi Aiko, "The Anti-Japanese Revolt of the Peta Army in Blitar," Southeast Asian Studies 13,4 (1976):
535-58.
In the January 6,1998, installment of "Watashi no rirekisho," in the Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Soeharto 
said, "In December 1944 the Indonesian commander who led the rebellion against the Japanese army in 
Blitar was executed." This is an extraordinary observation. The Blitar revolt occurred not in 1944 but in 
February 1945. The mistake may be due to a failure of memory on Soeharto's part and to the fact that he 
had more pressing matters on his mind at the time, given that his New Order government was beginning 
to collapse around him. It is possible, however, that the error, one of many in a thirty-part series, was 
made by the Japanese journalist who took down the president's story. Nor is it certain that the leader of 
the revolt was executed, although it is often assumed that he was.
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man.400 While still a schoolboy, he had made a point of swimming alone in the 
notoriously dangerous waters of the south coast wearing green swimming trunks, even 
though legend has it that anyone dressed in green will offend the Goddess of the South 
Seas and be drowned.401 After finishing junior high, he attended the Secondary 
Training College for Native Civil Servants (Middelbare Opleidingsschool voor 
Inlandsche Ambtenaren, MOSVIA) in Magelang.402 Although angry with the Japanese 
for disrupting his career, Suprijadi joined the initial Beppan training course at 
Tangerang. During that course, his close friend Zulkifli Lubis once remarked, Suprijadi 
had kept his thoughts to himself. "But by the time we were at Bogor, he often said, 'We 
can't trust the Japanese!"'403 That distrust had grown deeper over the next two years. 
By early 1945, it appears, Suprijadi had his heart set on immediate independence, to be 
achieved by revolution.404 In the opinion of a Japanese army investigator, Suprijadi was 
"a strange person, very suggestible but with strong powers of leadership."405 Suprijadi 
had likened himself to both Prince Diponegoro, the leader of the 1825-30 rebellion 
against the Dutch, and to a mystic who was Diponegoro's spiritual adviser.
In the early hours of February 14, backed by most of the officers in the battalion, 
two of them his seniors, Suprijadi led some 360 men out of the barracks in an 
emotionally charged but ineptly planned rebellion.406 The Indonesian troops directed 
mortar fire on the Sakura Hotel, where Japanese officers were billeted. They followed 
up with bursts of machine-gun fire aimed at houses occupied by the Japanese 
"supervising officers" and at the local Kenpeitai headquarters. The attackers then left 
Blitar, with three columns heading north and one south. Despite months of talk and 
preparation on the Indonesian side, during which attempts were made to enlist the 
support of other Peta battalions, the revolt was poorly executed. It was dealt with 
quickly and effectively by the Japanese, who rushed troops to the area while seeking to
400 Interview, Major General Sukotjo Tjokroatmodjo, May 28, 2009. Sukotjo's wife, Sri Kustijah, was a good 
friend of Suprijadi before the war.
401 Personal communication, Sri Kustijah, August 18, 2009.
402 Interview, Sukotjo Tjokroatmodjo, May 12, 2009. According to another source, Suprijadi attended the 
MOSVIA in Jakarta. Interview, Colonel Soepardio, Bogor, September 10,1998. Sukotjo is a more reliable 
source on this point.
403 See "Zulkifli Lubis, Komandan Intelijen Pertama Indonesia," Tempo, July 29,1989, pp. 54-55.
404 Lebra, Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia, p. 150.
405 See report by Captain Yamazaki Hajime, quoted in Miyamoto, "Jawa shusen shori-ki," p. 227.
406 One of the few officers not to join the revolt was the battalion commander, Surachmad, who had been 
the wedana (district chief) in Blitar under the Dutch. It has been claimed that Surachmad warned the 
Japanese military shidokan (supervising officer) that Suprijadi and his associates were planning to rebel.
For details of that allegation, see Soeryana, "Blitar: The Changing of the Guard" in Lucas, ed., Local 
Opposition and Underground Resistance, p. 307, and translator's footnote, p. 320-21. See also Jacques Leclerc, 
"Afterword: The Masked Hero," in Lucas, ed., Local Opposition and Underground Resistance, pp. 328-30. 
Although Surachmad's battalion revolted, some have alleged that the Japanese took no action against him. 
According to Soeryana, a man of the left (whose name is sometimes given as "Soerjono"), Surachmad had 
been a member of the pre-war Dutch political police. Former Peta officers reject the charge that Surachmad 
betrayed his own men and the claim that he escaped without punishment; they say that he was, in fact, 
beaten by the Japanese. After the proclamation, Surachmad became a TNI regimental commander in 
Kediri. It was a company from one of Surachmad's battalions that captured and shot the revolutionary 
leader Tan Malaka in 1949. For further details about the Blitar affair, see Soedianto Sastroatmodjo and 
Aboelkahar, TKR Divisi VII Untung Suropati Malang-Besuki 1945-1948 (Malang: UM Press, 2000), pp. 42-48.
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negotiate a settlement with the rebel leaders.407 Colonel Miyamoto, who was given the 
task of clearing up the Blitar incident, sent the head of intelligence, Lieutenant Colonel 
Masugi, to the town. Masugi was to recommend that the leaders of the revolt be court- 
martialed.408 Captain Yanagawa, who had done so much to establish the Peta and who 
had recently set up the Special Guerrilla Unit (Yugekitai), was also sent to Blitar. He 
was joined by a three-man party from the East Java Yugekitai, headed by twenty-year- 
old Bambang Supeno, a future chief of staff of the Indonesian Army (1952-55) and a 
future ambassador to Japan.409 Unable to locate Suprijadi, who simply vanished but 
who may, in fact, have been captured and killed by the Japanese, Supeno sought to 
persuade Muradi, another leader of the revolt, to bring the main body of the battalion 
back to Blitar. The negotiations remained deadlocked until Colonel Katagiri, the 
commander of the Japanese regiment in Malang, handed his ceremonial sword to 
Muradi as an act of good faith pledging that he would honor his commitments, one of 
which was an assurance that no one would be court-martialed.410 The units returned to 
Blitar on February 17.
What caused the revolt? One key factor was resentment at the economic misery 
that had been visited on the island under the Japanese and the suffering of the civilian 
population, especially the romusha.411 A second had to do with the daily humiliations of 
military servitude under the Japanese, not least the slappings, which were an affront to 
Javanese. But there were particular local factors as well. By early 1945, Japanese 
soldiers in Blitar were widely disliked on account of their arrogance and insensitivity. 
Discipline was lax, and some Japanese officers seem to have spent much of their time 
forcing their attentions on local women. The behavior of Japanese civilians seconded to 
the army was no better. According to Miyamoto, there was resentment in Blitar over 
"the licentious and luxurious lifestyle of the Japanese," who were heedless of the 
hardships of the local people. There was anger, too, over the Japanese attitude towards 
the issue of independence.412 "As Blitar is located away from the center," Captain 
Yamazaki Hajime, the officer in charge of the supervision of the Peta, noted in a report 
to headquarters, "there was not adequate supervision of the Giyugun there, and the
407 As well as sending a company of Kenpeitai troops to disarm the Indonesian battalion, the Japanese 
dispatched units from the Katagiri Regiment in Malang and the Harada Regiment in Surabaya. They also 
involved, in some way, elements from four kinds of Indonesian units: two Peta battalions (one from Kediri 
and one from Tulungagung), although these, it seems, were not deployed; a Yugekitai "Task Force" from 
Malang; elements from the police in Kediri; and elements from the Tokubetsu Keisatsutai. At the same 
time, they sought help from Suprijadi's spiritual advisor, a certain Kiyai Bendo. Interview, Colonel 
Soepardio, Jakarta, September 10,1998; Yanagawa "Statement," Part III, p. 3; Soedianto et al., TKR Divisi 
VII Untung Suropati, p. 47; M. Oudang, Perkembangan Kepolisian di Indonesia, p. 47; and Nugroho, "The Peta 
Army During the Japanese Occupation," pp. 183-84.
408 Interview, Colonel Miyamoto, February 4, 1999.
409 This was the first and last operating order given to the Yugekitai. According to Yanagawa, the dispatch 
of the Yugeki task force to deal with the mutiny "caused a rumor among Giyugun [Peta] that 'I Go' Task 
Force [Yugekitai] was a Kenpei in Giyugun." Nor was this the only problem. The East Java unit of the 
Yugekitai Task Force was so "influenced by the Blitar riot [sic] and we had to give other education to these 
Giyugun." See "The Organization of 'I GO' Task Force," Yanagawa "Statement," Part III, p. 3.
410 That, at least, is how the Indonesians tell the story. See Nugroho Notosusanto, The Revolt Against the 
Japanese of a Peta Battalion in Blitar, pp. 22-23. Some retired Indonesian officers believe that Katagiri's men 
had, by then, already captured and killed Suprijadi.
411 See for example, Nugroho Notosusanto, "The Peta Army During the Japanese Occupation," p. 178; and 
Nugroho, The Revolt Against the Japanese of a Peta Battalion in Blitar, p. 13.
412 Miyamoto, "Jawa shusen shori-ki," p. 227.
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Japanese trainers [as well as] civilians seconded to the military and ordinary civilians 
had been leading a dissolute life."413 Resentment, which had been simmering for 
months, is said to have come to a head when a wealthy Japanese raped the fiancee of a 
Peta officer.414 In an outburst of fury, the (always unidentified) Indonesian officer killed 
a Japanese instructor and fanned "dissatisfaction among the people over the Japanese 
attitude towards the independence issue, in order to gain wider support for his 
actions."415
At Blitar, an entire Peta battalion had taken part in an armed uprising, the first time 
an Indonesian unit had turned on its mentors.416 Alarmed by this development and 
fearing that the unrest could spread, the Japanese disarmed the battalion and arrested 
no fewer than fifty-five officers and men, ignoring the promises of clemency that are 
said to have been given by Katagiri. Among the detainees were two of the four 
company commanders, eight of the twelve platoon commanders (the number would 
have been nine had Suprijadi been produced), and thirty-three of the forty-eight 
bundanchos (squad leaders, or NCOs). These men were sent to Jakarta to face a court 
martial. All were convicted. Six were sentenced to death (and later beheaded on the 
beach at Ancol, in Jakarta), three to life imprisonment, and the others to various 
periods of imprisonment. The remaining officers and men of the battalion were taken 
to Brebeg, a remote village on the lower slopes of Mt. Wilis, a volcano about thirty 
miles northwest of Blitar, an area known mainly for its pine forests and its poisonous 
black-widow spiders. According to a Japanese officer who had trained Peta recruits at 
Bogor, "After the rebellion, the Japanese army removed the battalion from Blitar to 
somewhere remote so they would not influence others. It was almost like 
imprisonment! No weapons! As punishment, they took away all the weapons. Instead, 
they were given wooden guns."417 After Blitar, the Japanese abandoned any plans they 
may have had to transform Peta into a national army; there was no more talk about 
Peta regiments and Peta brigades. They also shelved their plan to put the three Peta 
regional headquarters entirely in Indonesian hands.418
In writing about this period, Soeharto is at pains to stress his mounting anti- 
Japanese feeling. All his experience in the Peta, he said, had convinced him "that in no 
way could we condone the brutal treatment meted out by some of the Japanese
413 Ibid.
414 The rape was mentioned by Captain Yanagawa in a 1962 interview with Nugroho Notosusanto. See 
Nugroho, "The Peta Army During the Japanese Ocupation," p. 187. Colonel Miyamoto, who sent 
Yanagawa to Blitar to investigate, notes primly that the Japanese man "robbed a Giyugun officer of his 
girlfriend." See Miyamoto, "Jawa shusen shori-ki," pp. 227-28.
415 This account is based on a report made by Captain Yanagawa. See Miyamoto, "Jawa shusen shori-ki," 
pp. 227-28.
416 After the Blitar revolt, members of a Peta company guarding a hydroelectric plant at Cileunca, south of 
Bandung, rebelled against two Japanese instructors attached to the company, killing one of them. The 
Japanese are said to have beheaded two Peta NCOs and two soldiers who were involved in the affair and 
tortured others. See "Peristiwa Pemberontakan Peta di Cileunca Pangalengan, Bandung Selatan, Jawa 
Barat," in Peta: Tentara Sukarela Pembela Tanah Air Di Jawa dan Sumatera 1942-1945, ed. Purbo Suwondo 
(Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1996), pp. 175-91. The date in the title is misleading; Peta was only established in 
1943. See also Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia (JPRS), p. 205.
417 Interview, Morimoto Takeshi, February 1,1999.
418 Interview, Colonel Miyamoto, February 20,1999.
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officers. I felt a growing desire to fight back."419 In the aftermath of the Blitar incident, 
he goes on, the Japanese decided to purge the Peta officer corps not just in Blitar but in 
various other places as well. "I had a feeling that I was one of those who would be 
ousted, but a number of Japanese officers who respected me saved me from 
expulsion."420 Some years later, Soeharto gave this story a further polish. The 
Kenpeitai, he said, "began watching me closely because they knew I was beginning to 
feel critical about them."421 Even if these claims are true, it is notable that Kenpeitai 
"suspicion" is not referred to until 1945.
Soeharto may have felt some concern about his position at that time. But the 
Japanese confined their wrath to those who had led the Blitar revolt, and it is difficult 
to avoid the impression that Soeharto is attempting here to embellish his not- 
altogether-shining nationalist credentials. If he felt a growing desire to fight back, he 
had an odd way of showing it. Everything suggests that, at this time, he was quite 
willing to go on ingratiating himself with the Japanese. Nor, it seems, did the Japanese 
ever entertain any serious doubts about Soeharto's loyalty at the time of the Blitar 
uprising. On the contrary, he was the one man, out of 250 Peta company commanders 
on Java, to whom they turned in their hour of need. Immediately after the revolt, 
Soeharto was sent to Brebeg to train junior Peta members as bundanchos, to replace 
those arrested by the Japanese.422 Given the state of Japanese paranoia about the loyalty 
of the Peta, there could hardly have been a more sensitive assignment at that time or 
stronger evidence of the faith that Soeharto's superiors had in him.
Japanese officers who served in Java reject out of hand Soeharto's claim that he fell 
under suspicion at this time. "In his memoirs, he claimed that he was considered a 
dangerous person by the Japanese army," said Morimoto Takeshi. "But that was not 
true ... I think Mr Soeharto concocted a story that the Japanese army didn't like him 
and considered him a dangerous person. He wanted to give the impression he was a 
person who always fought against the Japanese."423 The Japanese, said Morimoto, had 
never had any reason to doubt Soeharto's loyalty. They would not have sent him to 
Jakarta in late 1944 to train the students from the technical schools had they not trusted 
him implicitly. Nor would they have sent him to help retrain the remnants of the Blitar 
battalion after the February 1945 revolt. "Do you believe that the Japanese army would 
give responsibility to someone they considered dangerous? The Japanese army 
selected Soeharto to become the head of this training group for Heiki Bundancho 
[ordnance squad leaders] [in Jakarta], so we obviously trusted him."424
Morimoto is not much impressed by Soeharto's claim that he was under Kenpeitai 
surveillance. "Soeharto said he was closely watched by the Kenpei because he was
419 Soeharto, My Thoughts, p. 21.
420 Ibid.
421 Soeharto, "Watashi no Rirekisho."
422 According to Morimoto, Soeharto was put in charge of retraining the Second Company of the Blitar 
battalion. Interview, Morimoto Takeslii, February 1, 1999.
423 Ibid. During the interview, Morimoto spoke, unbidden, of Soeharto's "forgeries" and "fairytales." A 
number of other retired Japanese officers expressed doubts about the accounts that Soeharto gave of his 
experiences during the occupation.
424 Ibid.
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saying things against the Japanese army. But everyone, including myself, was watched 
by the Kenpei. So he wasn't the only one."425
Morimoto is not alone in claiming that the Japanese had reason to believe they 
could rely on Soeharto at this time. According to Tsuchiya, Soeharto had always done 
everything the Japanese had asked of him and more. Soeharto had been an 
"outstanding" platoon commander and had been sent back to Bogor to train as a 
company commander. He had moved up "the elite ladder of the Peta organization" 
and been chosen to "clear up" the Blitar rebellion. 'This shows, I think, that he was 
trusted by the Japanese military."426 Asked why the Japanese chose Soeharto for such a 
highly sensitive assignment, Tsuchiya replied, "Since I wasn't closely working with 
Soeharto at that time, I can only guess it was because he was considered capable by 
Japanese military officers to do this rather difficult task of grasping the Blitar battalion 
as a whole and bringing it under control."427
Some Indonesians who served with Soeharto in the Peta believe that he was, 
indeed, suspected by the Japanese after the Blitar revolt. "Speaking of the suspicious 
attitudes of the Japanese," said Colonel Soepardio, the Indonesian military historian, 
"even [prominent future leaders such as] Sudirman and Achmad Yani and Sarwo 
Edhie were suspected by Japanese intelligence. They were suspected by the Kenpeitai 
and the higher command. They used all sorts of channels for information."428 But that, 
said Soepardio, made it even more difficult to understand why Soeharto would have 
been given such a sensitive assignment. As he put it, "we ... don't understand why! 
But those were the facts! He was assigned there."429 It may simply have been that 
Soeharto was the most qualified man for the job. "He had been a sergeant in the KNIL 
and promoted from shodancho to chudancho. He may be classified as an outstanding 
[officer.] Maybe. [But we ask ourselves] 'Why did they choose Soeharto to do that 
job?"'430 The only conclusion that could be drawn, he felt, was that the Japanese had 
decided they could trust Soeharto.
Whatever the truth of the matter, Soeharto does not appear to have achieved much 
at Brebeg, where he evidently stayed for about five months, from March until August 
1945.431 The atmosphere seems to have been one of distrust and disillusionment, of 
languor and half-hearted training. "The battalion was under what we call
425 Ibid.
426 Interview, Tsuchiya Kiso, February 2,1999.
427 Ibid.
428 Interview Colonel Soepardio, Jakarta, September 10,1998.
429 Ibid.
430 Ibid.
431 Soeharto's noncommissioned officer in Brebeg was Imam Munandar, a shodancho who had been born in 
Blitar. See ibid, and Bachtiar, Siapa Dia?, pp. 214-15. Imam Munandar was to prove a blunt and brutally 
direct Soeharto subordinate in later years. In 1966, when he was the military district commander in 
Surabaya, his commanding officer, General Soemitro, observed that it was strange that, while many low- 
level supporters of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI, Partai Komunis Indonesia) had been killed, 
many PKI cadres were in jail. Imam Munandar replied, "In that case, let's just release the ones we have in 
jail and kill them." Ramadhan K. H., Soemitro: Former Commander of Indonesian Security Apparatus (Jakarta: 
Sinar Harapan, 1996), p. 113. During the New Order, Imam Munandar rose to major general. He served as 
governor of Riau between 1980-90.
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confinement/' said former Staff Sergeant Murakami Kiyota, who was in charge of 
training noncommissioned officers at Brebeg.
It was the size of four middle-sized companies and had about four hundred men. 
They were not serious about training any more ... There were a few houses in the 
area, one of which was used by the instructors and another as a brothel. Several 
prostitutes lived there. I was wondering if this was the way things should be, but 
soon enough the war ended. Then the corps was dispersed.432
On February 5, 1945, while he was preoccupied with his Special Guerrilla Force 
duties, Yanagawa was ordered to help establish yet another armed body, Hizbullah. In 
early 1945, twenty Peta shodanchos from each of the three provinces of Java, all of them 
"very enthusiastic" Muslims, were trained at a former camp for Australian POWs in 
Cibarusa (Bogor) by a twenty-man team of Yugekitai shodanchos.433 The training of 
those in the Islamic Youth Corps (Kaikyo Seinen Teishintai), or "Islamite Youth 
Forwarder Unit," as it was rather awkwardly described in a subsequent Allied 
interrogation report, was conducted by the Department of Religious Affairs of the 
Military Administration, with help from the Yugekitai. Although five hundred Muslim 
trainees were eventually given three months' military instruction, Yanagawa, told 
Allied interrogators that,
owing to the indifference of the Indonesian staff, and the quarrels among the 
different sects of Islam these works [s/c] only remained nominal. Afterwards there 
was trouble between the Preparatory Committee of the Indonesian Independence 
Movement and staff of the Islamite [s/c] and the Military Administration lost their 
[sic] enthusiasm. So no good effect came out of this endeavour.434
"We Fight Together and We Die Together"
In late 1944 and early 1945, as Soeharto shuttled between Solo, Jakarta, Madiun, 
and Brebeg, the Japanese position grew increasingly untenable. By early March 1945, 
MacArthur's forces had recaptured Manila after heavy fighting. By late March, US 
Marines had seized Iwo Jima, at the cost of 6,800 American and 21,000 Japanese lives. 
In April, Australian forces captured Tarakan, the oil port in eastern Kalimantan. The 
path now lay open to the Japanese home islands. But MacArthur had not finished with 
Southeast Asia. He planned to have an Allied invasion force storm ashore in Java in 
June; the American and British chiefs of staff would ultimately overrule this plan. 435 As
432 Morimoto, Jawa boei giyugun-shi, p. 595.
433 Yanagawa "Statement," Part III, p. 3.
434 Ibid. Yanagawa never seemed to work up much enthusiam for Hizbullah. "I was rather busy with my 
own work in Bandung," he told Allied interrogators, "so I used to go to this training camp every other 
week." The five hundred Hizbullah trainees, devout Muslims aged between seventeen and twenty, came 
from residencies across Java.
435 As noted in a British officer's telegram, MacArthur "always maintained it was mistake to change SWPA 
[Southwest Pacific Area] but fell in with the British [sic] views ... His own plan was to land 7th and 9th 
Australian Divisions last less a Brigade ferried in landing craft and timed to arrive coincidently with main 
surrender in TOKYO and thinks he would have met no serious opposition from Australian Government at 
that time." See cable from Gairdner, British Staff Section Tokyo, to Mountbatten, November 17,1945, TNA: 
PRO WO 203/6418. 58696. The SWPA included Australia, the Philippines, the Solomons, New Guinea, the
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the Japanese officers of the Sixteenth Army planning staff saw it, there was still some 
time left in early 1945 for them to develop Java as a supply base. A "decisive war in 
Java" would only come, they felt, after Singapore, Banjarmasin, and Makassar had 
fallen to the Allies. But they were well aware that an attack on Java, which they now 
expected to be launched "from the direction of Sumatra," would be unstoppable. There 
would be no hope of holding off an Allied landing with a handful of under-strength 
Japanese battalions, backed up by untested Peta units scattered along the coast. As 
Miyamoto wrote after the war, "The enemy was expected to attack Java with at least 
ten divisions equipped with tanks and other sophisticated weapons and under a 
complete air cover."436
Faced with an impossible situation, the Japanese decided they would pull their 
forces back to the mountains of West Java and fight a last-ditch battle in the region of 
Bandung, just as the Dutch had attempted to do three years earlier. This time, 
however, there would be no surrender. The Japanese on Java planned to fight to the 
death, as had the 21,000 Japanese defenders on Iwo Jima. For the Allies, any landing on 
the island might well have proved extremely costly, at least in the final phase. Even at 
this stage, the Japanese could field a mixed-bag force of 80,000 men—15,000 soldiers of 
the Sixteenth Army, 15,000 Japanese civilians attached to the army, 20,000 men of the 
Forty-Eighth Division (which had been brought in from Timor), 10,000 men from the 
Air Force, and 20,000 from the Navy.437 They also had 40,000 small arms and a factory 
that could produce 175 tons of gunpowder a month and 50,000 hand grenades.438
As the staff officer in charge of strategy, Colonel Miyamoto had to make a decision 
about the future role of Peta. Aware that he had 80,000 Japanese available and even 
more doubtful about Peta following the Blitar revolt, he concluded that there would be 
"no need at all to rely on the Giyugun as a military force."439 Peta battalions would not 
be involved in the final stand in West Java, but would be left to follow their own 
inclinations. "I'm sure [Japanese officers] intended to make the Giyugun [Peta] a key 
adjunct to the Sixteenth Army when they created it in 1943," Miyamoto said many 
years later. "However, as the war situation became worse and worse, and we were 
beginning to foresee the possibility of Java turning out to be the last battlefield for the 
Southern Army (Nanpogun), we didn't want the Indonesians to share our fate, as 
fellow travelers in one and the same boat."440
Bismark Archipelago, the British North Borneo territories, and all of the Netherlands Indies except 
Sumatra.
436 Miyamoto, "Jawa shusen shori-ki," p. 230.
437 Ibid., p. 231. Friend says the Japanese drew up their plans for the final battle in April 1945. Friend, The
Blue-Eyed Enemy, p. 203.
435 Miyamoto, "Jawa shusen shori-ki," pp. 231-32.
439 Ibid., pp. 229, 231, and 233.
440 Miyamoto Shizuo, reply given in response to written questions from the author, May 25,1999. Some 
confusion has arisen over Japanese thinking about the role Peta was expected to play in the event of an 
Allied landing on Java. This is partly because there were serious differences of opinion between 
Miyamoto, on the one hand, and Beppan officers such as Yanagawa and Tsuchiya, on the other. Miyamoto 
expected the Allies to land in Java in overwhelming force once they had "annihilated" Japanese forces on 
Singapore. The Japanese were in a hopeless position, he knew, but the intention was to fight to the death 
in West Java. The Indonesians had been indoctrinated with the slogan "fight together, die together," 
referring to their partnership with the Japanese. But it was unlikely, Miyamoto argued in a post-war 
memoir, that the Indonesians would continue to share "a firm comradely sentiment" with the Japanese in
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This is disingenuous. Miyamoto's decision that the Peta would not play an 
important role in the defense of Java did not stem from a Japanese desire to save the 
Indonesian force from the ravages of combat, perhaps even annihilation. Peta, after all, 
had been created to defend Java. Rather, it stemmed from his belief that when the chips 
were down, the Japanese would not be able to rely on Peta standing firm. Owing 
perhaps to the extreme sensitivity of the situation, staff officers of the Sixteenth Army 
did not communicate any of this to Indonesian political leaders. On the contrary, they 
managed to convey the impression that the Indonesians were to be left to man the 
beach defenses alone, puny and underequipped, in the face of an overwhelming Allied 
assault, cannon fodder for the now absent Japanese. As Miyamoto noted, "In order ... 
to keep the Japanese frontline troops well disposed towards the Giyugun and the 
Heiho, I ordered the Japanese instructors to train the Indonesians diligently and to 
stress the slogan 'We fight together and we die together.'"441 This led, not unnaturally, 
to misunderstanding and resentment. As noted earlier, Sukarno was deeply troubled
the face of overwhelming Allied firepower. For that reason, he decided he could not take Peta into 
consideration when preparing his strategic plans. It would be better, he argued, for Peta troops to be 
moved to East Java so they would not be drawn into the climactic battle on Java. See Miyamoto, 
"Miyamoto Shizuo no hanashi," pp. 195-217. Miyamoto claims to have been concerned, too, that the 
Japanese had insufficient small arms. He could cobble together a Japanese force of sixty thousand men for 
the army's last stand, excluding those units that were being brought in from Timor. There were 60,000 
small arms on Java, but only 34,000 of them were in Japanese hands, 19,000 having been turned over to 
Peta and 7,000 to the Indonesian police. Miyamoto said he would have liked to claw back all 26,000 
weapons in Indonesian hands, but settled instead for 6,000. His reasoning was that these weapons were 
desperately needed by the Japanese. But he did not make any secret of his concern that the Indonesians 
had so many weapons at their disposal.
Beppan officers such as Yanagawa and Tsuchiya, who had done so much to create and nurture the 
Indonesian self-defense force, wanted it to play an important role in the defense of Java, if only as a 
guerrilla force. Tsuchiya believes that Miyamoto was motivated more by an unjustifiable fear of Peta than 
by a desire to arm additional Japanese units. As he explained it:
After the Blitar revolt, Miyamoto drew up a plan under which the Japanese would fight against the 
Allied forces on their own while giving Peta tougher training so that its members would gain pride in 
themselves as an Indonesian military force and fight separately from the Japanese. His idea was to 
prevent the Peta, at the very least, from interfering with Japanese operations. In order to weaken 
Peta's combat ability, he made them give back 6,000 rifles. His idea was to have Peta reorganized into 
units that did not need rifles, such as artillery, engineering, transport, and supply, to be commanded 
by those Peta leaders specially retrained by the Japanese Army. He thought that, by doing so, he 
could reduce the number of fighting battalions without hurting their honor and pride. (Tsuchiya Kiso, 
written communication, May 29, 2002.)
Misunderstandings about the Japanese Army's plans for Peta have been compounded by a small, but 
significant, error that occurred when Miyamoto's memoirs were translated into English for a book that 
appeared in 1986. In the book, the translator or editors inserted, in square brackets, a reference to "the 
secret official attitude" that Peta units "would not be militarily reliable." See Miyamoto, "Jawa shusen 
shori-ki," p. 233. That, however, is not what Miyamoto wrote in "Jawa shusen shori-ki":
I never said "The Giyugun would not be reliable." I just decided we would not rely on the Giyugun at 
a time of decisive action. They may be militarily reliable [ateni naru], but we would not rely on them 
[ateni shinai]. That was our attitude—a common understanding shared by higher officers of the 
Sixteenth Army. We thought ownership of the Giyugun should be in Indonesian hands—not in the 
hands of the Japanese military. They should choose their own way [jibun no michi] when the war goes 
into a decisive phase. We couldn't tell whether they would be anti-Japan or pro-Japan when that time 
came. (Miyamoto Shizuo, responses to written questions, May 25,1999.)
Whatever the shortcomings in the translation of the original passage, this argument is unpersuasive. Both 
here and in his memoir, "Miyamoto Shizuo no hanashi," Miyamoto comes very close to questioning Peta's 
reliability. See Miyamoto, "Miyamoto Shizuo no hanashi," pp. 195-217. What is more, Tsuchiya says that 
is exactly what he did.
441 Miyamoto, "Jawa shusen shori-ki," p. 233.
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by the thought that Indonesians might be used as a shield for the Japanese. His 
concerns were only laid to rest when the Japanese arranged for him to meet Captain 
Yanagawa. During the meeting, Yanagawa made it clear that that was not the case.442
As the Sixteenth Army was preparing to make a final stand in West Java, US Army 
Air Force B-29 bombers were taking the war to the Japanese home islands, with 
devastating consequences. On a single night in early March, a force of 334 aircraft 
mounted a low-altitude incendiary attack on Tokyo, targeting the vulnerable wood 
and paper Japanese houses. Almost sixteen square miles of the city were burnt out and 
267,000 buildings destroyed. More than 83,000 people died. In the months ahead, the 
B-29s were to return night after night, triggering firestorms in as many as fifty cities.443 
In Southeast Asia, Japanese positions were under relentless Allied attack. By June, 
MacArthur was firmly in control of the Philippines. On July 1, he sent Australian 
troops ashore at Balikpapan, the port and oil-processing center in eastern Kalimantan.
The hopelessness of the Japanese position was well known in Indonesia, and as the 
months passed, the calls for independence grew increasingly strident. For young 
Indonesians, the mood was electric, the atmosphere charged with possibilities. As 
Benedict Anderson has observed, "The sense of waiting and preparation spread slowly 
but inexorably. By the end of the occupation, it was as if a gigantic engine was being
442 Interview, Morimoto Takeshi, February 1,1999. As concern mounted in Indonesian circles, Kaneko 
Tomokazu, a civilian employed in the Sixteenth Army's propaganda department, arranged a secret 
meeting between Yanagawa and Sukarno. Recalling those events, Kaneko said:
I arranged that meeting because I had heard that Sukarno and other Indonesians were a bit unhappy 
about the Peta deployment. It looked like the Japanese were planning to use Peta as a stiield at the 
front line instead of having Japanese dying. I heard this and thought it was a terrible 
misunderstanding. That is the reason I arranged this secret meeting between Yanagawa and Sukarno. 
Through this dialogue, Sukarno came to realize that wasn't the purpose of the Peta deployment... I 
remember Sukarno left the meeting greatly relieved, and it showed in his expression. Sukarno and I 
left in the same car. I remember Sukarno being very excited. (Interview, Kaneko Tomokazu, Tokyo, 
February 3,1999.)
Kaneko, who went on to become vice president of the "Japan-Indonesia Association, Inc.," believes tliis 
was "one of the most historic meetings in Japan-Indonesia relations."
The change in Japanese policy was communicated immediately to the Beppan officers and came as no 
surprise to them. As Tsuchiya said:
Unlike people like Yanagawa and me, who arrived in Java at the time of the landing operations and 
worked together to start up the Giyugun, Mr. Miyamoto came to the island much later, when the 
prospect of Japan winning the war was negligible. Besides, he had little knowledge of Indonesia or 
the feelings of its people. He said from the time of his arrival in Java that such a thing as the Giyugun 
couldn't be relied upon. It was only after the war, when he was back in Japan, that Mr. Miyamoto 
came to understand how the Indonesians felt and became a sympathizer of the Peta. After Japan lost 
in Burma, Guadalcanal, and Saipan, we were aware that the Japanese military itself was no match for 
the Allies. How could the Japanese military [Nihongun] count on the Giyugun when we had lost 
confidence in ourselves as a military force? (Tsuchiya Kiso, response to written questions, June 19, 
1999.)
According to Tsuchiya, the Beppan officers did not hold it against Miyamoto when they saw several 
years' work apparently going to waste. "The fact that Mr. Miyamoto said he didn't rely on Peta didn't 
make us hostile to him," he said. "We [at Beppan] weren't on bad terms with him." After the war, 
Tsuchiya said on another occasion, Miyamoto became "deeply pro-Indonesian and pro-Peta." He came to 
be impressed by the nationalist feelings and pro-Japanese sentiment of young Indonesians. He fell in love 
with Indonesia and took care of many Indonesians who went to Japan to study. (Tsuchiya Kiso, written 
communication, May 29, 2002.)
443 Spector, Eagle Against the Sun, pp. 504—05.
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accelerated ever more furiously, but not yet put into gear."444 By mid-June 1945, Tokyo 
had decided that it had no option but to bow to the inevitable. It ordered that "all 
possible speed should be made towards the granting of Indonesian independence."445 
As the Japanese saw it, Java was "politically more advanced and should be given 
independence earlier than the other territories concerned," preferably by early 
September 1945.446
On August 7, the day after the United States dropped a single atomic bomb on 
Hiroshima, killing eighty thousand people, Japan's Southern Army announced that the 
proclamation of independence would be approved as soon as a preparatory committee 
had made the necessary arrangements. Four days later, at a meeting with Sukarno and 
Hatta in the hill station of Dalat in southern Vietnam, Field Marshal Terauchi 
confirmed that independence would soon be granted, albeit under Japanese 
guidance.447 The Japanese, he said, would support independence for the whole of the 
former Netherlands East Indies, pointedly excluding Malaya and the British territories 
in North Borneo, which the Indonesians were claiming. Indonesia now looked set to be 
granted independence under Japanese auspices. Events, however, were running out of 
control.
At midday on August 15, 1945, while Soeharto was retraining the disarmed and 
dispirited soldiers from the Peta battalion in Blitar, Emperor Hirohito announced in a 
radio broadcast that Japan had surrendered unconditionally. There had been rumors 
for more than ten days that Japan might surrender, but they had always been denied. 
Now, at his headquarters in Jakarta, Lieutenant General Nagano Yuichiro, the 
commander of the Sixteenth Army, and his senior officers listened to the broadcast in 
disbelief. "All of us," one officer remembered, "stood upright solemnly unable to utter 
a single word ... Commander Nagano left the room totteringly with a grave and 
sorrowful look."448 Captain Tsuchiya was one of the officers at army headquarters. At 
first, he said, "we could not believe it. And I went back to my office but I was so 
troubled that I did not know what to do that day ... I thought that broadcast was not 
true and that it was a false broadcast from the Allies."449 Captain Yanagawa, who, like 
Tsuchiya, had been in Java since the Japanese landings, was equally disconcerted. "I 
felt," he said, "such a big shock that it was like a rushing train in full speed stopping
444 Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution, p. 31.
445 "Interrogation of Maj. Gen. Nishimura Otoshi on the Indonesian Independence Movement," Singapore, 
January 16,1947, NIOD IC No. 059330 (10 pp.) According to Miyamoto, who worked closely with him, 
Nishimura's given name was Otsugu, not Otoshi. This may not be right. The name is rare, and the Chinese 
characters can be read in four or five different ways. The Allied interrogators may have heard Nishimura 
pronounce his own name and written it down as given.
446 Ibid.
447 J. D. Legge, Sukarno: A Political Biography (Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1973), p. 193. In the Japanese 
version of events, Sukarno and Hatta went to Saigon "to express their gratitude" to Field Marshal 
Terauchi. Major General Nishimura, April 10,1947, reply to questionnaire of Mr. A. P. M. Audretsch, 
NIOD IC No. 006793-006807, p. 6.
448 Yamamoto Moichiro, "Watashi-no Indonesia— Dai Juroku Gun Jidai-no Kaiso" [My Indonesia, a 
Memoir on the Period of My Service in the Sixteenth Army] (Tokyo: Nihon-Indonesia Kyokai, 1979), p. 77, 
as cited in Goto Ken'ichi, "Caught in the Middle: Japanese Attitudes toward Indonesian Independence in 
1945," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 27,1 (1996): 37—48.
449 "Statement," Captain Tsuchiya Kiso, March 3-8,1947, p. 7.
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suddenly."450 For the Deputy Chief of Staff, Major General Nishimura Otoshi, the 
broadcast came "like a thunderbolt from a clear sky."4'1
Tsuchiya Kiso (right) visiting his former Beppan colleague Yanagawa Motoshige at the latter's home in
Jakarta, September 28, I c>72.
Events now moved quickly. At a meeting on August 16, Nagano ordered his men 
to demobilize all Peta units on Java and Bali and gather in their arms.452 No one at 
headquarters argued against the decision. As Benedict Anderson has noted, the Allies 
could hardly be expected to look with favor on a body "created for the sole purpose of 
fighting against them."453 Nor, in the wake of the Blitar revolt, could the Japanese be
450 Yanagawa "Statement," Part III, p. 4.
4:11 Major General Nishimura, April 10,1947, reply to questionnaire, p. 15.
444 Miyamoto, "Miyamoto Shizuo no hanashi," p. 213. Anderson, citing an Indonesian army history, writes 
that Nagano made the decision on August 17. See Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution, p. 100. Nugroho 
says orders to disband the Peta battalions were issued on August IS. Nugroho, "The Peta Army During 
the Japanese Occupation," p. 197. Yet another source says the order to disband the Peta was issued on 
August 19. See "Explanations Regarding all Kinds of Armed Bodies," p. 3.
453 Anderson, liivu in a Time of Revolution, p. 99.
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comfortable living alongside an Indonesian force with some 37,000 men and more than 
one-fifth of the weapons then on Java.454 Politically, it was another story. At a ceremony 
in the front garden of his small Jakarta villa on August 17, Sukarno delivered a short 
speech and then read out the proclamation of Indonesia's independence, a two- 
sentence statement that he had drafted following close consultations with Vice 
Admiral Maeda. "We, the people of Indonesia," it said, "hereby declare the 
independence of Indonesia. Matters which concern the transfer of power and other 
things will be executed by careful means and in the shortest possible time."455 After this 
announcement, so brief but so pivotal, a Peta officer raised the red-and-white national 
flag, and those present joined in singing "Indonesia Raya."456 Across town, Tsuchiya 
was burning Peta records and other secret papers.
On August 19, General Nagano issued a four-point order. Support for the 
Indonesian independence movement was to cease immediately; the Japanese military 
administration was to remain in power until the arrival of Allied troops; law and order 
was to be maintained; and the status quo at the time of the surrender was to be 
maintained. Indonesian hopes had been riding high until this point. Now, it was 
learned, there would be no further help from the Japanese, a development greeted 
"with great annoyance and resentment."457 Before long, the Japanese would be fighting 
to contain an island-wide outburst of popular fury, in which hundreds of Japanese 
soldiers and civilians would be slaughtered.
Disarming the Volunteer Army
The Sixteenth Army had decided to disarm and demobilize the Peta. But the 
Japanese had good reason to be worried. What if Peta units refused to hand in their 
weapons? What if they rioted? As it happened, the thirteen thousand Peta weapons 
were handed in without incident on August 19-20, thanks to careful planning, and a 
certain amount of duplicity, on the part of the Japanese.458 Peta battalions were told 
that, in view of the critical situation, they were about to be given Japanese weapons in 
place of the Dutch ones they had been using.459 After they turned their weapons in at 
the armory, the Indonesian soldiers were assembled on the parade ground. As they 
listened to lengthy speeches, soldiers from local Japanese battalions stood guard 
around their compounds, while others placed the weapons on waiting trucks, which 
promptly drove away. The next day, the Indonesians were told about the Japanese
454 Anderson's analysis accords with that of Colonel Miyamoto, who made the recommendation to disband 
Peta. See Miyamoto, "Miyamoto Shizuo no hanashi," p. 213.
455 For a full account of Sukarno's speech, which was lost for many years, see George McT. Kahin, 
"Sukarno's Proclamation of Indonesian Independence," Indonesia 69 (April 2000): 1-3.
456 For a detailed examination of the events culminating in the proclamation, see Anderson, Java in a Time of 
Revolution, pp. 61-84.
457 Nishimura interrogation, January 16,1947.
458 Peta had earlier been forced to surrender 6,000 of its 19,000 weapons.
459 For a good account of the process, on which this section is based, see Nugroho, "The Peta Army During 
the Japanese Occupation," pp. 197-98. According to Miyamoto, "The Peta disbanded calmly on August 19 
and Heiho on August 23." See Miyamoto, "Miyamoto Shizuo no hanashi", p. 217. Nishimura says "the 
disbandment of the Giyugun and Heiho came ... on or after Aug. 19th." It was "a bigger success than had 
been expected, taking advantage of Indonesia's unpreparedness." See Maj. Gen. Nishimura, answers to 
additional questions from Mr. A. P. M. Audretsch, April 15,1947, p. 3, NIOD IC No. 006808-006811.
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surrender and the decision to disband the Peta. They were not told that Sukarno and 
Hatta had declared Indonesia's independence.
In his memoirs, Soeharto writes that on August 18 [sic], 1945, "we were dismissed 
and ordered to surrender our arms." This is unconvincing. Soeharto and one or two 
others may have had weapons while stationed at Mt. Wilis. The men of the Blitar 
battalion did not. Of all the sixty-six Peta battalions on Java, this was the one the 
Japanese now had least reason to fear. Be that as it may, the events of August 19 must 
have been deeply puzzling to Soeharto. He had no idea that the Japanese had 
surrendered, nor did he have any idea that Sukarno had proclaimed Indonesia's 
independence. All he knew was that, some time after the unit had surrendered its few 
weapons, a party of Japanese army officers turned up mysteriously at Mt. Wilis to 
announce that the Peta had been disbanded. Soeharto and his fellow Javanese were 
paid six months' salary in advance and given an allowance of clothing and food, 
including rice, salt, and sugar, after which they were left to make their way home. The 
Java Volunteer Army had ended not with a bang, not even with a whimper.
In early 1942, the people of Java largely accepted, and had long since 
accommodated themselves to, Dutch rule. Now, three-and-a-half years later, they had 
no time for it at all. An old world had been turned on its head. There were many 
reasons for this, but they all came back to the fact that the mystique of Dutch power 
had been irrevocably shattered. In March 1942, Indonesians had seen the Dutch on Java 
surrender to an Asian power after a land campaign lasting only eight days. They had 
then looked on as the Japanese went out of their way to humiliate and mistreat 
Europeans. During the Japanese occupation, many Indonesians had moved up the 
bureaucratic ladder to occupy places once largely reserved for Europeans. Others had 
been trained in armed bodies or been mobilized in Japanese-created youth groups. All 
had been subjected to unremitting Japanese propaganda, which was virulently anti- 
American, anti-British, and anti-Dutch. Japanese promises of independence had 
whetted the Indonesian desire for self-rule. Japanese abuses had sharpened Indonesian 
anger and a determination to go it alone. Now, the Indonesians found themselves in a 
political vacuum with the Japanese defeated and the Dutch yet to return. Indonesian 
leaders, both political and military, were more than willing to fill the void. The Dutch, 
meanwhile, labored under the delusion that nothing had really changed in the East 
Indies. The Dutch in the Netherlands had endured five years of German occupation, 
during which there had been virtually no news from Java. The Dutch on Java, 
languishing in POW and civilian internment camps, were almost equally ignorant 
about events that were taking place beyond the barbed wire. Nor did Dutch 
servicemen in Australia know very much more; each time they had sent agents to Java, 
the Javanese had betrayed them to the Japanese, which should itself have told them 
something.
"The Peta Made Him"
The people of Java had suffered dreadful privations during the Japanese 
occupation. Soeharto, a born survivor, had had rather a good war. He had served in 
two armies, first on one side, then on the other. He had been well-fed, well-dressed, 
and well-paid. And although he was yet to fire a shot in anger, his career was coming
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along nicely. The Dutch had pushed him through their pre-war NCO-training 
programs as they prepared to face a Japanese onslaught. The Japanese had pushed him 
through their wartime officer-training programs as they prepared to face an Allied 
onslaught. Now, with the Japanese beginning to withdraw, dejected and apprehensive, 
to their camps and cantonments, and the Dutch yet to return, Soeharto was poised to 
play his part in the struggle that would secure Indonesia's independence.
In mid-August 1945, Soeharto had a lot to be thankful for. As one of his Indonesian 
colleagues put it, "The Peta made him."460 During his twenty-two months in the Peta, 
Soeharto had gained a great deal of invaluable experience. He had been sent on an 
abbreviated but rigorous platoon commander's course under tough and experienced 
Japanese NCOs, many of them veterans of the war in China. He had created and 
trained a forty-four-man platoon (shodan) and led it for four months. He had qualified 
as the leader of a 132-man company (chudan), with a rank equivalent to captain. He had 
served in a series of important training and administrative positions. It had, in short, 
been a time of rare and unexpected opportunity, allowing him to build on all he had 
learned in the KNIL. In August 1945, Soeharto had more military training by far, and 
more military experience, than perhaps 98 percent of his fellow Peta officers, the men 
who would form the backbone of a new Indonesian army.
For the moment, it is true, Soeharto was just another ex-Peta officer, one of about 
2,150 such men demobilized and disarmed by the Japanese.461 His prospects did not 
seem especially bright. In the small world of the Indonesian elite, Soeharto was very 
much an outsider, socially and educationally. He was unknown outside the Peta—and 
not especially well-known within the Peta, given the Japanese practice of allowing 
minimal lateral contact among Peta units. Nor did he have any connections with the 
nationalist movement. Indeed, he would have been regarded with skepticism by many 
nationalist leaders, partly on account of his service in the KNIL, partly on account of 
his uncritical support for what some of them saw as Japanese fascism. But in the fluid 
and dangerous world of post-surrender Java, Soeharto held some important cards. He 
had ability, training, experience, judgement, and determination, as well as a wide 
range of contacts among young men from Yogyakarta who had been trained to fight.
460 Interview, Purbo Suwondo, Jakarta, April 14,1998.
461 The number of Peta officers is derived from figures given in the Yanagawa "Statement," Part I, pp. 6-7; 
Part II, pp. 3-6, and 8; Part III, pp. 1-2.
